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
# 5th SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE)

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## 1st SPECIAL FORCES

AD391693

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AUG 12 1968

✓  
QUARTERLY  
✓ COMMAND REPORT  
FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 DECEMBER 1968

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⑥ Lessons Learned, HEADQUARTERS,  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP, AIRBORNE [U]. ⑧

⑨ for period  
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
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HEADQUARTERS  
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APO US Forces 96240

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Reports Control CSG-28 (R1)

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United States Army, Vietnam  
APO San Francisco 96307

THRU: Commanding General  
U.S. Army Ryukus Island, Okinawa  
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Section I. Significant Organization or Unit Activities.

1. General:

During the reporting period, several highly significant events occurred. These ranged in scope from the much publicized PAVN attack on Plei Me to the less publicized but equally significant actions in II Corps at Vinh Thanh and the increase in activities against the VC in IV Corps. The significance of Plei Me went far beyond the scope of the CIDG program in that it gave the U.S. combat units a concrete opportunity to coordinate their efforts in the all-out campaign against the VC. This operation utilized forces and weaponry which encompassed the entire counter-insurgency spectrum from the simple Montagnard CIDG striker to the sophisticated B-52 in a direct support role. US Army, Navy and Air Force units together with their Vietnamese comrades in arms worked in harmony to decisively defeat the Viet Cong in this historic battle.

a. The attack on Camp Plei Me was well planned and the PAVN forces fought with unusual tenacity and great courage. In a matter of hours Plei Me became the concern of commanders at all echelons. The 5th Group Commander immediately dispatched two Airborne/Ranger companies from Project Delta as

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the initial reinforcing element. The supporting Air Commando Squadron commenced emergency resupply by airdrop while TAC air pinned down the VC and turned night into day by continuously dropping flares. The Air Force and the airborne rangers saved the camp. During the later stages of the battle the 1st Cav elements assumed the initiative in a joint effort to pursue and defeat the VC. Project Delta working with the 1st Cav, provided reconnaissance teams to determine the VC withdrawal routes and assembly areas, while the CIDG camps at Duc Co and Plei Me provided base areas and local security forces. B-52 strikes were used in a direct support role for the first time, while the 1st Cav units relentlessly pursued the VC/PAVN to the Cambodian border. The Plei Me campaign became the focal point in the integrated war effort. Since Plei Me, the camps at Plei Djereng, Plei Mrong and Khe Sanh have had patterns of events and PAVN build-ups similar to those preceding Plei Me. However, because of the cooperation established at Plei Me, ARVN and US reaction forces have reinforced and conducted joint operations before the VC were completely established. B-52 strikes have been called in before the camps have been attacked. Detailed contingency planning has been developed to cope with the situation before it became serious. These were the results of lessons learned during the battle of Plei Me. (Incl 1).

b. The increased buildup of Free World Armed Forces in Vietnam has continued to benefit the CIDG program as pointed out in the report for the third quarter. Both FWAF and CIDG forces have found joint operations mutually beneficial. The resettlement of Vinh Thanh valley (Happy Valley), Binh Dinh Province, is an outstanding example of the complementary efforts of FWAF and CIDG and serves as a model for use in other areas. The VC had forced refugees out of the valley on to the coastal plain and occupied the area with elements of the 2nd VC Regt and the 95th PAVN Regt. Early in October the 1st Cav Division conducted operations in the valley to clear out the VC. In the meantime, CIDG forces were being recruited, equipped and trained at Binh Khe to move into the valley to secure it. Once the valley had been cleared, the CIDG force moved to the Vinh Thanh camp site. Artillery support was provided by the 1st Cav as well as engineer support to assist in camp construction. The CIDG force, once established, have kept the area secure and have expanded their control to the point where 6,500 of the original 10,000 inhabitants are back in the valley under government control. (Incl 2).

c. There has been a significant increase in activity along the border area of IV Corps, particularly in Kien Tuong Province, where there have been more than a hundred contacts with VC. The CIDG camps have conducted attacks into VC controlled areas that had not previously been invaded by government forces. Losses to the VC in both personnel and supplies were heavy while CIDG losses have been light. Camp Cai Cai attacked a VC safe area on 11 October killing 28 VC and capturing 3, including one PAVN officer. (Incl 3). Camp Tuyen Nhon conducted three major attacks against previously unhampered VC bases capturing or destroying over fifteen tons of munitions, machinery and medicine vital to the support of VC operations. (Incl 4). The camps at Moc Hoa and Tuyen Nhon conducted a joint attack on a VC base area



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on 31 December, killing fifteen VC and destroying a munitions factory, printing shop and medical laboratory stocked with free world and communist bloc medicines and chemicals. These actions have reduced the Viet Cong control of the people in the area, as well as inflicting losses in both men and material. The VC have retaliated by attacking seven company-size Forward Operating Bases (FOB's), overrunning three of them. Despite numerous VC retaliations, the CIDG in this area have been able to maintain an impressive kill ratio of eight to one in addition to the sixty-five weapons, five factories, three training schools, 167 houses and 159 sampans captured or destroyed.

d. The number of Vietnamese advised by the 5th Special Forces Group has tripled during the year to nearly 60,000 fighting men. Much of this was brought about by the assumption of the Sector/Subsector advisory role which was non-existent in January and now involves more than 50% of our teams. During the year there has been an increase of twenty-nine camp locations with another eighteen projected for the last half of FY 66. The budget for the FY 66 expansion and FY 67 have already been programmed and approved. (Incl 5, 6, 7).

e. Briefings were conducted for several visiting dignitaries including Secretary of the Army Stanley R. Resor, General Earl Wheeler, Gen Harold K. Johnson and Senator Edward M. Kennedy. These briefings contributed materially to the overall understanding of the Special Forces role in the counterinsurgency environment. Gen Johnson indicated that the briefing was most encouraging in that USASF effort was being successfully integrated with those of the U.S. combat forces. (Incl 8 and 9).

## 2. Intelligence.

a. The emphasis placed on intelligence collection during the previous quarter has increased both the quantity and the quality of information received. The opening of four new camps affords the opportunity to establish intelligence nets in areas where previously no information existed on enemy activities. Thirty-two demolition specialists attended an intelligence school conducted during October. This forty-hour course, designed to retrain the demolition specialist as an assistant intelligence sergeant, will materially increase the collection effort at the "A" detachment level.

b. A S-2 conference was held in Saigon during December. The primary purpose was to discuss the forthcoming IG inspection and coordinate collection efforts. The arrival and intended employment of SMIAT agent handlers was also discussed.

c. Plans were finalized with SMIAT regarding the arrival and employment of trained agent handlers. These agent handlers will be utilized at selected "A" detachment sites where intelligence nets are already operational but can be improved and expanded. Initially six sites have been selected as "hot" areas. It is expected that the SMIAT Handlers will greatly increase our intelligence capability.

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d. The S-2 Bi-monthly intelligence conference attended by a representative from all intelligence agencies in the Nha Trang area is proving highly successful. The conference gives all agencies an up-to-date picture of current trends and collection efforts. Coordination and cooperation between units has greatly improved.

e. Counter-intelligence nets within the camps are becoming more effective. Camps continue to apprehend infiltrators.

f. Long range patrols operating out of Camp Khe Sanh, I CTZ, confirm the infiltration of VC units from Laos. Patrols have observed numerous elephant tracks believed to be the means of transporting heavy mortars and equipment.

g. Three examples which reflect the increased intelligence collection effort are as follows:

(1) Following the seige of Duc Co, which encompassed a period of forty-eight days, a medical patrol was informed of the location of the grave of an American pilot shot down during the seige. The informat offered to lead a patrol to the site which subsequently recovered the body of a US Army Pilot.

(2) Increased U.S. unit use of USASF intelligence assets in ground operations. (Incl 10).

(3) A patrol operating out of Camp Khe Sanh (I CTZ) received a report that a PAVN unit was located between their location and Camp Khe Sanh. The patrol doubled back and engaged a superior PAVN force. The contact resulted in 32 PAVN KIA plus a considerable amount of ChiCom equipment captured. (Incl 11).

### 3. Operations and Training.

#### a. CIDG Program.

The CIDG program is continuing to prove its value as a stabilizing force in the complex war effort in Vietnam. It has proven to be a dollar-saving economy of force measure designed to control rural population in addition to the assigned offensive missions (Incl 12). USASF detachments are advising over 60,000 Vietnamese troops utilizing only 1600 Americans. This is the equivalent of more than three U.S. combat divisions. Throughout the year the kill ratio of known VC KIA to U.S. KIA has been 76:1. Despite the introduction of PAVN forces the VC/CIDG kill ratio has remained 4:1 for the calendar year. With the expansion of the war, more areas are being released from VC domination. The CIDG program, with its flexible funding system and outstanding logistical support, is ideally suited to fill the

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vacuum created by the purely military FWAFF and PAVN forces once they depart the battlefield (Incl 13). To assist in the stability tasks being assumed, the C, B and A detachments have been augmented with Civil Affairs, Psychological operations, intelligence specialists and communicators. (Incl 14). The additional personnel have given the program the flexibility necessary to coordinate with other agencies and conduct joint operations in all Corps areas.

b. Significant CIDG Actions.

(1) The four most significant operations have been mentioned previously: Plei Me, Vinh Thanh, Tuyen Nhon and Cai Cai operations. Others worthy of mention are the progress of the Australian/American team at Tra Bong, I Corps (Incl 15); the series of successful operations at Buon Ea Yang in II Corps (Incl 16); and the use of a joint operation in III CTZ to conduct the bomb damage assessment after a B-52 strike (Incl 17).

(2) One other short operation was significant. On 5 December a long range reconnaissance patrol from Dak Pek camp was heli-lifted to a point along the Laotian-Vietnamese border. The patrol was composed of 2 USASF, 2 VNSF, and 3 CIDG. For five days they patrolled a zone parallel to the border in areas previously unmolested by government forces. During this time they uncovered and mapped a dirt road completely camouflaged by tree canopy and jungle growth. The road was being used by the VC to infiltrate men and supplies on elephants and in wagons. Later they reconnoitered a VC way station which was designed to accommodate two rifle companies. Operations of this type will be of increasing significance now that air support and combat reaction forces are available to destroy the targets once the location is fixed.

c. Increases and Gains.

(1) Since 1 October four new camps have been opened, two closed and one turned over to a MACV Subsector team. On 10 October a TDY detachment from Okinawa established a subsector headquarters at Ap Bac, Kien Tuong Province, in IV Corps. Initially members of the detachment worked with the District Chief and his Regional and Popular Forces while the area assessment was being conducted. They have now recruited and trained the CIDG force and are constructing the CIDG camp eleven kilometers west of the district town. The second camp to open was Vinh Thanh which has been previously discussed (Incl 2). The third new camp is at Tien Phuoc, Quang Tin Province, I Corps. This camp was opened in much the same manner as Ap Bac, with a co-equal CIDG/Subsector mission (Incl 18). The last new location is Xuan Loc, Long Khanh Province. The B detachment moved from Phuoc Vinh because the area no longer required CIDG security after the 3rd Bde, 1st U.S. Infantry Division, occupied the town. In the new location the B team has the co-equal



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CIDG/Sector advisor mission. The camps that closed were Binh Khe on 15 October, and Phuoc Vinh on 20 December. Hoi An, Binh Dinh Province, II Corps, was converted to a MACV subsector team on 14 December.

(2) The CIDG program has continued to increase in strength during the last quarter. The total number of CIDG companies has increased from 183 at the end of last quarter to 215 at present. This represents a substantial increase in troop strength throughout the year from 19,000 in January, to 26,000 at the end of September and up to 30,400 at the end of the year. This troop strength is spread over the entire country at seventy-eight separate locations.

d. CIDG Losses.

There have been no significant CIDG losses during the quarter. Even with the attack on Plei Ke and the seven attacks on FOB's in IV Corps, the losses have been light, totalling in these actions 52 CIDG KIA, 113 CIDG WIA, 20 CIDG MIA as opposed to 225 VC confirmed KIA. This represents an extremely fine showing for the CIDG, since these actions were all large scale VC attacks.

e. Joint FWAF/CIDG Operations.

With the expansion of Free World Armed Forces deployed in Vietnam it is becoming increasingly evident that FWAF and CIDG are ideally suited to complement each other in their common effort to defeat the Viet Cong and restore control to the central Saigon government. The FWAF have a hard hitting, fast moving, capability and sophisticated weaponry to deal a heavy blow to the Viet Cong overt militant power. However, they lack the ability to ferret out the VC infrastructure that controls the people in rural Vietnam. Also they are not suited for stability type operations; those which take a long period of time to reconstruct the government organization at the hamlet, village, and district level. These last two missions are suited to the CIDG program which in turn lacks the fire support, training and inherent leadership to conduct large scale military operations. Thus the two forces, at opposite ends of the counterinsurgency spectrum, are able to complement each other's efforts.

FWAF commanders and US advisors are realizing the benefits of employing these forces together, and continuing use is made of CIDG assets to assist the FWAF. Examples were pointed out in the last quarterly report where CIDG were used as Guides, Interpreters, Scout/Trackers and Captive Interrogators. To date, this assistance has increased to include the following additional tasks:

(1) Assisting Advance parties. This has been done at An Khe with the 1st Cav division headquarters and at Phuoc Vinh with the 3d Brigade of the 1st Inf division. Assistance has taken the form of CIDG security forces,

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intelligence and OB files, and use of physical facilities existing in the area.

(2) Temporary Staging and Base Areas. During operations in areas of CIDG camps, numerous FWAf units have used the CIDG camps as headquarters, resupply areas, and staging areas. Examples are the USMC force reconnaissance teams that stage out of Bato in I CTZ, the ROK marines that use Dien Khanh camp in II CTZ and the 1st Cav that used Duc Co during the pursuit of the VC to the Ia Drang Valley - Chu Pong mountain area.

(3) Intelligence of Local Areas. Information from their files can be provided by USASF camps to assist in planning operations. EEI can be given to them for long range planning, or subsequent to operations, CIDG forces can provide assessments as to damage to the VC organization and impact on the local population, such as the Xom Cat Area Assessment (Incl 19).

(4) Area Indoctrination. There are numerous examples of how the local CIDG and the USASF advisor can assist in indoctrinating newly arrived FWAf, either by small unit or on a cadre basis. Basic survival dangers of the area, VC booby traps and techniques peculiar to an area, Vietnamese habits, traditions and customs, terrain orientations and climatology are but a few examples.

(5) Joint Patrols and Operations. CIDG and USASF can be cross attached on joint operations or CIDG forces can perform missions such as a blocking force, security element or flank security for FWAf operations. An example is the USMC battalion size operation in I CTZ on 1 November. The marine battalion acted as the driving force while the CIDG blocked at the eastern end of the Tra Bong valley.

(6) Delta Reconnaissance. Project Delta reconnaissance teams have been used in support of B-52 strikes, the 1st Cav Division after Plei Me, the 1st Inf Division in the Michelin Rubber Plantation and Operation New Life with the 173d in Binh Tuy Province. This use is presently being expanded because of the successes already achieved.

f. Co-equal Sector/Subsector Role. This mission maximizes the goal of an integrated effort on the part of the Vietnamese to coordinate and co-operate with their separate forces and agencies in getting on with the war. The USASF advisor, who wears two hats, plays the greatest role in integrating the Vietnamese efforts in all aspects of the counterinsurgency effort. The military operational effort is coordinated between CIDG, Regional Force, Popular Force, ARVN, National Police, the Navy and the VNAF. The intelligence collection pools the assets of agent nets, National Police, MSS, Customs Officials and civilians in the Sector Operations Intelligence Center. The CIDG CA/PO program is integrated into the rural reconstruction program of USOM. In addition, US advisors are available for RF/PF as well

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CIDG training and operations. Chau Doc in IV CTZ is an excellent example of the value of this integrated approach. (Incl 20). The sector/subsector role is working well at the sector level in all B teams of III and IV Corps, and in the A teams of all four Corps areas.

The subsector advisors job is particularly important because he assists in maintaining a representative of the central government at the village and district level. It is important for the people in rural areas to be able to associate themselves with the central government in Saigon through local officials. The subsector advisor is the man who has the most influence over this most vital link, the District Chief. USASF in the co-equal subsector advisor and CIDG roles are well suited to add strength to the position of the District Chief and assist him in coordinated efforts in his district. Through joint RF/PF and CIDG operations, areas are more effectively cleared and secured. Integration of medical, civic action and psychological activities are better oriented towards a common goal through the efforts of a single advisor team. The USASF advisor has the basic skills necessary within his team and has the flexibility of the CIDG program to assist him in his mission.

Presently there are 35 A detachments in the subsector role and 6 B detachments in the sector role. With the current expansion through the end of the fiscal year there will be a total of 54 sector or subsector teams, which is approximately 60 percent of the deployed detachments. This represents a significant increase from the two A detachments that were involved on a test basis only eight months ago.

g. Mike Force.

(1) The Mike Force is the multi-purpose reaction force at each C detachment headquarters and at Nha Trang used to reinforce or relieve camps under stress (Incl 21). There are five Mike Force battalions organized into a headquarters and three companies each. The TOE has been finalized and each C detachment is presently recruiting up to its authorized 590 men. Each Mike force will have a USASF A detachment assigned. At present the forces are organized at Bien Hoa and Nha Trang. Danang and Pleiku have companies that are organized, trained and have operated successfully; however, they have not been filled up to their maximum strength. The IV Corps Mike Force at Can Tho has just recently been approved by the IV CTZ commander and is in the infant stages of development.

h. Project Delta.

During the period Project Delta has greatly expanded the scope of its operations to include reinforcing the besieged Plei Me camp and extensive operations with U.S. combat forces. To cope with the need for an increased operational capability, the project has increased its strength

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the Liberation of the Oppressed Race (FULRO) threatened to create unrest in three CIDG camps at Loc Thien, Plei Djereng and Mai Linh. In each case agents for FULRO went to the camps in order to foment rebellion, however contrary to past uprisings, no CIDG camps were actively involved in this attempt. (Incl 24).

#### 4. Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations.

a. Civic Action and Psychological Operations have made significant strides during the reporting period. This increase resulted from the impetus provided by strong command support, expansion of Psy Ops support, and the assignment of additional personnel with CA/Psy Ops as their primary duty. An aggressive CA/Psy Ops campaign was launched at each level of command. Integration of CA/Psy Ops into all aspects of USASF operations has been stressed through staff visits, commander's conferences, and briefings, resulting in an increased awareness and appreciation of the most important aspect of our operations - that of building confidence in the government of Vietnam and assisting the Vietnamese people in achieving a stable self-sufficient nation.

b. At the end of the quarter, 622 CA projects had been initiated, 612 completed, and 161 were still in progress. Although this accounts for approximately 50% of the civic action projects conducted by all USARV units, the number of projects is not the most important aspect of the USASF CA Program. The significant factor, especially in the sub-sector role, is the approach employed Special Forces. Local RVN officials, VNSF, and CIDG are utilized to plan and implement the civic action program. This method of operation has been the "Key" to improving the effectiveness of RVN officials and organizations, and convincing the people that the RVN government is concerned about their welfare.

c. The most successful counterinsurgency effort in II Corps was conducted by Camp Duc Co. In August, Duc Co was under seige by the Viet Cong. Many civilians were forced to move out of the area, and the remaining civilians were under control of the Viet Cong. During November and December, Duc Co conducted an extensive program consisting of civic action, psy ops, intelligence, and military operations. This integrated effort resulted in 2,300 civilians being resettled from VC controlled areas to RVN control, and 139 VC surrendering through the Chieu Hoi appeal. Today Camp Duc Co, the only representative of the RVN government in the area, influences and controls more than 6,000 civilians. The method of operation and techniques employed in the Duc Co area illustrate one of the significant roles that Special Forces plays in this type warfare (Incl 25 & 27).

d. During the past three months over 21,000 refugees moved into "A" detachment operational areas. Special Forces personnel and local RVN

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to seventy-three U.S. personnel. Four US reconnaissance teams have been organized in addition to the twelve Vietnamese-American teams. The two Airborne/Ranger companies used to reinforce CIDG camps at Cai Cai and Dak Pek returned in October to be committed in support of Delta Project operations. All elements were given intense training in the Nha Trang area to prepare for future commitments. Delta type reconnaissance has proven so fruitful that U.S. units are sending specially selected volunteers to be trained by Delta teams. The 1st Infantry Division elements have already begun training. Two USAF FAC teams have been attached to the project on a test basis to improve the coordination with close air support elements. A US Army airlift platoon has been placed under operational control of the project so that the pilots may develop the required skill levels needed to support operations of this nature. Delta type operations will be of increased significance now that US combat forces can be brought to bear on the targets uncovered by their reconnaissance. (Incl 22).

i. Training.

(1) With the expanded war effort and resultant expansion of the CIDG program the need for properly trained troops has taken on new meaning. Each camp is now prepared to utilize their combat reconnaissance team in support of joint U.S. combat forces operations. To meet the demands for proficiency, renewed emphasis has been placed on the training conducted at the Vietnamese Special Forces Training Center at Dong Ba Thin, in addition to the decentralized training conducted at each camp. All training conducted at the training center has now been centralized under the staff and faculty of the school which is advised by USASF detachment B-51. The CIDG leadership course and Combat Reconnaissance Platoon training are now being conducted by better qualified Vietnamese instructors. The instructors themselves are being programmed for instructor training to increase their proficiency.

(2) The graduation rate during the final quarter was approximately sixty-five percent of the total attending the school. Those who did not graduate received a certificate of attendance. The largest group of personnel who did not attain a score high enough to graduate were in the CIDG leaders course. The graduation rate in that course was about fifty percent. Of the 692 students in all four courses during the final period there were 437 who received a diploma. This brings the yearly total attendance to 2,869 with 1,805 graduating. (Incl 23).

(3) Decentralized training at the A detachment camps has been stepped up to prepare for the expansion. During the reporting period over 8,000 CIDG soldiers completed training. Major emphasis is being placed on small unit actions, scouting and patrolling, and intelligence reporting.

j. FULRO.

During the period 17 through 20 December, the United Front for

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officials have developed, and frequently implemented, plans to indoctrinate, process, and provide food and shelter for these refugees. This is a rapid, well organized operation designed to gain support of the refugees and enable them to become self-sufficient (Incl 30). During December refugees moved into the vicinity of Camp An Lac. Well planned civic action projects and propaganda themes were initiated to convince the refugees local RVN officials were concerned with their welfare. As a result, the refugees provided information which enabled a CIDG patrol, guided by a refugee, to capture a cache of weapons, 40,000 pounds of rice, several Viet Cong documents, and kill four Viet Cong.

e. CA/Psy Ops/Med patrols continue to be a major means of gaining civilian support and extending the control of RVN into rural areas. Special Forces medical personnel and Special Forces trained Village Health Workers treated 76,632 civilians at local dispensaries and on medical patrols.

f. During this quarter, Special Forces has seen the impact a CIDG organization has on the conduct of CA/Psy Ops activities in village and hamlets and during military operations; therefore, Special Forces has initiated a program to organize and train CA/Psy Ops squads in each "A" detachment camp. In support of this, during the month of December 52 Montagnards completed a ten-week course of instruction and 42 started a new course at the Montagnard Training Center at Pleiku. The course consists of practical training in motivation indoctrination, field expedient printing, loudspeaker broadcasts, agriculture, animal husbandry, carpentry, masonry, and blacksmithing. These CIDG personnel return to their camps and become cadre for CA/PO squads. The employment of this organization at Camps Plei Do Lim, Plei Mrong, and An Lac indicates the success of this type unit, and marks a major advancement in Special Forces CA/Psy Ops activities (Incl 29).

g. One of the major improvements in psychological operations this quarter has been the great increase of psy ops support. Propaganda Support Centers have been organized in I, II, and III CTZ's. The mobile printing facilities of U.S. Army psywar detachments have reduced the response time for large quantity production of leaflets from three weeks to only 36 hours. The 5th Air Commando Squadron (Psy Ops) now has twenty (20) U-10 and five (5) C-47 aircraft strategically located in all four CTZ's. This additional support has enabled the Special Forces operational detachments to conduct more effective psychological operations. Printed matter and leaflet production have improved in quality and quantity. Over two million leaflets and more than 150,000 publications, such as bulletins, magazines and local newspapers were distributed this quarter by Special Forces Psychological Operations personnel. The effectiveness of these efforts is indicated by the movement of 21,444 refugees into "A" detachment operational areas.

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h. An intensive psychological operations effort in support of the besieged Plei Me Special Forces Camp and the subsequent tactical operations is outlined in Inclosure 26. This after-action report emphasizes the importance of contingency planning, coordination of effort, and the availability of psy ops aircraft; and also points out some of the problem areas encountered. One of the most important results of this psychological operation was the lessons learned by the U.S. Army and RVN psychological operators, especially the requirement for close coordination and knowledge of each others capabilities and limitations.

i. The rally conducted at Nhon Hoa after an attempted VC attack is an example of the decentralized psychological operations program. The quick response by the Special Forces and Vietnamese CA/Psy Ops personnel in capitalizing on Viet Cong disregard for the people is an example of turning psychological operations into an aggressive weapon against the Viet Cong (Incl 28).

j. This quarter there has been a great increase in personnel assigned to CA/Psy Ops positions. All "A" detachments in Phase III, development, now have personnel assigned with CA/Psy Ops as a primary duty. All CA and Psy Ops staff officers are school trained. None of the 42 NCO's who arrived this quarter, however, had been school trained in CA or Psy Ops. To offset this lack of training, a four-day course of instruction will be conducted during 25-29 January. This course will stress the practical "Nuts and Bolts" of Civic Action and Psychological Operations at the district and hamlet level.

k. The CIDG Motivation Team was expanded in November from 20 cadre to 40 cadre, thereby doubling its training capability. Organized into eight five-man units, it is now capable of training 560 men per month. During this quarter a total of 1,053 CIDG and PF soldiers received this intensive motivational training. As a method of winning the support of the population, local officials also received this highly effective training which is designed to arouse nationalism and anti-communist motivation. Plans are being made to incorporate motivational training into other training programs conducted by USASF and VNSF. Inclosure 31 is a summary of this quarter's accomplishments and a translated letter of appreciation from An Phu District officials.

##### 5. Personnel and Administrative Activities.

a. Personnel requisitions are presently being prepared to support the Troop Unit Change Request of 6 November 1965. (Incl 34). This TUCR was submitted to USARV on 4 December 1965, was approved and has been forwarded to COMUSMACV. The TUCR of 6 November 1965 represents an increase in strength of eight-eight personnel. The TUCR was submitted to support the expansion of the operational mission of the Studies and Operations Group

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(Saigon). This group will be supported by the 5th in all administrative personnel actions. The TUCR of 24 August 1965 was approved by USARPAC GO 327 dated 24 November 1965. The group is presently beginning to realize an influx of personnel; this is the beginning of the fill action to support increases approved by USARPAC GO 327 dated 24 November 1965. Complete fill action will not be realized until June 1966. Approximately eighty percent of the requisition submitted to support this increase will be filled by team packets provided by the 7th SFGA, Fort Bragg, N.C. The remainder will be filled by individual replacements.

b. The second quarter of FY 66 saw the rotation of eighty-three percent of the Headquarters and Signal Companies. To provide some overlap and continuity, rotation dates of this group were staggered in thirty day increments. Inclosure 32 shows the attrition rate for the year 1965. These figures are valid and most likely will increase in 1966 due to the expansion of the war and future anticipated missions. Attrition has steadily increased and is presently at a rate of five percent for the calendar year.

c. Plans are presently being developed to institute an incountry rotation plan to readjust the packet teams coming from CONUS. By using the entire spectrum of Special Forces activities in Vietnam as a base, this should present no major problem.

d. USARPAC GO 327 dated 24 November 1965 increases the strength of the Group to 1902 total: 407 Officers and Warrant Officers, and 1495 enlisted men. The TUCR of 6 November 1965 increases the Group strength to 1990. Eighty-six of this eighty-eight represents the SOG support indicated above.

e. Personnel shortages still exist in communications and administration MOS's. Although these technical skill shortages have not affected the operational ability of the group to date, they could very well impede the expansion plans of the future. The following MOS shortages are considered critical:

- (1) 05C RTT Opr
- (2) 26P Rad WV Prop Sp
- (3) 31J RTT Repmn
- (4) 43E Prcht Rigger
- (5) 71B Clerk Typist
- (6) 96B Intel Anal

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f. Command guidance published during the quarter is included as inclosure 33.

6. Logistical Activities.

a. General: The Logistical Support Center in Nha Trang continued providing overall logistical support to both the USASF and CIDG personnel located in the various camps throughout the Republic of Vietnam. An internal reorganization of certain key supervisory positions and an almost complete turnover of US personnel occurred during the quarter.

b. Air Movements: During the reporting period approximately twenty-three million pounds of supplies and equipment were delivered by air from the Logistical Support Center to the operational detachments in the field utilizing both Army and Air Force aircraft. Approval was obtained for an additional four CV-2 Caribous which will greatly assist in the movement of supplies in support of the proposed buildup. These additional aircraft will possibly "open the door" to a decentralized system of supply distribution in order to provide closer support to the A and B detachments. Continued maximum effective use of available aircraft in Nha Trang has greatly contributed to the efficiency of the logistical support to the point where no appreciable backlog exists at LSC.

c. Supply: The major effort for the supply branch of the Logistical Support Center, responsible for the receipt, storage and issue of the supplies, has been in making preparations for the forthcoming buildup. Sufficient supplies for the initial phase of the buildup are on hand; however, it has become increasingly difficult to maintain necessary stockage levels during the last quarter because of the shortage of LST's and the lack of adequate facilities for off-loading deep draft vessels in the port of Nha Trang. The quick responsiveness and flexibility of the supply system was illustrated during October. During the siege of Plei Me over 310,000 pounds of supplies were airdropped into this small camp in a three day period with less than a 3% loss.

d. Maintenance: The maintenance effort is largely accomplished by Phillipinos from the Eastern Construction Company, Inc., on contract to perform higher echelon Ordnance, Signal, Quartermaster and Engineer maintenance at the Logistical Support Center and down to the C detachment level. Present plans call for an expansion of the contract in order to provide maintenance technicians down to the B detachment. The major problem in maintenance has been the lack of repair parts for bulldozers, generators, mechanical handling equipment and certain vehicles.

e. Construction: The Logistical Support Center is responsible for staff supervision of the entire construction effort in-country and for the procurement of class IV materials at the lowest cost for distribution to the

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various camps. The major problems in this area have been the non-availability of engineer support and the rising costs of materials.

#### 7. Aircraft Support.

General: The aircraft supporting the 5th SFGA are three classes: command and control, cargo and special mission. An increase in personnel strength of the Group and changes in certain missions have resulted in changing aviation requirements.

##### a. Command and Control Aircraft:

(1) One of the Group's major problem areas has been and continues to be a lack of Army aircraft to enable commanders and staff personnel to inspect and advise their counterparts in the Special Forces camps. With some 62 "A" detachments, 11 "B" detachments and 4 "C" detachments spread geographically from the northern border of South Vietnam all the way to Phu Quoc Island off the southern coast, the need for air travel is apparent. Additionally, there is a continuing requirement for emergency resupply of small weight and bulk items which do not justify the use of a larger CV-2B or C-123. To meet all of the above missions the Group is allocated 3 U-1A (Otter) aircraft. Within each Corps, the senior Corps advisor is allocated certain Army aircraft to be utilized in support of all Corps missions. Unfortunately, tactical priorities, determined by the Corps Advisor, normally result in inadequate support for Special Forces. As an example, the Group Civil Affairs Officer who is responsible for the initiating, conduct, and constant supervision of SF civil affairs projects throughout the country has been able to make only 12 visits to A camps during the last 6 months. Aircraft are needed.

(2) By June 1966, the 5th SFGA will advise and control some 80,000 troops or the equivalent of a US Army Corps of 4-5 divisions. By US standards of one aviation battalion per division adequate support of this 80,000 would call for 5 aviation battalions. By proper utilization one company of aviation, pre-dominantly helicopter (UH-1), could enable the 5th SFGA to meet all foreseeable requirements. The present lack of aviation support is critical. An airmobile company of 25 UH-1D helicopters would solve the problems.

##### b. Cargo Aircraft:

(1) Currently the Group is supported on a daily basis by 3 CV-2B (Caribou) and 3 C-123 aircraft provided by the Air Force. In addition Air Force C-130 aircraft are available on a mission request basis. The above described airlift support enables the Group to move approximately 140,000 pounds of cargo daily. This amounts to 4-5,000,000 pounds each month. During periods of emergency such as Plei Me, during the recent quarter,

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additional aircraft support is provided temporarily through MACV.

(2) The approximate 30% increase in the number of Special Forces camps in Vietnam during the next 6 months period Jan - Jun 1966 will result in a requirement for additional cargo aircraft support. There are two aspects to the new airlift requirement. First, to initially establish each new "A" detachment some 275,000 pounds of airlifted cargo are required. Because new camps are usually established in a basically hostile area, it is important that the Group have the capability of introducing the needed supplies promptly. To delay may mean the loss of a camp. Second, after the camp is established it will require an average daily resupply of 18,000 pounds.

(3) To meet the increased demands described above the Group has requested that the Caribou support be increased from 3 to 11. In addition it is intended that greater utilization will be made of the Air Force C-130 aircraft which have the advantage of speed and increased payload over the C-123 and CV-2B. All "C" detachments (and some "B" detachments) are located near an airfield large enough to accommodate the C-130. The additional Caribou support will be utilized to shuttle cargo relatively short hauls. It is essential that these aircraft be in direct support (DS) of 5th SFGA and not in general support (GS) of each Corps advisor. The CV-2B would operate as follows: 2 from Danang, 6 from Nha Trang, 2 from Pleiku and 1 from Can Tho.

(4) If the aforementioned request is approved the buildup of Special Forces can be supported logistically.

(5) The new CV-7A (Buffalo) has been flying missions in support of 5th SFGA since Nov 65 as a part of a 90 day test program. The first Buffalo has been joined by the second one (1 Jan) and both are flying cargo to Special Forces camps. The aircraft has an outstanding capability that is particularly useful in a war such as that being conducted in Vietnam. As new camps are constructed it is exceedingly difficult for the personnel on the ground to construct an airfield of much greater length than 1000-1500 feet. Terrain and lack of construction material or equipment are the obstacles normally encountered. The Buffalo has demonstrated that it can consistently fly 10,000 pounds of cargo (Caribou hauls 5,000 pounds) into Caribou type airstrips. The C-123 hauls 10,000 pounds but is unable to operate from airstrips less than 1800 feet in length. The Buffalo has even operated from at least one airstrip that is considered too short for Caribou operation. The greater speed of the Buffalo (200 knots) enables one or two extra cargo hauls per day (C-123 and CV-2B cruise at 145-150 knots). Over a 30-day period the impact of the increase in daily shuttles is substantial in terms of cargo moved per available aircraft. Several Buffalo companies would do much to ease the growing aerial resupply requirements in Vietnam. The aircraft's only shortcoming is its inability to transport a 2½ ton truck because of cubic space limitations.

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c. Special Mission Aircraft: Effective 26 December 1965 the 5th SFGA was granted operational control of the 145th Airlift Platoon consisting of 10 (UH-1B) helicopters. The purpose of this platoon is to provide support for Delta Project missions. These aircraft are not available for other uses.

8. Medical.

a. Outline of Medical Activities:

(1) The Medical Airborne Rescue Team (MART), and Medical Airborne Team (MAST) were organized 20 Oct 65 in accordance with MACV Directive 40-3 dated 22 Jul 65 (Ref 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) Regulation 40-1). The MART is designed to provide emergency medical care in inaccessible areas. It includes 5 personnel, 1 officer and 4 EM, serving in medical, communications, and security capacities. The MAST is designed to render assistance in event heavy casualties are incurred by a Special Forces camp under attack. This second team consists of 1 doctor and 2 medical aidmen and was employed with considerable effectiveness during the action at Plei Me. Both teams will be comprised of personnel from the SFOB at Nha Trang.

(2) The SFOB Dispensary was enlarged, renovated, and more suitably equipped to meet the demands of an increased patient load and greater requirements for medical support. Concurrently, a fortified Emergency Medical Bunker was designated and equipped and an SOP for handling of casualties during hostile action was developed. At present the latter is the only activity of its kind in the Nha Trang area.

(3) Close coordination with LLDB High Command Surgeon and LLDB Medical Officer at the "C" detachment level has been maintained in the areas of medical support activities, medical supply, and related activities.

(4) Action has been initiated to improve the medical care rendered CIDG sick and wounded in II Corps and III Corps thru formal and informal arrangements with nearby US Military Medical Installations (8th Field Hospital at Nha Trang and 85th Evacuation Hospital at Qui Nhon) and Vietnamese Province Hospital at Bien Hoa which has a USOM Surgical Team.

(5) In order to more profitably sample information and data from Special Forces operational detachments which are actually or potentially in contact with representative areas of all RVN, the medical MOPSUM has been revised. This will provide a more meaningful system of collection, consolidation and dissemination of medical intelligence to all interested health agencies.

(6) MEDCAP Supply plan for expansion was prepared and forwarded to Surgeon, MACV. This plan was approved and has been implemented by the J4 Medical Division of MACV making MEDCAP supplies available to all "C" detachment locations, rather than only at the SFOB at Nha Trang. The result of

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this change is more effective medical civic action programs on the various operational levels.

b. Preventive Medicine Activities:

(1) Surgeon, 5th SFG (Abn) was named a member of the MACV-USOM Joint Preventive Medicine and Communicable Disease Control Committee and attended three monthly meetings in Saigon. Through this agency, epidemiological data from USASF detachments is disseminated to all military and civilian health agencies in Vietnam. The Committee designated the Surgeon's Office, 5th SFG (Abn) as the Central Epidemiological Reference Office CERO for II Corps and USOM Region II. Participation in this activity will also insure that Special Forces medical personnel are kept abreast of intelligence gained and developments made by other organizations.

(2) A Preventive Medicine Program for 5th SFG (Abn) has been initiated by Capt Edens, Preventive Medicine Officer. In actual application, emphasis has been placed on developing "field expedients" for maintenance of adequate hygiene and sanitation in those underdeveloped areas lacking conventional facilities and equipment. Accordingly, directives based specifically on in-country data have been prepared for instruction on water treatment, rodent and insect control, and food procurement and preparation.

(3) Utilizing information from "A" detachment medics, 5th SFG (Abn), this office investigated and assisted in handling of three plague outbreaks in I Corps and two plague outbreaks in II Corps. In each of these instances, a Medical Officer from the Surgeon's Office was dispatched to the immediate area to aid in evaluation and management. In each case efforts made were in cooperation with local Vietnamese health authorities. When necessary, nearby US units were briefed.

c. Current Activities:

(1) A program for in-country training of USASF medics with emphasis on tropical diseases, sanitation, and civic action operations and techniques has begun. TDY medical personnel from the 1st SFG (Abn) in Okinawa will enter RVN on 1 Feb 66 to implement this standardized POI in each CTZ. These POI's are being compiled by in-country doctors because of their intimate first hand knowledge of the problems involved.

(2) In coordination with Public Health Branch of USOM, a standardized POI for medical instruction of indigenous personnel is being established and disseminated for use by all USASF medics in their training programs. This will insure that all graduates meet GVN requirements for certification upon satisfactory completion of the course of instruction. Records of trained personnel are kept in order to insure credit for participation in the program and to prevent unqualified personnel from being given unwarranted responsibility.

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9. Signal.

a. Since 1 October 1965, the total traffic count within the group increased approximately 100%. The Communications complex at the SFOB handled a total of 1653 in October as compared to 3205 in December. This increase of traffic can be directly attributed to the expansion in number of operational detachments, the increase of both friendly and enemy tactical operations, and the improved radio teletype on-line network which is now completely operational down to and including B detachments. Although the amount of traffic has taken a drastic upward trend, the group communications personnel have been capable of providing reliable and responsive service.

b. The Group single side band (voice) and AM (CW) nets continue to augment the radio teletype network and have provided reliable means of communication for the Commander and Staff at all echelons. During the siege at Plei Me, the Group Commander was in instantaneous contact with the ground commander through the single side band phone system, which provided him with a minute-to-minute evaluation of the tactical situation. The CW net has been utilized to pass traffic pertaining to aerial resupply missions throughout the country and to function as an emergency net.

c. During the period 4-12 November this headquarters received a visitor from Office, Chief-Communications and Electronics, DA, Special Warfare Branch. The purpose of the visit was to discuss the utilization of the new radio base station AN/TSC-26 which the group will receive during the third quarter FY/66. A number of areas pertaining to the set were discussed, to include site selection, availability of NEI teams, PLL, and assignment of trained operator personnel.

d. The initial increment of 159 AN/PRC-64 radios programmed for this headquarters has arrived in country. At present, the radio is under extensive field test, conducted by Project Delta. Test results indicate that the radio is very reliable at ranges in excess of 50 kms, and has in certain areas provided reliable voice and CW communications at ranges from 0 to 20 kms. Lack of crystals at this time precludes issue of available sets; however, the crystals should arrive within the next 30 days and the radios will be issued to Project Delta and to the Recon Platoons at each operational detachment.

e. A number of improvements in communications operations have been implemented during the past three (3) months. The most noticeable improvements have been as follows:

(1) A base station complex has been installed for Project Delta which provides that unit with a reliable long distance, all country communications capability, with deployed Recon Teams. This base station (also tied to the group communications system) provides Delta with a readily available

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facility for relaying traffic to higher headquarters (Saigon) and for coordinating with other group subordinate headquarters.

(2) The SFOB Signal Complex has been modified to provide a semi-automatic relay capability. Traffic can now be relayed thru the tape relay facility between all stations in the Group RTT network, which has reduced handling time.

(3) Project Delta has devised a method of making antenna towers out of 500 lb bomb shipping racks. By bolting the racks together and, setting in a cement base, a very sturdy, forty (40) or fifty (50) foot tower can be erected for approximately \$25.00. The antenna set AB-105/V, 70 ft. costs approximately \$420.00; thus a considerable savings has been realized. It is now planned to have antenna kits (racks, bolts, nuts, guy wires) prepared for each detachment as required.

(4) The underground wire antenna, incased in plastic water hoses, has proven to be operationally reliable. This method of installation should be completed at the majority of A detachment sites within the next 90 days. The underground antenna is utilized as a alternate in the event direct enemy fire destroys those erected in the normally accepted manner.

f. Insufficient quantities of radio set, AN/PRC-25 is the main communications deficiency. Experience has proven that this particular set far exceeds the capabilities of the AN/PRC-10 and requires less maintenance. Requirements for the AN/PRC-25 have greatly increased due to the expansion of Project Delta, expansion of total number of operational detachments, and the need for a FM radio to provide extended voice communications for long range patrols. The 196 sets presently on due out to the Group are urgently required as mission essential.

#### 10. Future Plans.

a. Conversion to Regional Force. A goal of forty CIDG companies has been set for conversion to Regional Forces during calendar year 1966. The first step has been to change the TOE of the CIDG company from 150 to 132 men to coincide with the Regional Force TOE. The second step has been the selection of Camp An Phu as the test camp for conversion. At An Phu all five CIDG companies are expected to be converted. In future conversions, however entire camps will not necessarily be converted. One or two companies at a time will be transferred intact with their present organization, rank structure and leaders, to the Regional Forces. They will remain in their home district or province and will continue to have the same USASF advisors and be doing essentially the same job. The anticipated problem area is the support available to them from the MAP program. It is felt that the conversion of a company basis rather than a camp basis will be more readily acceptable by all concerned.

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b. Increased emphasis will be continuously placed on the co-equal sector and subsector role. All new B detachments and thirteen A detachments are expected to assume the sector/subsector role. In terms of total troops advised, the fifty-four detachments with co-equal missions will be advising more Regional and Popular Forces than the ninety-six sites advising CIDG forces.

c. Improved Ground Reconnaissance capability. Because of the dense jungle canopy the need is still apparent for detailed ground reconnaissance. Aerial and electronic reconnaissance have improved; however, they have not been sufficient. Targets still require verification. Ground reconnaissance by small, highly skilled teams continues to be a paramount requirement. Techniques perfected in Project Delta are being utilized by several detachments now and will be expanded. The CIDG recon platoons at each camp will provide the basis for further developing these small highly mobile and well trained teams.

d. At a recent briefing for Gen. Westmoreland, he proposed that USASF assets be used to advise and assist in Phu Yen Province, II CTZ. The USASF would assume co-equal missions as Sector/Subsector advisors in addition to the CIDG mission. This would be done in much the same manner as in Binh Dinh Province, where this was so successful in the past.

Section II: Commander's Recommendations.

1. In order to maintain its present operational capabilities, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) should be allowed to perform parachute jumps for proficiency and advanced qualifications. These operations would not detract from the operational capability of logistical or command and control aircraft.

2. During the pre-mission training greater emphasis should be placed on the language capability. The necessity for increased linguists is greater for two reasons:

a. With increased emphasis on civic action and psychological warfare there is a greater need to speak with the people and understand them.

b. Because of increased reconnaissance operations of small size, which normally do not have an interpreter, and increased joint operations with U.S. combat units, the USASF advisor must be able to speak the language.

3. During pre-mission training selected USASF non-commissioned officers should be informed and trained in CA/PO before they arrive in Vietnam. In selecting NCO's for CA/PO assignments, priority should be given to individuals

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
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who have a basic skill as a combat engineer, medic or weapons man.

4. The lack of command and control aircraft continue to be a problem. An airmobile company has been previously recommended in the last report. Either an organic aviation company or sufficient Direct Support aircraft in each Corps area is required. Two aircraft (preferably UH-1D) per "C" detachment and one aircraft per "B" detachment is the desired goal. The 5th SFG Headquarters has a requirement for the continuous use of three utility type aircraft.

34 Incl  
as

  
WILLIAM A. McKEAN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

— CONFIDENTIAL —



Inclosure 1 (CIDG in Camp Defense) To Quarterly Command Report for Period  
Ending 31 December 1965, HQ, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF 10 Jan 66

### SUCCESS STORY

#### CIDG IN CAMP DEFENSE (PLEI ME)

##### 1. General Situation:

a. Plei Me is a USASF advised CIDG camp, located approximately fifty kilometers south of Pleiku. Prior to 19 October 1965 the camp was in the secure phase of the CIDG program, Phase III, and had not encountered any Viet Cong activity that indicated a major attack was pending.

b. The friendly situation prior to the attack was as follows: A combat patrol consisting of 85 CIDG and two USASF were on a sweep and clear mission fifteen kilometers north west of the camp. In addition to this operation the camp had five local security ambush patrols in the near vicinity of the camp. These patrols were composed of eight men each. On a regular basis two outposts were maintained. One was located two kilometers south of the camp and the other was one kilometer northeast of the camp. Each of the outposts were composed of twenty CIDG troops. The remaining force inside the camp totaled approximately 250 CIDG, 14 LDB (VN Special Forces) and 10 USASF.

##### 2. Sequence of events during the Siege:

a. The camp started receiving small arms fire from the southwest at 1915 hours on 19 October 1965. It was determined later that one of the local ambush patrols was involved in a fire fight with a PAVN unit of unknown strength. At 2200 hours the outpost to the south was attacked by approximately forty PAVN soldiers. At the same time the camp began receiving 81mm mortar and 57mm recoilless rifle fire. Twenty minutes later contact with the outpost was lost.

b. The PAVN force launched their first attack on the camp at 00300 hours 20 October, from the north and northwest. By 0110 hours the attack had grown in intensity and the PAVN were within the defensive wire barriers, to the south, on the east near the main gate and to the north near the corner bunker. They made a concerted effort to overrun the corner bunker, however, the defenders in the vicinity stiffened and repulsed the attack. When the attack was initiated a flare ship had been requested, and it arrived on station at 0215 hours. Air strikes had also been requested and they began arriving at 0345 hours. The attack continued throughout the night and at 0600 hours the north bunker was hit by 75mm recoilless rifle fire. The bunker, although partially destroyed continued to hold.



Inclosure 1 (Cont'd)

c. Support for the camp continued as the first medical evacuation helicopter arrived at 0730 hours, and departed at 0900 hours with four wounded CIDG. The C detachment surgeon arrived on the first medical evacuation ship and remained in the camp to treat the wounded. (The surgeon remained at the camp during the entire siege, was wounded three times and treated himself on each occasion without slowing his pace in looking after the other wounded). One of the US Army helicopters flying support for the first medical evacuation was shot down by ground fire. Attempts to reach the downed aircraft were unsuccessful and a USASF sergeant was seriously wounded. As the rescue team worked its way back to the camp, they were pinned down by heavy machine gun fire. The sergeant died of wounds while they were pinned down and one other USASF team member was wounded.

d. The USASF and LLDB detachment commanders submitted requests through both channels for re-inforcements at first light on 20 October. The request was received at II Corps Tactical Zone Headquarters at 0518 hours. The ranger units in the Pleiku area had been assigned a reserve mission for operations and were not available for use as re-inforcement element. The Commanding Officer, 5th SFG (Abn) and his LLDB counterpart ordered two VMSF Airborne Ranger companies located in the Binh Dinh Province, to be air lifted to Pleiku. Later that day the II Corps commander agreed to send a relief force composed of one Armed Cav troop, one AFC company and one Ranger company by road to Plei Me. They departed Pleiku early on the morning of 21 October. The Commanding Officer, 5th SFG (Abn), through advise to his counterpart dispatched the two VMSF Airborne Ranger companies, by helicopter, in three lifts to a landing zone six kilometers north of the camp. The first lift departed, Pleiku at 0800 hours on 21 October.

e. The patrol from Plei Me, on the sweep and clear operation to the northwest of camp, began moving back to Plei Me upon notification that the camp was under attack. The patrol successfully closed into the camp without encountering any major action at 2130 hours on 20 October. The Camp was under continuous small arms and mortar fire from 1200 hours on the 20th until 0400 hours on the 21st. Then for two hours everything was quiet and very little activity could be observed outside the camp. At 0600 hours the camp again came under heavy small arms and mortar fire.

f. The last lift of the two VMSF Airborne Ranger companies arrived on the landing zone at 1005 hours and the force deployed immediately for movement to Plei Me. The commander, making an extremely wise decision, moved due east for several kilometers before turning south toward the camp. Although the movement was extremely difficult through the jungle growth, the strategy allowed the force to close into the camp, without being ambushed or becoming involved in a major fire fight. They closed into the camp twenty-three hours later at 0900 hours on the 22nd. The camp had sent out a link-up force at 1830 hours the previous evening, however, they failed to locate the relief force and returned to camp at 0700 hours on the 22nd.



Inclosure 1 (Cont'd)

g. The relief force dispatched by the II Corps commander was ambushed at 1100 hours on the 21st approximately half way between Pleiku and Plei Me. They went into a perimeter defense immediately, and remained in that location until the evening of the 23rd. Late that evening they began moving toward Plei Me again. At 0330 hours the column was hit along the entire length with small arms and mortar fire. During this action they lost a large number of their vehicles and troops. However they succeeded in fighting their way out and continued on to Plei Me, arriving at 1645 hours on the 25th.

h. An A-1E aircraft was shot down by ground fire at 0140 on the 22nd. The pilot chuted out and landed approximately 500 meters from the camp. Rescue efforts that day failed to recover the pilot. At 1600 hours that evening the second A-1E was shot down and the pilot was rescued by members of the camp. From 1800 hours that day until 0200 hours on the 23rd, firing on the camp was sporadic, however, at 0210 hours the camp began receiving heavy mortar fire from the southwest, which continued until 0400 hours. After that the camp remained quiet for the next twenty-four hours, receiving only H and I fires. The link-up force reported many PAVN bodies around the camp and they brought in numerous weapons that they had picked up. The pilot of the first A-1E that was shot down was rescued on the 23rd.

i. After the VNSF Airborne Ranger companies arrived in camp on the 22nd, the defenses were immediately re-aligned and new responsibilities designated. That afternoon at 1400 hours a three company size force composed of Rangers and CIDG departed the camp to clear the high ground outside. One USASF Captain was killed and one wounded on this operation. There were eleven Ranger/CIDG and one LLDB Lt killed, and 26 Ranger/CIDG wounded. The operation closed back into the camp at 1840 hours. During the operation they had met fanatical resistance, and one PAVN soldier was observed chained to a .50 caliber machine gun. For the next three days the camp continued to launch company and platoon size offensive operations and rescue missions against the well emplaced PAVN units around the camp.

j. H & I fires continued throughout the remainder of the day and through the night of 24 and 25 October. An operation was launched at 0930 hours on 25 October in an attempt to clear a slope north of the camp. The operation met with stiff resistance and was forced back to the camp. This was the last major resistance received from the PAVN units around Plei Me. The ARVN relief force from II Corps began clearing operations around the camp on the 26th and met very little resistance. A Nung company from the USASF C detachment arrived at 1530 hours that day and began a screen operation on the road between Plei Me and Pleiku. This operation terminated successfully at 1200 hours on 28 October without any contact. At 2245 hours on 29 October the camp received ten rounds of mortar fire from the southwest. This was the last fire received by the camp and the seige was ended.



### 3. Air Support:

a. Tactical air support during the seige of Plei Me was superb, and the men who were on the ground being supported have nothing but praise for the men in blue. They revealed that on numerous occasions the aircraft placed their ordnance on PAVN assault forces within and adjacent to the defensive wire. Without this type of support at several critical times the camp would have surely been breached. There was a total of 672 sorties flown in support of the camp from 17 through 30 October 1965. There were two A-1E fighters shot down during these missions and both pilots were recovered.

b. The aerial resupply was also conducted in an outstanding manner. During the period 22 through 25 October 1965 a total of 313,000 pounds of supplies were air dropped to beseiged Plei Me. Most of the missions were accomplished under extremely difficult conditons. The drops were made at night into a 200 meter triangle. 304,000 pounds of the supplies landed inside the camp and the remaining 9,000 pounds were either retrieved or destroyed by the camp. There were 41 missions flown, 25 by C-123 type aircraft from the 310th Air Commando Squadron and 16 by CV2B type aircraft from the 92nd Army Aviation company. Nineteen of the C-123 and two CV2B aircraft were hit by fround fire. Of the aircraft hit, the two CV2B and seven of the C-123's remained out of service as a result of the hits received. There were two US Army and two USAF enlisted men wounded during the missions. The USASF logistical support center continued to resupply the other CIDG camps during this period on a reduced basis because of the number of aircraft and crews available.

### 4. Statistics of Plei Me Seige:

#### a. Casualty Recapitulation

(1) Friendly	KIA	WIA	MIA
USASF	3	7	0
LLDB	1	2	0
VN ABN Rangers	15	29	0
CIDG	14	28	0
Newsman	1	0	0
TOTAL	34	66	0
(2) Enemy	KIA	WIA	MIA
Confirmed	141	0	0
Estimated	241	300	0



b. Confirmed Enemy Units Encountered:

- (1) 32nd Regt (PAVN) Independant
- (2) 66th Regt (PAVN) 304th Division
- (3) 33rd Regt (PAVN) Unknown Parent Unit

5. Conclusions:

a. The PAVN attacked Plei Me for three basic reasons.

- (1) Plei Me was the only organized force blocking the southern avenue of approach to Pleiku.
- (2) To test their combat capability against American and ARVN ground and air re-inforcements.
- (3) To gain immediately a significant combat success against American, ARVN and CIDG troops which would instill confidence and provide experience for their newly committed troops.

b. The local security ambush patrols and combat outposts provided the early warning necessary for the camp to be alert for the attack. The re-inforcement by helicopters was successful because the troops were landed out of range of the anti-aircraft weapons and they approached the camp from an unexpected direction cross-country. Successful offensive operations were conducted by the forces from the besieged camp which improved moral and fighting spirit. The tactical air support provided the necessary punch at the critical times to prevent the PAVN from massing for their assaults. The Logistical Air support provided the life line of ammunition, food and medical supplies necessary to give the strike force staying power during the seige.



Inclosure 2 (Joint 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), VNSF Pacification of Vinh Thanh Valley) to Quarterly Command Report for Period ending 31 Dec 65, HQ, 5th SFC (Abn) 10 Jan 66.

HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-CO

18 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report Joint 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),  
VNSF Pacification of the Vinh Thanh Valley.

1. Background.

a. The intelligence picture indicated that elements of the 2nd VC Regiment and the 95th PAVN Regiment were occupying the Vinh Thanh Valley. Aircraft were receiving small arms and automatic weapons fire throughout the valley. When any friendly unit crossed over the Song Can River in a northerly direction they were engaged with intense small arms and automatic weapons fire. Intelligence reports from informants, SMIA and the National Police indicated that the VC had physical control of all of the hamlets in the valley. The district headquarters was withdrawn by air under combat conditions in February 1965. Information provided by IPV reports and recon elements of the 1st Bde, 101st Airborne Division clearly indicated that all twelve hamlets were fortified by entrenchments and punji stake walls and man traps.

b. Planning and coordination effected prior to the operation: Planning conferences were held in August and September with Binh Dinh Sector Advisors, the 22nd ARVN Division Advisors and the USSF "B" Team S-3 and the C-2 S-3. At the conference held late in September which included the 1st Cavalry Division it was decided that the month of October was the best time to relocate the CIDG Camp from Binh Khe into Vinh Thanh Valley. The main reasons for this were, to allow the new "A" detachment time to learn the area, and to finish the training of the two CIDG companies so the camp would have four fully trained companies. RF/PT participation was requested and it was denied. A request for GVN officials from district police, VIS and USOM was also denied. Based on these denials it was decided that the move into the valley would be a joint VNSF - 1st Cav Division (Airmobile) Pacification Operation.

2. Conduct of the Operation:

a. The pacification of the Vinh Thanh Valley began with the arrival of the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division into the An Khe area. A total of twenty seven joint operations were conducted with the Airborne Brigade and the CIDG troops at Binh Khe and An Khe camps. These operations began to wrestle the control of the valley from the VC. Early in October one battalion from the 2nd Bde, 1st Cav Division (Airmobile) began a thirty day clearing operation of the valley floor.



AVSF-CO

SUBJECT: After Action Report Joint 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),  
VMSF Pacification of the Vinh Thanh Valley

On 9 October the CIDG Camp at An Khe committed two CIDG Companies, one combat recon platoon, six USSF and three LIDG at an FOB in the vicinity of BR 638585. A pilot team from Binh Khe Camp was moved up to the FOB to conduct an initial area assessment and determine a site for the new camp. On 13 Oct a planning conference was held with the 2nd Bde and it was decided to establish the camp at BR 615605. Prior to this time, some material had been stockpiled at An Khe and Binh Khe camps. Two companies of CIDG and advisors along with one infantry battalion, one engineer company and one artillery battery moved forward and set up the camp. Joint operations were conducted daily to clear the area. Work progressed so rapidly that the CIDG troops and advisors from An Khe were returned to their base station by 3 November.

b. On 4 November, a meeting was held at An Khe with JUSPAO representatives. The Mobile Political and Psychological Instruction cadre for the Motivation Training of Popular Forces and two mobile administrative teams from Province would move up to the camp on 15 November. Unfortunately, this never came about because of other requirements. The infantry battalion and supporting troops withdrew from the area on 21 November. There were several plague deaths in late November and early December but an epidemic was halted by the rapid response of all agencies operating in the area. The Division Artillery has continued to fire H&I fires throughout the valley and the outlying hill masses. At the present time, joint operations are conducted with both the 1st Cav Div (AM) and the ROK Division.

### 3. Conclusions:

a. The coordinated efforts of US Ground Combat Troops/CIDG Forces successfully cleared the Vinh Thanh valley of Viet Cong insurgents in a short period of time, allowing the government of Viet Nam to again exercise control over a populace and strategic area.

b. While US ground combat troops, with the aid of organic artillery units, cleared and secured the surrounding terrain, US engineer units aided USASF advised CIDG forces in the construction of a permanent CIDG camp. This camp not only is a base for combat operations, but also is a symbol of government control and a nucleus for extending political influence throughout the area.

c. Continued support of the CIDG camp by US combat forces, the presence of friendly artillery units, and the availability of US Reaction Forces has added immeasurably to the confidence of the civilian population in the ability of the government to protect them from Viet Cong intimidation.

Incl 2 Cont'd



AVSF-CO

18 December 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report Joint 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile),  
VNSF Pacification of the Vinh Thanh Valley

This, combined with vigorous civic action/psychological operations campaigns waged by the CIDG forces in conjunction with their continuous security mission, has influenced the former population to return to their homes. To date, over two thirds of the original 10,000 persons living in the valley have returned.

d. Due to the joint efforts of US forces and USASF advised CIDG troops, the area of the Vinh Thanh valley has reached that degree of pacification necessary to re-establish GVN administrative offices in the former District town. It is evident that the local population, liberated from the Viet Cong and protected by US and CIDG forces, will lend their support to their government and restore prosperity to Vinh Thanh valley.

Incl 2 Cont'd



HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

28 October 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General William E. DePuy

SUBJECT: Successful Combat Operation Conducted by Camp Cai Cai

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION:

a. Intelligence reports, augmented by aerial reconnaissance, indicated that the Viet Cong had established two bases consisting of a training center, field hospital, engineer repair facility, communications center, transportation section and VC - Khmer liaison office in Kien Tuong Province at WT 647105 and WT 685129. These sites were guarded by 60 VC and 70 VC respectively. The plans for the operation were formulated by the American Advisors of USASF Detachment A-412 and presented to their Vietnamese VNSF counterparts. The plan called for the employment of two CIDG Companies, one LLDB Airborne Ranger Company, a CIDG Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, seven USASF Advisors and six VNSF Advisors. In addition, a support element consisting of 2 O-1F Observation Aircraft, 5 armed UH-1B's and 2 UH-1B's for command, control, air resupply and medevac were called for. Special equipment used were 3 newly acquired airboats and 8 plastic assault boats with 25 HP outboard engines.

b. The deployment of forces called for the Airborne/Ranger Company, advised by 2 USASF, to assault objective #1 at WT 647105 from the west, utilizing plastic assault boats for transportation. One company of CIDG, advised by 2 USASF and 2 VNSF, were to move by sampans and assault objective #2 located at WT685129 from the south. The Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, advised by 2 USASF and 2 VNSF, was designated to provide security to the right flank during movement and to the east of the objective during the assault. To allow maneuverability during the movement and assault phases, airboats were designated for transportation of the Reconnaissance Platoon. The remaining CIDG company with 81 mm mortars, advised by 1 USASF and 2 LLDB, was to trail south-west in reserve, utilizing sampans.

c. The operation commenced at 101600 October with one CIDG company departing base camp for a forward assembly area located at WT616100. The second CIDG company (reserve) departed the base camp at 110400 October to move into the reserve position. At 110800 October, the Airborne/Ranger Company departed base camp by plastic assault boats for the Cai Co Canal which was to be their axis of advance to the objective. To reach the canal, which

Inclosure 3 to Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



SUBJECT: Successful Combat Operation Conducted by Camp Cai Cai

separates Vietnam from Cambodia, it was necessary to "pole" the assault boats through 3 kilometers of rice paddies. The Combat Reconnaissance platoon departed base camp by airboat at 110700 October and assumed flank security responsibility for the two assault elements.

d. Initial contact was made at 111100 October when the Airborne/Ranger Company encountered 7 VC at WT 608122. During this brief encounter 1 Airborne/Ranger was wounded by a mine, while 1 KIA and 2 WIA were inflicted on the VC. A second contact was made at 111120 October when 14 VC were encountered at WT 622113 by the Airborne/Ranger Company. During this action 4 VC were killed and the remainder escaped into Cambodia. At 111135 October, the Ranger company contacted 12 VC at WT 635115. The VC returned fire, but waited too long to attempt to flee into Cambodia. By employing fire and maneuver the Airborne/Rangers rapidly overwhelmed the VC killing 9. 15 minutes later the Airborne/Rangers attacked 17 VC at WT 650120 and immediately came under intensive VC fire. Not to be denied a victory, the Rangers displayed the same courageous determination they had earlier, and assaulted directly down the canal in the plastic assault boats and at the same time placing heavy automatic and M79 fire on the Viet Cong positions. The shock action and rapidity of this maneuver resulted in 14 VC KIA and 3 VCC. The overall results of this highly successful operation were 28 VC KIA, 2 VC WIA and 3 VC captured, to include a North Vietnamese advisor. A total of 9 weapons were captured along with a large quantity of documents, grenades, pellets for improvised Claymore mines, assorted medical equipment and 500 meters of communications wire. Destroyed in the operation were two 8-bed hospitals, a school, 24 houses, 15 sampans, 150 kilos of rice and assorted personal and household goods. The only casualties suffered by the friendly forces were 3 Airborne/Rangers WIA.

## 2. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT TECHNIQUES EMPLOYED:

a. The outstanding success of this well executed plan can be attributed to the aggressiveness of the Airborne/Ranger Company and the mobility of the boats. The airboats were ideally suited to a screening mission since they had freedom of movement over the open rice paddies. Although they could be heard while still 3 kilometers away, they could not be seen. This psychologically upset the VC and caused them to delay in their defensive positions rather than scatter into the rice paddies as they normally would. The assault boats were used as transportation on the first two contacts. The Airborne Rangers dismounted and assaulted on foot. Consequently most of the VC were able to flee into Cambodia. However, on the second two encounters, machine guns were placed in the two lead boats with M79's to back them up. The soldiers stayed in the boats and assaulted into the middle of the VC defensive positions before getting out to chase down the enemy. This caught the VC red handed. They delayed too long

Incl 3 Cont'd



AVSF-C

28 October 1965

SUBJECT: Successful Combat Operation Conducted by Camp Cai Cai

because of the uncertainty of the airboats' locations around them, and were surprised by the aggressiveness and rapidity of the Airborne/Ranger attack.

1 Incl  
Operation Overlay

WILLIAM A. McKEAN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

Incl 3 Cont'd







HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

1 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General William E. DePuy

SUBJECT: Successful Combat Operation Conducted by Camp Tuyen Nhon

1. SUMMARY OF ACTION:

a. Reliable intelligence reports received from an agent indicated that the Viet Cong had established a munitions factory approximately nine kilometers SE of Camp Tuyen Nhon. Aerial reconnaissance of the area revealed there was a grouping of seven structures in this vicinity. These structures appeared highly suspicious due to the dense growth in which the buildings were located and the fact that the nearest populated area was more than five kilometers away. Additional intelligence reports indicated that the area was being utilized as a VC rest and resupply point for VC forces moving between the III and IV CTZ boundary. The location of the suspected munitions factory placed it in a strategic position with the capability of manufacturing and supplying munitions to VC forces in both III and IV CTZ. VNSF/USASF made joint plans for an assault on the suspected VC location. These plans called for the employment of one CIDG Company, one CIDG Combat Reconnaissance Platoon with four USASF and three VNSF Advisors. A support element consisting of two 81mm mortars, five USASF, two VNSF and two O-1F Observation Aircraft was also included in the overall operation plan.

b. The concept of operation called for the Combat Reconnaissance Platoon, advised by two USASF and one VNSF, to assault the objective from the west flank. The CIDG Company, advised by two USASF and two VNSF, was to assault the objective from the southwest. The CIDG Company and the Combat Reconnaissance Platoon were to depart the base camp as one unit, utilizing sampans, and move to a forward assembly area where they would assume their individual axis of advance to the objective. The command post and support element were to move by plastic assault boats to the support area (see inclosure #1, Operation Overlay). The observation aircraft were to be in the vicinity of the operational area and on call effective 0630 hours on the day of the operation.

c. The operation commenced at 030010 November with the CIDG company and the Combat Reconnaissance Platoon departing base camp for their forward assembly areas. The command post and the support element departed the base

Inclosure 4 to Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



1 December 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR: Brigadier General William E. DePuy  
SUBJECT: Successful Combat Operation Conducted by Camp Tuyen Nhon

camp at 030500 November and moved by plastic assault boats to the vicinity of the objective area.

d. At 030630 November the support element encountered a mined barrier across the canal at coordinates XS316768. The barrier was quickly dismantled by USASF personnel and the support element continued on to their predesignated position without further incident. The assault force closed into the objective area at 030900 November. At that time five VC were observed fleeing the area. The objective was taken at 030915 November without any resistance from VC forces. A thorough search of the objective area was conducted and approximately thirteen tons of ammunitions and manufacturing equipment was discovered. At 031000 November security was placed around the periphery of the objective and a detailed inventory was conducted (see inclosure #2). Upon completion of the inventory, at 031600 November, the entire munitions cache and manufacturing equipment were destroyed by USASF demolition personnel. To insure total destruction, an airstrike consisting of two A1E and two F-100 aircraft was conducted at 031700 November. During the airstrike, several secondary explosions were noted and damage assessment was estimated at eighty percent (80%). USASF demolition personnel completed the destruction of the VC complex and the operation terminated at 032210 November with all friendly forces returning to base camp.

## 2. ANALYSIS OF OPERATION:

a. The area in which the factory was located was flat terrain, with water covered reeds and dense undergrowth. The depth of the water throughout the axis of advance and the objective area varied between two and four feet. This type environment greatly hampered both sampan and foot movement throughout the area.

b. Due to the limited accessibility to the objective area by plastic assault boats and sampans, the majority of the VC security force was able to escape.

c. Future operations utilizing airboats, over terrain of this nature, should enable friendly forces to capture more of the VC fleeing the objective areas.

2 Incl  
as

WILLIAM A McKEAN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

Incl 4 Cont'd



Inclosure 2 (Captured Munitions and Equipment), To Ltr, Subject: Successful Combat Operation Conducted at Camp Tuyen Nhon, 1 Dec 65.

	<u>Wt of Ea.</u>	<u>Nr of Ea.</u>
VC locally made Shape Charge	17½ lbs	38
Conical Water Mine	83	90
Short Conical Water Mine	27	31
Short Cone Shaped Mine	27	29
Hollow Cone Mine	15	5
Anti-Personnel Mine	2	106
AP "Toe Tapper" Mine	1	385
Turtle Mine, Sheet Metal	20	78
Turtle Mine, Sheet Metal	30	31
Turtle Mine, Sheet Metal	50	8
Round Volume Mine	15	270
Beetle Cylindrical 8x12 Mine	13	80
Turtle Mine 28x3x5, Sheet Metal	26	19
Flat Box Mine 2x6x8	5	39
US M-14 Mine (LOP 15-22) (LOP 15-55)		26
US 60mm Mortar Shells		25
US 57mm RR Rounds		4
Local made 60mm Mortar shells		38
Rifle Grenades		40
Local Made Fragmentation Grenades		600
Chinese Potatoe Masher Grenades		16
Booby Trap Grenades, painted with red and yellow stripes		10
Cases of TNT	100 lbs	21
Jars of Sulphur	50	1
Local Made Explosive Filler in earthen jars	100	11
Jars of Sodium Nitrate	50	5
Jars of Nitro starch	50	2
Large bags of Powder	50	3
Ready Shaped TNT Mine Boosters	150	
Paraffin Slabs 2x12x24	400	
Brass and Copper Tubing, Assorted sizes	500	
Large bottles of Black Powder		16
Bottles of Acid, Large		74
Bottles of Alcohol, Large		106
Rounds of Small Arms Ammunition, Assorted		6000
Furnaces		2
Press, Large		1
Electric Generator, 4KW, US Made		1
Brass Mold, All sizes		18
10 Kilo Weighing Machines		2
US 155mm Rounds		3
US 105mm Rounds		37
Sampans		3
Houses, wood floors w/Korea Sheet Metal Roofs		7
55 Gallon Gas Drums, Full		2
Medical Supplies	20 lbs	
Documents (Most deal with 514 Bn)	4	

Incl 4 Cont'd



Inclosure 2 (Captured Munitions and Equipment, Continued)

Large Assortment of Tools

Several Hundred Demolition caps and Fuzes

Large Amount of electrical equipment for electrical detonation

Incl 4 Cont'd



52

26

LAGRANGE  
CANAL

5103

Adventure route

YAM CO TAY RIVE

5-☒

M. 81, VIETNAM, 1:50,000, SHEETS 6343 I 6742 II  
 CT 4415, 5745 (GEN) 6343 II 6742 III  
 022000 NOV 65

REFR - CHAT RGN UNIT, 1 LUB, 2 USASF, 5AMPANDS  
KAW - 1 COCIDG, 2 LUB, 2 USASF, 5AMPANDS

Alfins

36A1D

1031

5

73

Inc2 : cont'd


58



# CONFIDENTIAL

## US SPECIAL FORCES DEPLOYMENT

1 JANUARY 1966



### KEY

- % - CO-EQUAL CIDG CONTROL/SECTOR ADVISOR ROLE.
- \* - CO-EQUAL CIDG/SUBSECTOR ADVISOR ROLE
- + = SUBSECTOR ADVISOR ROLE ONLY.
- # - CIDG CONTROL/SECTOR AND SUBSECTOR ADVISOR ROLE.

NOTE: NO KEY MARK INDICATES CIDG ROLE ONLY.

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## ETHNIC INFORMATION-SPECIAL FORCES STRIKE FORCE CAMPS

DET	COMMANDER	LOCATION	ETHNIC GROUP (S)
C-1	LT COL FACEY	DANANG	NUNG
A-113	CAPT STITT	DANANG	NUNG
A-101	CAPT WAGELSTEIN	KHE SANH	VN, BRU
A-102	CAPT JENNINGS	ASHAU	VN
A-103	CAPT SPENCER	GIA VUC	HRE, VN
A-104	CAPT SUHOSKY	HA THANH	HRE, VN
A-105	CAPT OLLESH	KHAM DUC	VN
A-106	CAPT PATTON	BA TO	HRE, VN
A-107	CAPT FAZETAS (AATTV)	TRA BONG	HRE, VN
A-108	CAPT O'CONNOR	TLEN PHUC	VN
C-2	LT COL PATCH	PLEIKU	NUNG, RHAD, VN
A-211	CAPT SANFORD	DAK PEK	SEDANG, HALANG, JEH, VN
A-212	CAPT McMILLAN	PLEI MRONG	JARAI, BAHNAR, VN
A-213	CAPT SCHMIDT	PLEI DJERENG	JARAI, BAHNAR, MNONG, VN
A-214	CAPT DICKENS	PLATEAU GI	SEDANG, BAHNAR, MNONG, VN
A-215	CAPT CONWAY	DUC GO	JARAI, VN
A-216	CAPT WORD	PLEI DO LIM	JARAI, BAHNAR, VN
A-217	CAPT WILLCOUGHBY	PLEI ME	JARAI, RHAD, BAHNAR, VN
A-219	CAPT DODDS	PLEIKU	NUNG
A1-322	CAPT RUHLIN	DAK TO	SEDANG, BAHNAR, RONGAO, JEH
B-22	MAJ WOOD	AN TUC	JARAI, BAHNAR, HRE, VN
A1-112	CAPT GREGOR	MAI LINH	JARAI
A1-114	CAPT SNYDER	BONG SON	VN
A1-211	CAPT DURE	VINH THANH	VN
A1-212	MAJ BASS	LE LOI	CHAM, NUNG, VN
A1-213	CAPT SCHROEDER	VAN CANH	VN
A-221	CAPT LYNCH	KANNACK	BAHNAR, SEDANG, HRE, VN
A-222	CAPT PETERS	DONG TRE	HA ROI, VN
A-224	CAPT GERMAN	PHU TUC	JARAI, BAHNAR
B-23	MAJ HUSSEY	BAN ME THUOT	RHAD, VN
A-232	CAPT RUGGLES	BAO LOC	KOHO
A-233	CAPT WHITE	HUON EA YANG	RHAD, MNONG, JARAI
A-234	CAPT THOMAS	AN LAC	KONG, MA, CHIL, VN
A-236	CAPT McKINNEY	LAC THIEN	RHAD, MNONG, JARAI, VN
C-3	LT COL WARREN	BIEN HOA	NONE
A-301	CAPT SIOMACCO	HO NGOC TAO	NUNG, NV
A-302	CAPT HOLMES	BIEN HOA	NUNG
B-31	MAJ SMITH, C	XUAN LOC	NONE
A-311	CAPT ROBINSON	TANH LINH	CHAM, THUNG, VN
A-312	CAPT KENNY	CAO BIEN	VN, CAMBODIAN
B-32	MAJ RADKE	TAY MINH	CAMBODIAN
A-322	CAPT FLORES	SUOI DA	VN, CAMBODIAN
A-323	CAPT SHELDON	TRANG SUP	VN, CAMBODIAN
A-324	CAPT HOLT	BEN SOI	VN, CAMBODIAN
A-325A	LT LEWIS	MUI BA DEN	CAMBODIAN
B-33	MAJ BARRON	HON QUAN	NONE
A-325	LT PATHON	CHON THANH	NONE
A-331	CAPT BROWNING	LOC MINH	VN, CAMBODIAN
A-332	CAPT DRISKO	MINH THANH	STIENG, VN
B-34	LT COL ROY	SONG BE	NONE
A-341	LT OLIVAZ	HU DOP	STIENG, VN
A-342	CAPT TAYLOR	DONG XOAI	VN
C-4	LT COL TUTTLE	CAN THO	VN
B-41	MAJ YANTIS	MUC HOA	NONE
A-411	CAPT ANDERSON	BINH HUNG	NUNG
A-412	CAPT PARKER	CAI CAI	HOA HAO
A-413	CAPT JONES	BINH THANH THON	HOA HAO, CAMBODIAN
A-414	CAPT LAMB	MOC HOA	VN, CHAM, CAMBODIAN
A-415	CAPT SHELTON	TUYEN NHON	NUNG, HOA HAO
A-416	CAPT HOLLAND	AP BAC	NONE
B-42	MAJ NELLER	CHAU DUC	NONE
A-421	CAPT HOWLEY	HA TIEN	VN, CAMBODIAN
A-422	CAPT WESNESKI	VINH GIA	VN, CAMBODIAN
A-423	CAPT BLESSE	TINH BIEN	HOA HAO, VN, CAMBODIAN
A-424	CAPT MARVIN	AN PHU	HOA HAO
A-425	CAPT JEZIOR	AN LONG	HOA HAO, VN, CAMBODIAN
A-426	LT NEILSON	TRI TON	NONE
A-427	CAPT PARENT	XOM DUONG DONG	VN, NUNG
A-428	CAPT TOPP	TAN CHAU	NONE
SFOB			
B-51	MAJ GRUENE	DONG BA THIN	VN, CHAM, TUONG, MIEN
B-52	MAJ BECKWITH	NHA TRANG	VN
B-53	CAPT MAIO	LONG THANH	NONE
A-323	CAPT WALKER	NHA TRANG	NONE
A-501	LT JENNINGS	NGUYEN VAN TAN	VN, CHAM, RAGLAI
A-502	CAPT CIMCOTTI	TRUNG DUNG	VN, CHAM, RHAD, RAGLAI, NUNG
A-503	CAPT CARTER	NHA TRANG	NUNG
A-521	CAPT CONE	NHA TRANG	NONE

# CONFIDENTIAL



GROUP 4  
DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.

CONFIDENTIAL

TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SFG (ABN), 1ST SF  
EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 1965

DPT	STATUS	COMMANDER	UNIT SECURE LOCATION WORD	CAMP PHASE	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION	ETD
C-1	PCS	LT COL FACEY	TIGER DA NANG (BT003758)	N/A	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	CONTROL	N/A
A-101	PCS	CAPT WAGHESTEIN	TALON THE SANH (XD850375)	III	QUANG TRI/HUONG HOA	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-102	PCS	CAPT JENNINGS	TANGO ASHAU (YC500838)	II	THUA THIEN/NAM HOA	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-103	PCS	CAPT SPENCER	TAMER GIA VUC (BS378270)	III	QUANG NGAI/BA TO	CIDG	N/A
A-104	PCS	CAPT SUHOSKY	TAPER HA THANH (BS390701)	II	QUANG NGAI/SON HA	CIDG/SS	N/A
A-105	PCS	CAPT OLLFSH.	TALLY KHAM DUC (ZC001090)	II	QUANG TIN/HIEP DUC	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-106	PCS	CAPT PATTON	TABLE BA TO (BS568328)	II	QUANG NGAI/BA TO	CIDG/SS	N/A
A-107	PCS	CAPT FAZEKAS (AATTV)	TENOR TRA BONG (BS340872)	II	QUANG NGAI/TRA BONG	CIDG/SS/MP	N/A
A-108	TDY	CAPT O'CONNOR	TEXAS TIEN PHUOC (BT113137)	I	QUANG TIN/TIEN PHUOC	CIDG/SS/MP	16MAY66
A-113	TDY	CAPT STITT	TEMPO DA NANG (BT008758)	N/A	QUANG NAM/HOA VANG	MIKE	14FEB66
<u>II CORPS</u>							
C-2	PCS	LT COL PATCH	SATAN PLEIKU (AR765475)	N/A	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	CONTROL/EF	N/A
A-211	PCS	CAPT SANFORD	SCOTT DAK PEK (YB945686)	II	KONTUM/DAK SUT	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-212	PCS	CAPT MC MILLAN	SCUBA PLEI MRONG (ZALL3675)	III	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-213	PCS	CAPT SCHMIDT	SHARK PLEI DIERENG (YA859531)	II	PLEIKU/LE THANH	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-214	PCS	CAPT DICKENS	SHARP PLATEAU GI (BS083145)	II	KONTUM/TOU MORONG	CIDG/SS	N/A
A-214 FOB	PCS	CAPT DICKENS	SOUTH MANG BUK (AS990425)	II	QUANG NGAI/TOU MORONG	CIDG/SS	N/A

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## TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

DET	STATUS	COMMANDER	UNIT		LOCATION	CAMP PHASE	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION	E
			SECURE	WORD					
A-215	PCS	CAPT CONWAY	STOUX		DUC CO (CHUDRON) (YA840249)	II	PLEIKU/LE THANH	CIDG/BS	N
A-216	PCS	CAPT WORD	SERGE		PLEI DO LIM (AR390272)	II	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	CIDG	N
A-217	PCS	CAPT WILLOUGHLY	SEVER		PLEI ME (ZA164058)	II	PLEIKU/PHU NHON	CIDG/BS	N
A-219	PCS	CAPT DODDS	SHALE		PLEIKU (AR765475)	N/A	PLEIKU/LE TRUNG	MIVE	N
AL-322	TDY	CAPT RUHLIN	STING		DAK TO (ZB012213)	II	KONTUM/DAK TO	CIDG/SS/MP	1
B-22	PCS	MAJ WOOD	SLASH		AN TUC (BR462436)	II	BINH DINH/AN TUC	CONTROL/CIDG	N
B-22(LN)	N/A	CAPT SMITH	STEEL		QUI NHON (CR088236)	N/A	BINH DINH/ANN HON	LIAISON	N
AL-112	TDY	CAPT GREGOR	SCOOT		MAI LINH (BQ245923)	II	PHU BON/PHU THIEN	CIDG	2
AL-114	TDY	CAPT SNYDER	SPADE		BONG SON (BR8-6947)	II	BINH DINH/HOAI NHON	RF/PF TNG/SS	
AL-211	TDY	CAPT DURR	SPEAR		VINH THANH (BR614605)	I	BINH DINH/BINH KHE	CIDG/SS	
AL-212	TDY	MAJ BASS	STAMP		PHI HO (BN274413)	N/A	BINH THUAN/HAI NINH	TRAINING AND STAGING	2
AL-213	TDY	CAPT SCHROEDER	STONE		VAN CANH (BR840064)	II	BINH DINH/VAN CANH	CIDG/SS/MP	1
A-221	PCS	CAPT LYNCH	SONAR		KANJACK (BR423649)	II	BINH DINH/AN TUC	CIDG	N
A-222	PCS	CAPT PETERS	STALK		DONG TRE (BQ909704)	III	PHU YEN/DONG XUAN	CIDG	N
A-224	PCS	CAPT GERMAN	SURGE		PHU TUC (BQ505598)	III	PHU BON/PHU TUC	CIDG/SS	N
B-23	PCS	MAJ HUSSEY	LABER		BAN ME THUOT (AQ780040)	N/A	DARLAC/BAN ME THUOT	CONTROL	N
A-232	PCS	CAPT RUGGLES	SPIKE		BAO LOC (ZTO68794)	I	LAM DONG/BAO LOC	CIDG/SS	N
A-233	PCS	CAPT WHITE	SAINT		BUON EA YANG (BQ094033)	II	DARLAC/PHUOC AN	CIDG/SS	N

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TROOP DISPOSITION				UNIT		CAMP		PHASE PROVINCE/DISTRICT		MISSION		ETD
DET	STATUS	COMMANDER	SECURE WORD	LOCATION	PHASE	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION					
A-234	PCS	CAPT THOMAS	SQUAD	AN LAC (AP865484)	II	DARLAC/LAC THIEN	CIDG					N/A
A-236	PCS	CAPT MCKINNEY	STORM	LAC THIEN (AP971756)	II	DARLAC/LAC THIEN	CIDG/SS					N/A
				III CORPS								
C-3	PCS	LT COL WARREN	VIPER	BIEN HOA (YT005118)	N/A	BIEN HOA/TRI TAM	CONTROL					N/A
A-301	PCS	CAPT SIOMACCO	VEXED	HO NGOC TAO (XT958011)	N/A	BIEN HOA/LAC THIEN	CIDG TNG					N/A
A-302	PCS	CAPT HOLMES	VICAR	BIEN HOA (YT005118)	N/A	BIEN HOA/TRI TAM	MIKE FORCE					N/A
B-31	PCS	MAJ SMITH, C.	VALET	XUAN LOC (YT458091)	N/A	BINH DUONG/PHU GIAO	CONTROL/SS					N/A
A-311	PCS	CAPT ROBINSON	VALVE	TANH LIPH (YT929262)	II	BIEN TUY/TANH LINH	CIDG/SS					N/A
A-312	PCS	CAPT KENNY	VISTA	CAO BINH (XT974497)	II	BINH DUONG/PHU GIAO	CIDG					N/A
B-32	PCS	MAJ RADKE	VENOM	TAY NINH (XT206508)	N/A	TAY NINH/PHU KHUONG	CONTROL/S/SS					N/A
A-322	PCS	CAPT FLORES	VIRGO	SUOI DA (XT331575)	II	TAY NINH/PHU KHUONG	CIDG/BS					N/A
A-323	PCS	CAPT SHELTON	VITAL	TRANG SUP (XT167563)	II	TAY NINH/PHUOC NINH	CIDG/BS					N/A
A-324	PCS	CAPT HOLT	VYING	BEN SOI (XT093475)	II	TAY NINH/PHUOC NINH	CIDG/BS/SS					N/A
A-325A	PCS	LT LEWIS	VIGOR	NUI BA DEN (XT281581)	N/A	TAY NINH/PHU KHUONG	RADIO RELAY					N/A
B-33	PCS	MAJ BARRON	VODKA	HON QUAN (XT758879)	N/A	BINH LONG/AN LOC	CONTROL/S/SS					N/A
A-331	PCS	CAPT BROWNING	VOTER	LOC NINH (XU732075)	II	BINH LONG/LOC NINH	CIDG/BS/SS					N/A
A-332	PCS	CAPT DRISKE	VOGUE	MINH THANH (XT643669)	II	BINH LONG/CHON THANH	CIDG/BS					N/A
A-325	PCS	LT PATYON	VERGE	CHON THANH (XT767618)	N/A	BINH LONG/CHON THANH	SS					N/A
B-34	PCS	LT COL ROY	VAPOR	SONG BE (YU178112)	N/A	PHUOC LONG/PHUOC BINH	CONTROL/S/SS					N/A

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## TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

DET	STATUS	COMMANDER	UNIT		LOCATION	CAMP	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION	ETD
			SECURE	WORD					
A-341	PCS	LT OLIVAZ	VOCAL		BU DOP (XU974292)	II	PHUOC LONG/BU DUC	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-342	PCS	CAPT TAYLOR	VESTA		DONG XOAI (YTO79759)	II	PHUOC LONG/DON LUAN	CIDG/SS	N/A
IV CORPS									
C-4	PCS	LT COL TUTTLE	FIGHT		CAN THO (WS843116)	N/A	PHONG DINH/PHONG PHU	CONTROL	N/A
B-41	PCS	MAJ YANTIS	FORCE		MOC HOA (XS028899)	N/A	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	CONTROL/S	N/A
A-411	PCS	CAPT ANDERSON	FEVER		BINH HUNG (VQ845815)	II	AN XUYEN/HAI YEN	SP SECTOR CIDG/SS	N/A
A-412	PCS	CAPT PARKER	FAITH		CAI CAI (WT562073)	II	KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-413	PCS	CAPT JONES	FIRST		BINH THANH THON (WT861032)	II	KIEN TUONG/TUYEN BINH	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-414	PCS	CAPT LAMB	FLOAT		MOC HOA (XS028899)	III	KIEN TUONG/CHAU THANH	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-415	PCS	CAPT SHELTON	FRONT		TUYEN NHON (XS273773)	II	KIEN TUONG/TUYEN NHON	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-416	TDY	CAPT HOLLAND	FRYER		AP BAC (XS165728)	II	KIEN TUONG/KIEN BINH	SS	15 MAR 68
B-42	PCS	MAJ NELLER	FORGE		CHAU DUC (WS131842)	N/A	CHAU DUC/CHAU PHU	CONTROL/S	N/A
A-421	PCS	CAPT HOWLEY	FLASH		HA TIEN (VS437467)	III	KIEN GIANG/HA TIEN	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-422	PCS	CAPT WESNESKI	FLAME		VINH GIA (VS762610)	III	CHAU DOC/HA TIEN	CIDG/BS	N/A
A-423	PCS	CAPT BLESSE	FAMED		TINH BIEN (VS953712)	III	CHAU DOC/TINH BIEN	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-424	PCS	CAPT MARVIN	FUGAL		AN PHU (WS105945)	IV	CHAU DOC/AN PHU	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-425	PCS	CAPT JEZIOR	FREON		AN LONG (WS402868)	II	KIEN PHONG/HONG NGU	CIDG/BS/SS	N/A
A-426	PCS	LT NEILSON	FRIAR		TRI TON (WS005515)	N/A	CHAU DOC/TRI TON	SS	N/A
A-427	PCS	CAPT PARENT	FAUST		XOM DUONG DONG (US867295)	N/A	KIEN GIANG/PHU QUOC	CIDG/SS	N/A

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## TROOP DISPOSITION LIST

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DET	STATUS	COMMANDER	UNIT SECURE WORD	LOCATION	CAMP PHASE	PROVINCE/DISTRICT	MISSION	ETD
A-428	PCS	CAPT TOPP	FAINT	TAN CHAU (WS267937)	N/A	CHAU DOC/TAN CHAU	CIDG/SS	N/A
				<u>SFOB</u>				
B-51	PCS	MAJ GRUENE	HONDA	DONG BA THIN (CP040290)	N/A	KHANH HOA/CAM LAN	VNSF TNG CEN	N/A
B-52	PCS	MAJ BECKWITH	HORDE	NHA TRANG (CP031518)	N/A	KHANH HOA/VINH KUONG	PROJ DELTA	N/A
B-53	PCS	CAPT MAIO (XO)	HOLLY	LONG THANH (YSL39919)	N/A	BIEN HOA/LAC THIEN	AUG MACV	N/A
A-323	TDY	CAPT WALTER	HANDY	NHA TRANG (CP031518)	N/A	KHANH HOA/CAM LAN	PROJ DELTA	24MAR66
A-501	PCS	LT JENNINGS	HAVEN	NGUYEN VAN TAN (CP031518)	III	KHANH HOA/VINH KUONG	CIDG	N/A
A-502	PCS	CAPT CINCOTTI	HAVOC	TRUNG DUNG (BP937557)	III	KHANH HOA/DIEN KHANH	CILG/SS	N/A
A-503	PCS	CAPT CARTER	HINDU	NHA TRANG (CP031518)	N/A	KHANH HOA/VINH KUONG	MIXE FORCE	N/A
A-521	PCS	CAPT COME	HELIX	DONG BA THIN (CP040290)	N/A	KHANH HOA/CAM LAN	PROJ DELTA	N/A

MISSION ABBREVIATIONS: CIDG - Civilian Irregular Defense Group  
 BS - Border Surveillance  
 S - Sector Advisor  
 SS - Subsector Advisor  
 EF - Eagle Flight  
 MP - Montagnard Program

RECAPITULATION: "C" DETACHMENTS - 4 PCS "B" DETACHMENTS - 11 PCS "A" DETACHMENTS - 52 PCS, 10 TDY

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 NHA TRANG (49FCPO351) VIETNAM  
 010001H JAN 66  
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APPENDIX 1 (Proposed Camp Locations) To ANNEX K (Task Organization) To  
 OPLAN 1-66 (U)

DETACHMENT	LOCATION	COORDINATES	PROJECTED ARRIVAL DATE	MISSION	REMARKS
"A"	IV CORPSE	VS907597	10 JAN	KKK	
"B"	KONTUM II	AR810890	10 JAN	CONTROL	
"A"	VANH CANH II	BR840064	15 JAN	CIDG/SS/MP	REPLACE TDY 15 FEB
"A"	DUC PHUONG III	YU435060	15 JAN	CIDG/SS/MP	
"A"	DAK TO II	ZB041245	30 JAN	CIDG/SS/MP	REPLACE TDY 14 FEB
"A"	DANANG I	BT008758	30 JAN	MIKE FORCE	REPLACE TDY 14 FEB
"A"	THUONG DUC I	ZC145534	9 FEB	CIDG/SS	
"B"	PLEIKU II	AR765475	9 FEB	CONTROL	
"A"	POLET KIENG II	ZA101912	9 FEB	CIDG	
"A"	MY LINH II	BQ250925	9 FEB	CIDG	REPLACE TDY 23 FEB
"B"	QUANG NGAI I	BS630740	15 FEB	CONTROL	
"A"	DAK SEUNG II	YB903412	15 FEB	CIDG	
"A"	LE LOI II	BN280450	15 FEB	CIDG	REPLACE TDY 28 FEB
"A"	SFOB	CP033517	1 MAR	DELTA	REPLACE TDY 14 MAR
"A"	HA TAY II	BR800838	1 MAR	CIDG	
"A"	AP BAC IV	XS157726	1 MAR	SS	REPLACE TDY 15 MAR
"A"	VINH THANH II	BR614593	15 MAR	CIDG/SS	REPLACE TDY 29 MAR
"A"	MINH LONG I	BS537516	15 APR	CIDG/SS	
"A"	BONG SON II	BR850925	1 APR	SS	REPLACE TDY 12 APR
"B"	DUC HOA III	XS595965	15 APR	CONTROL	
"A"	TIEN PHUOC I	BT113137	1 MAY	CIDG/SS	REPLACE TDY 10 MAY
"A"	KIEN DUC II	YU801245	15 MAY	CIDG/SS	
"A"	HAU DUC I	BS015975	1 JUN	CIDG/SS	
"A"	DUC HUE III	XT319082	1 JUN	SS/CIDG/BS	
"A"	DI LINN II	AN820820	15 JUN	CIDG/SS	
"A"	CAN THO IV	WS843116	15 JUN	MIKE FORCE	
"B"	I CORPS (Tentative)		1 JUL	CONTROL	
"A"	HIEP DUC I	AT914246	1 JUL	CIDG/SS	

Acknowledge:

McKEAN  
 Col

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HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO San Francisco 96240

AVSF-C

31 December 1965

SUBJECT: VIP Briefings

1. The following briefings were conducted during the final quarter of calendar year 1965 at the Headquarters, 5th Special Forces Group (Abn) in Nha Trang. This list does not include the numerous visits directly to detachment sites by VIP's visiting each Corps area.

<u>DATE</u>	<u>PARTY</u>	<u>TYPE VISIT</u>
1. 6 Oct	Maj Gen W.B. Rosson MACV C/S Brig Gen Linh Quang Vien	30 Min Operational Briefing
2. 15 Oct	Gen J.P. McConnell USAF C/S	30 Min Operational Briefing
3. 20 Oct	Lt Gen Lek Thai C/S Col Abhichart, RTA Maj Gen T.B. Whitehouse USAF Maj Gen J.N. Eubank MACVJ5	30 Min Operational Briefing
4. 22 Oct	Maj Gen R.H. Schellman G-3 USARPAC	45 Min Operational Briefing
5. 26 Oct	Sen E.M. Kennedy Sen J.D. Tydings Cong. J.C. Culver Cong. J.V. Tunney	45 Min Operational Briefing and visit Cai Cai Camp
6. 31 Oct	Maj Gen Campbell USAF Brig Gen Newcomer USAF	40 Min Operational Briefing
7. 1 Nov	Brig Gen Mueller Brig Gen Davis Army/USAF Spt Team	3 Hour visit, briefing tour LSC and lunch
8. 5 Nov	Cong. G.W. Gridler	30 Min Operational Briefing
9. 8 Nov	Lt Gen Heaton	One Hour Medical Briefing
10. 8 Nov	Cov Hughes and Hoffman	45 Min Operational Briefing
11. 10 Nov	Lt Gen Heintges Dep COMUSMACV	One Hour Operational and Logistics Briefing

Inclosure 8 to Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



AVSF-C

SUBJECT: VIP Briefings

31 December 1965

12.	16 Nov Mr Norton USOM Region II Rep. Col Call USA LNO	30 Min Operational Briefing
13.	18 Nov Mr Dovovan Mr McCollock Editor Time-Life	30 Min Operational Briefing
14.	20 Nov Maj Gen J. Wilson OPO	45 Min Operational Briefing
15.	22 Nov British Brig Gen & Party	3 Hour Briefing, discussion and lunch
16.	26 Nov Brig Gen Lang, SERICOM	30 Min Operational Briefing
17.	3 Dec Sen John Tower	45 Min Briefing & 3 Hour tour Buon Ma Yang
18.	3 Dec Mr Hansen Baldwin Mil Editor N.Y. Times	1 Hour Operational Briefing
19.	4 Dec Maj Gen Hurlburt	45 Min Operations & Logistics Briefing
20.	6 Dec Cong Ashley	45 Min Operational Briefing
21.	14 Dec Maj Gen Davis	1 Hour Operational and Intelligence Briefing
22.	23 Dec Gen E. Wheeler	30 Min Current & Future Operational Briefing
23.	27 Dec Gen H.K. Johnson	1 Hour Current & Future Operations Briefing, Tour LSC and Visit Tuyen Nhon Camp
24.	29 Dec Gen W.C. Westmoreland	30 Min Current and Future Operational Briefing

FOR THE COMMANDER:

DEAN B. JOHNSON  
Captain, Artillery  
Assistant Adjutant

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HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

SUBJECT: S-3 VIP Briefing Notes

I. The purpose of this briefing is to bring you up to date on the activities of the CIDG program.

In the briefing I will cover:

- A. The increase in strength of the program.
- B. Additional missions & tasks assumed.
- C. Where we expect to go in the future.
- D. Show some comparative results.
- E. Touch on problem areas.

II. DISPOSITION OF CAMPS.

- A. Black flags - A Detachments
- B. Blue flags - B Detachments
- C. Yellow flags - C Detachments
- D. Yellow squares indicate Sector/Subsector Role.
- E. Total of 49 camps, December 1964.
- F. Total of 78 detachment sites, December 1965.

III. INCREASE IN ASSETS AND STRENGTH.

(See Chart 1)

IV. ASSUMED FOLLOWING MISSIONS AND TASKS (CHART 2)

- A. Sector Subsector Role.
  - 1. 90 day test Feb-Apr 65.
  - 2. Conducted at camps Tinh Bien and An Phu in Chau Doc Province

IV Corps.

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Inclosure 9 to Quarterly Comm Report 31 Dec 65



SUBJECT: S-3 VIP Briefing Notes

3. Proved very successful and implemented immediately.

4. Presently 42 USASF detachments have co-equal mission of subsector or sector advisor in addition to CIDG role.

B. Immediate Action Tasks.

1. Eastern Binh Dinh Province II CTZ.

- a. In danger of losing Province to VC in April and May 65.
- b. COMUSMACV directed USASF to send in advisory teams.
- c. Within three weeks 5 "A" detachments were on site TDY from Okinawa.
- d. Worked directly with RF/PF until MACV advisor teams arrived.
- e. Phased out to open new CIDG camps within the Province.

2. Phuc Quoi Island IV CTZ.

- a. February 65 in danger of VC domination.
- b. Dispatched modified B detachment as subsector advisor and trained RF/PF.
- c. Later changed to A detachment and recruited and trained CIDG force.

3. Hai Yen, An Xuyen Province IV CTZ.

- a. Father Hoa and Chinese community not satisfied with support from Vietnamese government.
- b. Requested US advisors through U.S. Embassy.
- c. USASF assigned mission to furnish advisor team.
- d. In June 65, within 2 weeks, an "A" detachment was assigned as the advisory team.

C. Special In-Country Missions.

- 1. Project Delta assumes special missions.
- 2. Organization.
  - a. Headquarters (B detachment).

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SUBJECT: S-3 VIP Briefing Notes

- b. 12 Reconnaissance teams; two US, eight Vietnamese each.
- c. Four Vietnamese Airborne Ranger companies with US advisors to platoon level.
- d. Total of 73 US personnel involved.
- 3. Intelligence gathering and target detection capabilities.
- 4. Vung Ro Bay February 1965.
  - a. Recovered weapons being infiltrated by sea on North Vietnamese boat.
  - b. Incident became source material for State Department white paper.
- 5. Reaction Force at Plei Me.
  - a. ARVN II CTZ mounted ground reaction force from Pleiku.
  - b. Col McKean dispatched two Abn/Rngr companies to the camp by heliborne assault immediately.
  - c. Abn/Rngr companies coupled with outstanding USAF support saved the camp.
- 6. Assessment of B-52 Strikes.
  - a. 10 Sept, other US forces declined mission.
  - b. Conducted raid on VC Military Region 5 Hqtrs in Quang Tin Province I CTZ after B-52 strike.
- 7. Support ARVN operations.
- D. Increased Personnel Support to MACSOG.
  - 1. Presently one "B" detachment TDY to Studies and Observation Group.
  - 2. Under new TUCR we will supply one "C" detachment and two "B" detachments to support SOG.

## V. OPERATIONS WITH U.S. COMBAT FORCES (CHART 3)

## A. Assist Advance Parties.

- 1. 1st Air Cav Div at An Khe assisted by B-22 detachment.

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SUBJECT: S-3 VIP Briefing Notes

- a. Provided 2 CIDG companies for security.
  - b. Provided all intelligence data.
  - c. Provided use of all facilities.
2. 2d Bde, 1st Inf Div at Phuoc Vinh, same.
- B. Temporary staging and Base Areas.
1. Duc Co, 1st Cav staged there during pursuit in Ia Drang River valley Nov 65.
- C. Intelligence of Local Area.
1. One company, 1st Cav lived in village near Duc Co for 3 days. Reported no VC in area.
  2. USASF intelligence Sgt with card file on local VC and agents went into village and ferreted out 36 VC and 12 weapons.
- D. Area Indoctrination.
1. Vinh Thanh Valley and Kannack.
  2. Within 1st Air Cav TAOR.
  3. Joint operations to familiarize US troops with terrain, VC tactics and Vietnamese techniques.
- E. Guides used at all camps when US forces are in the area.
- F. Interpreters - also used at all camps when US forces are in area.
- G. Joint Operations.
1. Tra Bong, I CTZ.
  2. 1 Nov 65, USMC on driving force.
  3. Newspaper woman, Dickie Chappelle, killed.
  4. CIDG companies as blocking force.
- H. Delta Reconnaissance Teams.
1. Ia Drang Valley with 1st Air Cav.

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SUBJECT: S-3 VIP Briefing Notes

- a. Screen border north of river.
- b. Established that VC were moving SW to river valley and toward Chu Pong mountain.

2. Michelin Rubber Planation III CTZ. Screened southeast to determine VC exfiltration routes.

I. Operation New Life, Phuc Tuy Province, III CTZ.

1. Worked with 173d Abn Bde.
2. Screened mountains Northwest of rice harvest to determine VC strength in the area.

VI. WHERE WE EXPECT TO GO IN THE FUTURE (CHART 4).

A. Expansion of Sector/Subsector Role.

1. Thirteen new "A" detachments, five new B detachments.
2. Eight "A" and all five "B"'s will have co-equal mission of sector/subsector advisor.

B. Increased Emphasis on CA/PO.

1. Work in conjunction with sector and subsector roles.
2. Put at least 50% of our effort on CA/PO.
3. Not enough to just kill VC, we must also encourage the people to willingly support the government of Vietnam.

C. Conversion to Regional Force.

1. Reorganized TOE of CIDG company to correspond with RF TOE.
  - a. Old CIDG company, 150 men.
  - b. New company cut to 132 men.
2. Test camp for conversion is An Phu, Chau Doc Province, IV CTZ.
3. Goal is to convert 40 CIDG companies to RF during calendar year 1966.

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## D. Spearhead vs Airhead Concept.

## 1. Airhead Concept.

- a. Previously established CIDG program in remote areas.
- b. Cut off from GVN control by VC activity and/or terrain.
- c. GVN did not link-up.

## 2. Spearhead Concept.

- a. Start with population center.
- b. Organize CIDG program.
- c. Enlist assistance of district chief and district officials.
- d. Move to new location with CIDG program and GVN officials.
- e. Example Vinh Thanh, II CTZ.
- f. 1st Cav provided security and Engineer support.
- g. Originally 10,000 people in valley when VC drove them out in 1964.
- h. CIDG established camp and resettled 6,500 refugees back in the valley.

## 3. Improved ground recon capability.

- a. CIDG Combat Recon platoon per camp.
  - (1) 34 men indigenous to local area.
  - (2) Extra training in scouting & patrolling and small unit tactics.
  - (3) Centralized training at VNSF training center at Dong Ba Thin.
- b. Ho Nach Tao, III CTZ, trained long range teams to verify targets for first B-52 strikes in III CTZ, 24 hours before strike.
- c. Dak Pek -- Long Range patrol along Laos border from 5 to 10 December discovered wide dirt road completely covered by tree canopy being used by elephants and carts to infiltrate supplies. Also found way station

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SUBJECT: S-3 VIP Briefing Notes

capable of harboring two VC companies at a time.

4. Special Mission Task.

We are prepared on order to assume the mission involving:

- a. Ground reconnaissance.
- b. Location & detection of VC and/or PAVN routes of communication and infiltration.
- c. Interdiction of these routes with air.
- d. And to a limited degree ground follow-up.

VII. COMPARATIVE RESULTS. (SEE CHART 5).

VIII. CONTINUING PROBLEM AREAS.

A. Ethnic minorities.

1. Khmer Sereai.

- a. Political party composed of Vietnam born, Cambodian ethnic group.
- b. Populate border area in III and IV Corps.
- c. Goal is overthrow of Sihanouk.
- d. We have 17 Cambodian companies in our camps.
- e. We are directing them in pursuit of the VC, however periodically we experience some difficulty in keeping them from attempting their stated goals.

2. FULRO

Unit 1 Front for the Liberation of the Oppressed Race.

- a. Small undertones all year.
- b. Hinders our efforts with Montagnard program.
- c. Buon Brieng closed in Sept.
- d. Period 17 to 20 Dec threats and unrest in Montagnard camps.

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Incl 9 Cont'd



SUBJECT: S-3 VIP Briefing Notes

e. However contrary to past uprisings no CIDG camp were actively involved.

3. Leadership of VNSF.

- a. A problem in attrition.
- b. Young leaders being killed off over years.
- c. Remainder migrate to staff.
- d. Placing increased emphasis on VNSF training center at

Dong Ba Thin.

4. Command & Control Aircraft.

a. The C & B det are solely dependent upon Corps Senior Advisors for Command and control aircraft to exercise supervision of camps. With rapid escalation and buildup, majority of aircraft previously available to the Senior Advisor have been diverted to support combat operations of U.S. units. This resulted in a marked decrease in command and control aircraft to support the CIDG program.

b. We are presently limited to a total of three U-1A, Otters, and one Huey here at the SFOB. The minimum required to effectively accomplish the mission of Command and Control would be two Huey's, or equivalent fixed expanded to thirteen. The total of twenty-one minimum would be used to support the force structure previously indicated in the briefing. This force is spread over a 600 by 200 mile area and is equivalent of 5 U.S. combat divisions which would normally be supported by 5 Aviation Battalions. We desire the equivalent of an Aviation Company.

5. Engineer Support.

Recently approved expansion program require construction of 18 new Base areas. We lack the organic engineer personnel and equipment. Construction is a problem area, however not one we cannot lick. Our two Seabee support teams were released effective 1 January 1966. USARV directed the 18th Engineer Bde to provide equivalent support. This they are unable to do at present due to lack of air mobile equipment. We are continuing in the expansion program to use local labor and contractors. Due to increased cost of labor and material, brought about by rapid expansion of US forces, our expenditure in this area will increase significantly.

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Incl 9 Cont'd



CHART 1

STRENGTH & ASSETS COMPARISON

	<u>DEC 64</u>	<u>JUL 65</u>	<u>DEC 65</u>	<u>JUN 66</u>
USASF	1,356	1,505	1,592	1,988
CIDG	19,900	22,100	28,200	35,000
NUNGS	1,600	1,600	2,300	3,000
RF/PF	-0-	17,500	28,800	42,000
TOTAL VN	21,500	41,200	59,300	80,000
CAMFS	49	65	78	96

CHART 2

ADDITIONAL MISSIONS & TASKS

1. SECTOR/SUBSECTOR ROLE
2. IMMEDIATE ACTION TASKS
3. SPECIAL IN-COUNTRY MISSIONS
4. INCREASED SUPPORT TO MACSOG
5. OPNS WITH U.S. COMBAT FORCES

CHART 3

OPERATIONS WITH U.S. COMBAT FORCES

- A. ASSISTING ADVANCE PARTIES
- B. TEMPORARY STAGING AND BASE AREAS
- C. INTELLIGENCE OF LOCAL AREA
- D. AREA INDOCTRINATION
- E. GUIDES
- F. INTERPRETERS - LANGUAGE ASSISTANCE
- G. JOINT PATROLS AND OPERATIONS
- H. DELTA RECONNAISSANCE

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Incl 9 Cont'd



## CHART 4

WHERE WE EXPECT TO GO IN THE FUTURE

1. EXPANSION OF SECTOR/SUBSECTOR ROLE
2. INCREASED EMPHASIS ON CA/PO
3. CONVERSION TO RF
4. SPEARHEAD VS AIRHEAD CONCEPT
5. IMPROVED GROUND RECON CAPABILITY
6. SPECIAL MISSION TASK

## CHART 5

COMPARISON OF RESULTS

1. TOTAL CASUALTIES:	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>VC</u>			
	1963	151	413	1701		
	1964	159	1502	2137		
	1965	237	2594	4366		
2. KIA's:	<u>VC/U.S.</u>	<u>VC/CIDG</u>	<u>U.S.</u>	<u>CIDG</u>	<u>VC</u>	
	1963	74/1	10.3/1	13	93	963
	1964	51/1	2.9/1	23	396	1153
	1965	76/1	4.0/1	34	666	2566
3. SECTOR/SUBSECTOR TEAMS:						
	<u>APR 65</u>	<u>DEC 65</u>	<u>JUN 66</u>			
	2	41	54			
4. REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT:						
	1964	11,200				
	1965	43,000				

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Incl 9 Cont'd



CHART 6

CONTINUING PROBLEM AREAS

1. ETHNIC MINORITIES
  - A. KHYMER SEREAI
  - B. FULRO
2. LEADERSHIP OF VNSF
3. COMMAND AND CONTROL AIRCRAFT
4. ENGINEER SUPPORT

Incl 9 Cont'd



Inclosure 10 (USASF Det A-215 Support of 1st Cav Div Operations) to Quarterly Command Report for Period ending 31 Dec 65, HQ, 5th SFGA, 10 Jan 66.

HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-B

1 January 1966

SUBJECT: USASF Det A-215 Support of 1st Cav Div Operations, 27 Oct - 1 Nov 65

1. On 27 October, the 1st Bn, 12th Inf, 1st Cav Div, began conducting operations in the vicinity of Duc Nhiep (YA 885240), 13 Km east of Camp Duc Co. The Bn S-3 arrived at Camp Duc Co to conduct coordination with the Detachment Commander, Captain Johnson. This officer informed the Detachment Commander of the mission, disposition and activities of his unit and requested a USASF representative at the Bn CP to conduct a briefing on the area of operations for the unit commanders and staff.

2. The Battalion CP was located near the village of Duc Nhiep, and Company B of that Battalion had just completed moving through the village without locating any Viet Cong. The Battalion CO decided to move the company back through the village the next day, on 28 October. SSG Stevens and his interpreter accompanied the operation which was accomplished without incident. The company commander stated that he did not believe that there were any Viet Cong in the village, but followed the advice of SSG Stevens by conducting a detailed house to house search. The areas approximately 20 to 30 meters from the houses were checked, and the company found a cache containing approximately 2000 kilos of rice, 9000\$VN and some Viet Cong documents. The rice was transported to Duc Co and distributed to the refugees at that location. While the search was being conducted, SSG Stevens and his interpreter were looking for persons previously reported by agents as being Viet Cong. One aged located and interrogated, revealing the name of another Viet Cong. He agreed to cooperate, turned in his weapon, and guided a patrol to a concealed position containing five Viet Cong. These people were captured with four carbines and one MAS 49. The man who led the patrol to the VC hideout and his family were placed on a helicopter and sent to the Cheiu Hoi center in Pleiku. The interpreter told the villagers that they would be rewarded for weapons turned in and that all Cheiu Hoi personnel would be sent to Pleiku. Two more Cheiu Hoi personnel reported in very soon after that with one carbine and two M-26 grenades. More people began bringing in information, some of which led to the capture of the VC Village Chief, one platoon leader, and one squad leader. A total of 13 VC were captured with ten weapons and numerous grenades.

3. The Cavalry Company had neither an interpreter nor the intelligence coverage on the area to expose the VC infrastructures in the village of Duc Nhiep. This was accomplished primarily by close coordination with USASF personnel who had experience in the area to accomplish this type of mission.



Inclosure 11 (Khe Sanh Operation) to Quarterly Command Report for period ending 31 Dec 65, HQ, 5th SFGA, 10 Jan 66.

HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-B

1 January 1966

SUBJECT: Khe Sanh Operations, 29 November 1965

On 29 November 1965, an agent reported at Camp Khe Sanh (I CTZ) that the PAVN Division was located in Laos. On 6 December, another agent reported 4 PAVN Battalions had crossed the Vietnam-Laos border at XD 6655 and moved northwest. A patrol operating out of Khe Sanh reported monitoring Chinese Voice Transmissions on their radio. An agent reported a sizeable Viet Cong force located between the patrol and Camp Khe Sanh. The patrol doubled back and made contact with the force, resulting in 32 Viet Cong KIA plus a considerable amount of Chicom equipment captured. Accurate and timely intelligence enabled this unit to engage a far superior force and inflict heavy casualties with relatively minor casualties themselves.



Annex 1 to Inclosure 11 (Items Captured from Viet Cong at Khe Sanh) to Quarterly Command Report for Period Ending 31 Dec 65, HQ, 5th SFGA, 10 Jan 66.

HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE). 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-B

1 January 1966

SUBJECT: Items Captured from Viet Cong at Khe Sanh

2 rolls commo wire  
1 radio telephone (DAITU LAN 1 )  
NAM 61  
1 plastic canteen and 1 metal canteen  
1 pistol belt  
1 telephone (252B) 60.2.5000  
(0743)  
1 leather belt w/ holster, ammo pouch, cloth pouch, and canteen cover  
420 rds 7.62mm ammo w/ 31/57 on case  
1 small mirror  
1 metal medicine case 13  
6 60mm mortar rds -----11-65  
60  
14 30 rd magazines (7.62mm) curved  
2 15 rd magazines Carbine  
17 hand grenades w/ carrier  
3 shovels, personnel  
1 food bandolier w/ 5 food packets rice  
1 120 rd 7.62mm drum for MG 34 chambered 7.62mm  
1 60mm mortar w/handle: MMN 20296 AB N20296 321803 289 605647  
2 US carbines 6780223 & 7506003 (captured by VC & ambushed)  
4 CHICOM assault rifles with markings AK Assault Rifle  
947625  
947184  
9474949  
947559  
1 magazine 63136 assembly, Chinese carbine, outside left receiver 7063136 w/folding  
bayonet  
3 rucksacks  
1 mosquito net  
1 deck of cards  
1 metal bowl w/spoon  
1 pistol 9mm SN left side over grip 11003883 66 1964

All VC were wearing grey uniforms and were all VN; VC units of this area are primarily  
"Bru" Montagnard.



# THE ROLE OF US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES (USASF) IN VIETNAM

## GENERAL:

The US Special Forces commitment in Vietnam began as a mobile training team augmentation for MAAG. Later, the CIA sponsored a Special Forces effort to extend governmental control in certain remote areas. COMUSMACV assumed responsibility for Special Forces operations in 1963, eventually placing all deployed detachments under the operational control of the Senior Corps Advisors. The Commanding Officer of the 5th Special Forces Group exercises command (less operational control of the deployed detachments) over all Special Forces in Vietnam.

## MISSIONS:

The cold war mission of US Special Forces is to train and assist indigenous forces in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations. COMUSMACV has assigned the following specific missions to the 5th Special Forces Group:

### 1. PROVIDE ADVISORY ASSISTANCE TO VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES (VNSF):

This mission encompasses training and advisory activities for the VNSF, Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG), and Project Delta. Project Delta is a combat force composed of reconnaissance teams and airborne ranger companies for use on special missions as directed by the Vietnamese High Command. US Advisory personnel are assigned down to platoon level. The concept of DELTA's employment envisions the use of the reconnaissance teams to find and fix targets for attack by airborne ranger companies, other combat troops, or air strikes.

### 2. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES FOR THE CONDUCT OF BORDER SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS:

In carrying out this mission, USASF detachments are deployed along with VNSF detachments and CIDG troops in a series of camps along the Cambodian and Laotian border areas. Past experience has demonstrated the need for establishing border surveillance camps near population resources. These resources can then be exploited for intelligence as well as serving as a recruiting source for CIDG companies.

### 3. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS AGAINST VC WAR ZONES:

This mission is currently being executed against war zones C and D in III CTZ. The concept of operation provides for a series of USASF advised and supported VNSF/CIDG camps situated along the periphery of the war zones. Reconnaissance

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Inclosure 12 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



THE ROLE OF US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES (USASF) IN VIETNAM (CONT'D)

and combat patrols from these camps move into the fringes of VC "safe areas" where they attack the VC and destroy supply caches.

4. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF BASES FOR CONDUCTING OPERATIONS TO INTERDICT VC INTERNAL MOVEMENT CORRIDORS:

This mission is executed by USASF advised VNSF/CIDG camps astride the routes used by the VC for moving guerrillas and equipment in and out of their "safe areas". Such camps must be located in a populated area for the same reasons discussed under mission 2.

5. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IN SUPPORTING SUCH OPERATIONS AS DIRECTED BY COMUSMACV:

Employing USASF Detachments to exploit the refugee potential in eastern Binh Dinh Province by bolstering RF/PF activities, using USASF advised CIDG troops to relieve regular ARVN units in the remote central highlands for deployment to more critical areas, and the exploitation of certain B-52 strikes are examples of "fire brigade" type actions assigned to USASF. The build up and subsequent expansion of the tactical roles of U.S. combat forces have resulted in combined US/CIDG operations employing USASF advised CIDG troops in the "Apache Scout Concept". This concept of employment parallels the use of Apache Scouts with U.S. Army units during the Indian Wars. Specifically, the CIDG units and the USASF personnel controlling the units are employed under the tactical direction of the senior U.S. ground commander as guides, reconnaissance elements to find and fix VC targets, blocking forces, and security and terminal guidance elements for LZ's and DZ's. CIDG troops available for employment under the "Apache Scout" concept are obtained from the CIDG camps nearest the area of operation or from specific Apache units when formed by the resident Corps USASF C Detachments.

6. PROVIDE ADVISORY ASSISTANCE TO PROVINCE AND DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS:

This mission is a logical result of situations where USASF detachments were the only resident US advisory element located in the more remote and less populated districts. The sector and subsector advisory mission is usually performed in conjunction with one of the other missions discussed above. It includes advisory support for Regional and Popular Forces, and intensive CA/PO efforts to energize the civil government apparatus.

7. PROVIDE CIVIL AFFAIRS AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (CA/PO) ADVICE AND ASSISTANCE WHEREVER POSSIBLE:

This basic counterinsurgency mission is being carried out in all



## THE ROLE OF US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES (USASF) IN VIETNAM (CONT'D)

areas where USASF operational detachments are located. Special Forces detachments have been tailored specifically for this task by Special CA/PO augmentation and training.

### ORGANIZATION:

The organizational structure of the 5th SF Gp(Abn) provides a command, control, and logistical Special Forces Operational Base (SFOB) at Nha Trang with a liaison and MACV staff section located near MACV headquarters in Saigon. A Special Forces Control "C" Detachment is co-located with each of the four MACV Corps Advisory Detachments. Control "B" Detachments are deployed in the corps areas at locations where they can best influence the actions of their subordinate "A" Detachments. "B" Detachments for the most part are located near provincial capitals or divisional headquarters. "A" Detachments are located in CIDG camps deployed tactically in support of assigned missions. Whenever possible, the "A" Detachments are co-located with the district headquarters to facilitate district advisory activities. This organizational structure, after completion of the FY 66 build-up, will encompass 4 "C" Detachments, 16 "B" Detachments and some 72 "A" Detachments.

### CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS:

CIDG troops are organized into 150-man light infantry companies oriented and equipped for squad through company size combat and reconnaissance patrol operations. They can be effectively used to conduct raids on VC supply bases, ambush VC routes of communication, limited search and clear operations, and serve as a blocking force for larger combined operations. They lack the organic fire support, training, motivation, and inherent leadership to attack large VC troop concentrations or assault major VC fortified positions. They cannot be expected to replace conventional units in conducting large clear and hold operations. They can be used to follow up these operations to solidify the local security situation and to conduct population and resources control activities.

### ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT:

Administrative support for the USASF effort is provided primarily through the CIDG special funding program, with money available for both payroll and logistical procurement purposes. Expenditures from this fund are restricted to activities directly associated with the USASF CIDG program. This funding system provides the flexibility to allow timely response to critical situations. Almost all USASF supplies are delivered by air, at a rate of almost ten million pounds per month.

### COMMAND AND STAFF RELATIONSHIPS:

Detachments deployed in the various corps areas are under the operational control of the Corps Senior Advisors. In some cases, this operational control is passed from corps to divisions through the

Incl 12 Cont'd

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THE ROLE OF US ARMY SPECIAL FORCES (USASF) IN VIETNAM (CONT'D)

appropriate USASF "C" Detachment. The Commanding Officer, 5th SF Gp(Abn) exercises command of those detachments not deployed in the corps structure (Delta Project, VNSF training center, etc.) and command less operational control of all other detachments. He also exercises staff advisory and supervisory activities as COMUSMACV's staff officer for special warfare.

SUMMARY:

The USASF in Vietnam are deployed to discharge missions spanning the complete scope of counterinsurgency. The organizational structure has been tailored to meet the CA/PO, intelligence, and operational requirements associated with the full counterinsurgency effort. The USASF are backed up with a flexible logistical procurement system and a highly responsive aerial delivery capability which will allow the total effort to be quickly focused on critical requirements. It has a highly responsive multi-channel communication system plus command and staff agencies necessary to plan and control special operations as required. It is thus a valuable complement to other US advisory and operational assets in Vietnam, but a substitute for none.

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Incl 12 Cont'd



## OPERATIONAL BRIEFING NARRATIVE

### 1. INTRODUCTION

SIR I AM CAPT \_\_\_\_\_ ASST S3. I WILL GIVE YOU A 30 MINUTE ORIENTATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP.

I SHALL COVER THE ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION OF TEAMS, THE MISSIONS WE PERFORM, THE ASSETS WE HAVE AND THE RESULTS OBTAINED THUS FAR.

2. THE 5TH SFG IS ORGANIZED INTO A SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL BASE HERE AT NHA TRANG AND "A", "B" AND "C" DETACHMENTS IN THE FIELD. (MAP) THE SFOB IS MADE UP OF THE HQS & HQS COMPANY, SIGNAL COMPANY AND THE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT CENTER. THE HQS AND SIGNAL CO'S ARE SELF-EXPLANTORY. THE LSC SUPPLIES OUR DISPERSED AND REMOTE LOCATIONS FROM HERE ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY BY AIR. FOR EXAMPLE, DURING THE MONTH OF SEPTEMBER WE MOVED NEARLY 9 MILLION POUNDS OF SUPPLIES BY AIR TO OUR OPERATIONAL DETACHMENTS. DURING THE SEIGE OF PLEI ME IN THE LATTER PART OF OCTOBER, 313,000 POUNDS WERE AIRDROPPED INTO THE CAMP FROM HERE. IN AN EMERGENCY, WE CAN DELIVER SUPPLIES TO ANY LOCATION IN COUNTRY WITHIN 3 TO 5 HOURS. NHA TRANG IS ALSO THE LOCATION FROM WHICH COL MCKEAN EXERCISES COMMAND, LESS OPERATIONAL CONTROL, OF THE 77 SEPARATE SPECIAL FORCES CAMPS, (MAP) STRETCHING OVER THE WIDTH AND LENGTH OF SOUTH VIETNAM FROM KHE SANH JUST BELOW THE 17TH PARALLEL TO PHU QUOC ISLAND IN THE GULF OF SIAM.

3. (MAP) AS YOU LOOK AT THE MAP THE YELLOW FLAGS INDICATE THE "C" DETS, THE BLUE FLAGS INDICATE "B" DETS, AND THE BLACK FLAGS, "A" DETS. THOSE FLAGS WITH A SMALL YELLOW SQUARE IN THE TOP LEFT HAND CORNER DENOTE THE DETACHMENTS WHICH HAVE A CO-EQUAL MISSION AS SECTOR OR SUBSECTOR ADVISORS TO THE DISTRICT OR PROVINCE CHIEFS IN ADDITION TO THEIR CIDG MISSION.



4. THE "C" DETACHMENTS (CHART 1 ORGN OF "C" TEAM) ARE ORGANIZED AS YOU SEE ON THE CHART WITH A LT COL COMMANDING AND A NORMAL UNIT LEVEL STAFF. IN ADDITION TO THOSE PERSONNEL SHOWN ON THE CHART EACH "C" TEAM IS AUGMENTED WITH A CIVIC ACTION OFFICER, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OFFICER AND ADDITIONAL COMMO PERSONNEL. THE "C" DET IS A COMMAND AND CONTROL HQS CO-LOCATED WITH EACH OF THE VIETNAMESE ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS (MAP). WE HAVE 4 "C" DETS: C-1 LOCATED AT DANANG WITH FIRST CORPS, C-2 AT PLEIKU WITH SECOND CORPS, C-3 AT BIEN HOA WITH THIRD CORPS, AND C-4 WITH FOURTH CORPS IN CAN THO. THE "C" TEAM COMMANDERS COME UNDER THE OPERATIONAL CONTROL OF THE CORPS SENIOR ADVISORS.

5. THE "B" DETACHMENTS ARE ORGANIZED AS YOU SEE ON THIS **SECOND** CHART (CHART 2, ORGN OF "B" TEAM) WITH A MAJOR COMMANDING AND NORMAL UNIT STAFF, AUGMENTED SIMILAR TO THE "C" TEAM WITH CA/PSY WAR AND COMMO PERSONNEL. IN ADDITION THOSE "B" TEAMS THAT HAVE A CO-EQUAL SECTOR ADVISORY ROLE ALSO HAVE ONE OFFICER AS THE RF/PF ADVISOR. WE PRESENTLY HAVE 11 "B" DETS IN COUNTRY (MAP) DENOTED BY THE BLUE FLAGS. EIGHT OF THE "B" TEAMS ARE IN A COMMAND AND CONTROL ROLE. SIX OF THE 8 ALSO HAVE THE CO-EQUAL SECTOR ADVISORY MISSION. THERE ARE ALSO 3 SPECIAL "B" TEAMS. THE FIRST IS LOCATED AT DONG BA THIN (MAP). THEY ADVISE AND ASSIST THE VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES AT THEIR MAIN TRAINING CENTER. THEY CONDUCT TRAINING OF THE VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN. IN ADDITION, THEY CONDUCT A FOUR WEEK LEADERSHIP TRAINING PROGRAM FOR CIDG PLATOON AND SQUAD LEADERS AND A FOUR WEEK COURSE FOR CIDG COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE PLATOONS FROM EACH "A" TEAM CAMP. THE SECOND "B" TEAM OPERATES WITH PROJECT DELTA. THIS IS THE LARGEST OF THE "B" TEAMS, CONSISTING OF 55 US SPECIAL FORCES PERSONNEL.



IT IS ORGANIZED INTO 1 HQS ELEMENT, 12 RECON TEAMS OF 2 USASF AND 8 VIETNAMESE EACH, AND 4 VIETNAMESE AIRBORNE/RANGER COMPANIES WITH U.S. ADVISORS DOWN TO PLATOON LEVEL. THEY PERFORM ALL SPECIAL OPERATIONS WITHIN THE LIMITS OF SOUTH VIETNAM. THE REMAINING "B" TEAM WORKS WITH A STAFF DIVISION OF MACV HQ WHICH IS CONCERNED WITH CLASSIFIED PROJECTS.

6. THE "A" DETACHMENT IS THE BACKBONE OF THE SPECIAL FORCES EFFORT. THESE ARE THE PEOPLE WHO ARE LIVING IN THE REMOTE AREAS OF VIETNAM AND ARE DOING THE WORK. WE PRESENTLY HAVE 60 "A" DETS IN COUNTRY. 32 OF THEM HAVE CO-EQUAL MISSION OF SUBSECTOR ADVISOR IN ADDITION TO THEIR CIDG ROLE. 11 OF THE DETS ARE HERE TDY FROM THE 1ST SPECIAL FORCES GROUP IN OKINAWA. IN ADDITION TO BEING VOLUNTEERS, 68% OF THE MEN IN THE "A" DETS ARE RETURNEES WHO HAVE SPENT AT LEAST ONE PREVIOUS TOUR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. MANY OF THEM HAVE BEEN HERE THREE OR FOUR TIMES AND ARE CONSIDERED EXPERTS IN THEIR FIELDS. THE "A" DET IS TAILORED TO FUNCTION MOST EFFECTIVELY WITHIN THE THREE PHASES OF THE RURAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM (CHART 3-3 "A" TEAMS) THE CLEARING, SECURING AND DEVELOPING STAGES. DURING THE CLEARING STAGE WE ARE PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN MILITARY OPERATIONS. WE MUST BUILD A CAMP AND CLEAR THE AREA OF THE OVERT MILITANT VC POWER. TO ACCOMPLISH THIS WE USE THE NORMAL 12 MAN UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TOE "A" DET WITH TWO MINOR MODIFICATIONS. THE JUNIOR DEMOLITIONS SPECIALIST IS RETRAINED AS AN ASSISTANT INTELLIGENCE SERGEANT AND THE SENIOR COMBAT DEMOLITIONS SPECIALIST IS REDESIGNATED AS A COMBAT ENGINEER TO EMPHASIS HIS CONSTRUCTIVE RATHER THAN HIS DESTRUCTIVE CAPABILITIES. DURING THE SECURING STAGE (POINT TO CHART 3) WE ARE PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN FERETING OUT THE VC INFRASTRUCTURE AND REPLACING IT WITH GVN CONTROL. TO DO THIS WE PLACE ADDITIONAL EMPHASIS ON



INTELLIGENCE GATHERING AND SHORT TERM MAXIMUM IMPACT CIVIC ACTION AND PSY WAR PROJECTS. THE "A" DET IS AUGMENTED WITH TWO ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL. AN EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR CA/PO AND A CA/PO NCO. THE OFFICER IS SCHOOL TRAINED AND THE NCO IS GIVEN CROSS TRAINING IN CA/PO. THE NCO NORMALLY HAS A BASIC MOS AS A MEDIC OR ENGR SO THAT HIS PRIMARY SKILLS FIT DIRECTLY INTO THE CIVIC ACTION PROGRAM. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT THESE ARE THE ONLY TWO MEN WORKING IN THE CA/PO FIELD. WHAT THE AUGMENTATION DOES IS GIVE THE "A" DET COMMANDER GREATER FLEXIBILITY SO THAT HE NOW HAS A 14 MAN TEAM TO USE AS HE SEES FIT. THERE MAY BE 4 TO 6 MEN IN A TEAM INVOLVED IN CIVIC ACTION AND PSY OPERATIONS. AND CONVERSELY, THE CA/PO PERSONNEL CAN BE USED ON COMBAT OPERATIONS. DURING THE DEVELOPMENT STAGE (POINT TO CHART 3) GREATER EMPHASIS IS PLACED ON CIVIC AND POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT. MILITARY OPERATIONS ARE DIMINISHED DURING THIS PERIOD. WE DEVELOP THE ECONOMY OF THE AREA AND ESTABLISH FIRM GVN CONTROL OVER THE POPULATION. AS CONTROL PASSES TO THE LOCAL CIVILIAN GOVERNMENT WE TAILOR DOWN THE "A" DET TO THE MINIMUM ESSENTIAL U.S. PERSONNEL REQUIRED TO INSURE THAT THE LOCAL OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO CONTROL THE AREA SUCCESSFULLY. EVENTUALLY WE WILL BE ABLE TO PHASE U.S. PERSONNEL OUT COMPLETELY.

7. THE MISSIONS ASSIGNED TO SPECIAL FORCES ARE SHOWN HERE (CHART 4 - MISSIONS). BORDER SURVEILLANCE WAS DEVELOPED IN 1964 IN IV CORPS. THE ORIGINAL PLAN WAS TO EXTEND THE BORDER PROGRAM ALONG THE ENTIRE VIETNAMESE BORDER (POINT ON MAP); HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF A LACK OF POPULATION IN I & II CORPS AND THE DENSE VEGETATION IN THE BORDER AREA, IT WAS NOT FEASIBLE TO CONDUCT BORDER SURVEILLANCE IN THESE REGIONS. TODAY WE ARE CONDUCTING BORDER SURVEILLANCE FROM THE GULF OF SIAM AT HA TIEN (MAP)



THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRETY OF IV CORPS UP AS FAR AS BU DOP (MAP) IN III CORPS. IN ADDITION THERE IS INTERMITTANT SURVEILLANCE FROM SUCH ISOLATED OUTPOSTS AT DUC CO, DAK PEK, ASHAU AND KHE SANH (MAP).

OUR SECOND MISSION IS TO INTERDICT INTERNAL VC ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION. (POINT TO CHART 4) THIS IS DONE PRIMARILY IN II AND III CORPS. IN II CORPS WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A BELT OF CAMPS (SHOW ON MAP) TO INTERDICT THE NORTH-SOUTH FLOW OF VC TRAFFIC WITHIN COUNTRY. IN III CORPS A BELT OF CAMPS HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED TO CUT VC COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN WAR ZONE "C" IN TAY NINH PROVINCE (SHOW ON MAP) AND WAR ZONE "D" IN LONG KHANH PROVINCE.

THE THIRD MISSION (CHART) IS OPERATIONS AGAINST THE WAR ZONES THEMSELVES. WE ARE PRESENTLY RINGING WAR ZONE "C" (MAP) IN THE NORTHERN HALF OF TAY NINH PROVINCE WITH "A" TEAMS. THE CIDG MAKE LIMITED PENETRATIONS AGAINST THE PERIPHERIES OF THE WAR ZONES TO HARASS THE VC AND KEEP THEM OFF BALANCE. THIS IS ALSO TRUE OF OPERATIONS AGAINST WAR ZONE "D". IN THIS AREA WE ARE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF BUILDING CAMPS.

WE HAVE 3 SPECIAL MISSIONS ALSO. THE FIRST OF THESE IS THE MONTAGNARD PROGRAM (CHART). THIS IS A CARRYOVER FROM THE DAYS WHEN SPECIAL FORCES WORKED FOR CIA BACK IN 1961. AT THAT TIME WE WENT INTO AREAS THAT WERE ISOLATED FROM GVN CONTROL EITHER BY VC ACTIVITY OR TERRAIN. THE AREAS WERE PRIMARILY IN THE WESTERN PORTIONS OF I AND II CORPS (MAP). THIS DID NOT WORK TOO WELL BECAUSE WHEN THE AMERICANS PHASED OUT, THE VIETNAMESE ALSO LEFT AND THE MONTAGNARDS WENT BACK TO THEIR TRIBAL WAY OF LIFE. THE EMPHASIS NOW IS ON THE PIEDMONT REGION OF THE HIGHLANDS, CLOSER TO THE EAST COAST (MAP). IN 1964 THE VC DROVE THOUSANDS OF REFUGEES FROM THE HIGHLANDS TO THE COASTAL PLAIN. WE ARE NOW TAKING THE REFUGEES PLUS THEIR GOVERNMENTAL OFFICIALS,



TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THEM, AND THEN MOVING BACK UP INTO THE VALLEYS OF THE PIEDMONT AREA TO RESETTLE UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL. EXAMPLES OF THIS ARE VINH THANH WHERE 6,500 OF THE ORIGINAL 10,000 HAVE RETURNED AND BONG SON IN II CORPS AND TRA BONG IN I CTZ (MAP).

OUR SECOND SPECIAL MISSION (CHART) IS PROJECT DELTA. THEY PERFORM SPECIAL MISSIONS IN COUNTRY. THE RECONNAISSANCE TEAMS GO INTO VC AREAS BY PARACHUTE OR HELICOPTER TO DETECT VC INSTALLATIONS. THEY ARE CAPABLE OF BRINGING OTHER FORCES OR SUPPORTING FIRES TO BEAR ON THE VC UNITS DISCOVERED. THEY DEVELOP TARGET INTELLIGENCE FOR OTHER AGENCIES AND HAVE BEEN USED EFFECTIVELY TO ASSESS B-52 STRIKES. IN ADDITION THE AIRBORNE/RANGER COMPANIES ARE USED AS THE INITIAL REACTION FORCE TO GO TO THE AID OF RESEIGED CAMPS, AS WAS THE CASE AT FLEI ME.

OUR OPERATIONS WITH U.S. FORCES (CHART) ARE BEST EXEMPLIFIED BY OUR "B" DET AT AN KHE (MAP) WORKING DIRECTLY WITH THE FIRST AIR CAV DIVISION. WHEN THEY GO INTO AREAS NEAR OUR CAMPS WE CROSS-ATTACH USASF AND CIDG PERSONNEL TO THE AMERICAN UNIT IN ORDER TO PROVIDE INTELLIGENCE, GUIDES, INTERPRETERS AND ASSIST IN IDENTIFYING THE VIET CONG FROM THE LOCAL POPULATION. THIS IS ALSO BEING DONE IN III CORPS WITH THE 1ST U.S. INF DIVISION (MAP).

THE LAST, BUT BY NO MEANS LEAST, OF OUR MISSION TASKS IS IN THE AREA OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION (CHART). ALL CAMPS ARE VITALLY INVOLVED IN THESE FIELDS PARTICULARLY THOSE TEAMS WHICH HAVE THE CO-EQUAL SECTOR OR SUBSECTOR ADVISORY ROLE. ACTUALLY, MORE THAN 50% OF OUR EFFORT IS IN CA/PO. WE FIND THAT IT'S NOT ENOUGH TO JUST GO OUT AND KILL VC, WE HAVE TO FOLLOW THROUGH TO WIN THE HEARTS AND MINDS OF THE PEOPLE BY CAREFULLY



PLANNED CIVIC ACTION AND PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS.

8. THE RESOURCES WE HAVE AVAILABLE TO US (CHART - MANPOWER RESOURCES) ARE SHOWN HERE. THE FIRST IS THE VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES. THEY ARE OUR COUNTERPARTS, REGULAR VIETNAMESE ARMY PERSONNEL ORGANIZED SIMILARLY TO U.S. SPECIAL FORCES. THEY COMMAND THE CIDG CAMPS. WE ADVISE, ASSIST AND MONITOR THE VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES IN THE CONDUCT OF THE CIDG PROGRAM. THE CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUP PERSONNEL ARE JUST THAT(CHART), - CIVILIAN IRREGULARS. THEY ARE CIVILIANS RECRUITED ON A PARAMILITARY BASIS FROM THE LOCAL AREA AROUND THE CAMPS. THE VNSF RECRUIT, TRAIN, EQUIP, FEED AND PAY THEM TO SERVE IN THEIR LOCAL VILLAGES. THEY ARE CAPABLE OF CONDUCTING LOCAL SECURITY OPERATIONS UP TO COMPANY SIZE.

THE MIKE FORCE (CHART) IS A MULTI-PURPOSE REACTION AND REINFORCING FORCE LOCATED AT THE "C" TEAMS DANANG, PLEIKU, BIEN HOA AND CAN THO (MAP) AND HERE AT NHA TRANG. THIS IS A SPECIAL FORCE EQUIPPED, TRAINED AND LED BY AMERICANS SO THAT THEY ARE IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE TO GO INTO ANY AREA ON SHORT NOTICE. THE TROOPS ARE VIETNAMESE CITIZENS; HOWEVER, THEY ARE NUNGS OF CHINESE EXTRACTION. ORIGINALLY THEY CAME FROM THE MOUNTAIN AREAS OF I CORPS. UNDER THE FRENCH THEY FORMED THE 5TH NUNG DIVISION AND FOUGHT LOYALLY. THIS LOYALTY HAS NOW BEEN TRANSFERRED TO THE AMERICANS.

THE RF/PF, OR REGIONAL FORCE AND POPULAR FORCE, (CHART) ARE TROOPS THAT ARE UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PROVINCE CHIEFS AND DISTRICT CHIEFS RESPECTIVELY. THOSE DETACHMENTS WITH THE CO-EQUAL SECTOR OR SUBSECTOR ROLE ADVISE THE RF/PF. THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT UNDER THE CIDG PROGRAM WE EQUIP AND TRAIN THE CIDG, WHEREAS THE RF/PF ARE SUPPORTED BY THE MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND TRAINED AT ARVN SUPERVISED TRAINING CENTERS. WE EXERCISE ADVISORY INFLUENCE OVER THE RF/PF EFFORT.



THIS GIVES US A TOTAL OF OVER 57,000 TROOPS TO WORK WITH (CHART).

9. THE RESULTS THAT WE HAVE OBTAINED SO FAR (CHART 6 - RESULTS) ARE SHOWN HERE. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FIGURES ARE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF VIET CONG CASUALTIES AND PROBABLY MORE SIGNIFICANT IS THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REFUGEES RESETTLED UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

10. HOWEVER THIS HAS NOT BEEN WITHOUT CASUALTIES OF OUR OWN (CHART 7 - COMPARISON) IN 1963 WE SUFFERED 151 U.S. CASUALTIES. IN 1964 WE HAD ABOUT THE SAME WITH 159. HOWEVER, THIS YEAR THE TOTAL HAS JUMPED UP TO \_\_\_\_\_. YOU'LL NOTE HERE ALSO THAT THE VC TOTALS ARE SOMEWHAT MISLEADING. WE CAN VERIFY ALL OUR OWN CASUALTIES BUT WE ONLY COUNT THOSE VC THAT ARE OBSERVED BY AN AMERICAN. THIS ACCOUNTS FOR THE SMALL NUMBER OF VC WOUNDED, SINCE THEY NORMALLY TAKE ALL THE DEAD AND WOUNDED OFF THE BATTLE FIELD WHENEVER POSSIBLE.

11. SOME OF THE REASONS THAT WE HAVE BEEN SO SUCCESSFUL ARE SHOWN ON THIS CHART (CHART 8 - INHERENT ADVANTAGES). THE FIRST IS THE BASIC CROSS TRAINING OF ESSENTIAL SKILLS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY. THIS IS PRIMARILY TRUE WITH THE NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS. EACH MAN IS HIGHLY TRAINED IN HIS BASIC MOS. AS AN EXAMPLE, THE MEDICS HAVE A YEAR AND A HALF OF INTENSIVE SCHOOLING PRIOR TO COMING OVER HERE. THE OTHER MOS'S ARE EQUALLY QUALIFIED. BESIDES HIS BASIC MOS EACH MAN IS CROSS TRAINED IN OTHER SKILLS TO ADD DEPTH TO THE PROGRAM.

THE FLEXIBLE SEPARATE FUNDING SYSTEM IS THE SECOND FACTOR. WE CAN PURCHASE LOCALLY, CRITICAL ITEMS OR WE CAN CONTRACT LOCALLY FOR CONSTRUCTION, FOOD OR SUPPLIES. WE DO NOT HAVE TO GO THROUGH NORMAL FUNDING CHANNELS TO ACCOMPLISH THE JOB. IN ADDITION, THE FUNDING IS HANDLED BY USASF AT THE LOW-EST LEVEL.



THE THIRD ADVANTAGE GOES HAND IN HAND WITH THE FUNDING. AND THAT IS THE RESPONSIVE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM. WE CAN PURCHASE ITEMS DIRECTLY FROM OKINAWA, HAVE THEM DELIVERED HERE BY C-130 OR LST OVER THE BEACH. THEN THE SUPPLIES CAN BE AIRLIFTED DIRECTLY TO THE UNIT THAT NEEDS THEM.

THE LAST IS OUR SEPARATE AND COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM. WE HAVE PROBABLY THE BEST COMMUNICATIONS OF ANY UNIT IN COUNTRY. COL MCKEAN CAN WALK INTO HIS COMMAND BUNKER AND TALK DIRECTLY TO ANY "A" TEAM LEADER IN COUNTRY OVER A SINGLE SIDE BAND NET. WE ALSO HAVE RTT TO THE "C" AND "B" DETS. EACH TEAM HAS AS A BACKUP THE AN/GRC 109 FOR USE WITH INTERNATIONAL MORSE CODE. AND WE HAVE THE NORMAL FAMILY OF MILITARY F.M. RADIOS.

I HAVE GIVEN YOU AN INDICATION OF WHAT WE DO, HOW WE DO IT, AND WHY WE ARE SUCCESSFUL. THIS CONCLUDES MY PORTION OF THE BRIEFING SIR. I'LL BE MORE THAN GLAD TO ENTERTAIN ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.



### CHART 1 ("C" TEAM ORGN)

<u>CO</u>	<u>XO</u>	<u>S-1</u>	<u>S-2</u>	<u>S-3</u>	<u>S-4</u>	<u>SGT MAJ</u>	<u>INTEL SGT</u>	
LT COL	MAJ	CAPT	CAPT	CAPT	CAFT	E9	E8	(NORMAL TOE)
_____	_____	_____	_____	_____				

### CHART 2 ("B" TEAM ORGN)

<u>CO</u>	<u>XO</u>	<u>S-1</u>	
MAJ	CAPT	CAPT	(NORMAL TOE)
_____	_____	_____	

### CHART 3 (3 "A" TEAMS)

					ASST	HVY	LT	SR		CMBT		
<u>CLEARING:</u>	<u>CO</u>	<u>XO</u>	<u>OPN</u>	<u>INTEL</u>	<u>INTEL</u>	<u>WPSN</u>	<u>WPNS</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>ENGR</u>	<u>COMMO</u>	<u>COMMO</u>
	CAPT	LT	E8	E8	E5	E7	E7	E7	E5	E6	E7	E5

SECURING: XO CA/PO / CA/PO )

LT NCO

### DEVELOPING:

<u>CO</u>	<u>XO</u>	<u>INTEL</u>	<u>WPNS</u>	<u>MED</u>	<u>COMMO</u>	<u>CA/PO</u>	<u>ENGR</u>
CAPT	LT	E7	E7	E7	E5	E6	E6

### CHART 4 (MISSIONS)

1. BORDER SURVEILLANCE
2. INTERDICT INTERNAL VC ROUTES OF COMMUNICATION
3. OPERATIONS AGAINST WAR ZONES
4. SPECIAL MISSION TASKS
  - A. MONTAGNARD PROGRAM
  - B. PROJECT DELTA
  - C. OPERATIONS WITH U.S. FORCES
5. CONCURRENT CA/PO ACTIVITIES



CHART 5 (MANPOWER RESOURCES)

VNSF	3,000
CIDG	25,000
MIKE FORCE	2,000
RF/PF	27,500
	<hr/>
TOTAL	57,500

CHART 6 (RESULTS)

VC KIA (CIDG)	<hr/>
VC WIA (CIDG)	<hr/>
VCC (CIDG)	<hr/>
SUB TOTAL	<hr/>
TOTAL VC CASUALTIES	<hr/>
REFUGEES RESETTLED	<hr/>



CHART 7 (COMPARISON)

<u>1963 CASUALTIES</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USASF				
VNSF				
CIDG				
VC				

<u>1964 CASUALTIES</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USASF				
VNSF				
CIDG				
VC				

<u>1965 CASUALTIES</u>	<u>KIA</u>	<u>WIA</u>	<u>MIA</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
USASF				
VNSF				
CIDG				
VC				

CHART 8 (INHERENT ADVANTAGES)

1. BASIC CROSS TRAINING OF ESSENTIAL SKILLS FOR COUNTERINSURGENCY
2. FLEXIBLE SEPARATE FUNDING SYSTEM
3. RESPONSIVE LOGISTICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM
4. SEPARATE AND COMPREHENSIVE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM



# "C" Detachment

Det Co  
Lt Col

Adj XO

Adj Capt

S2 Capt

S3 Capt

S4 Capt

CA Off Capt

Asst CA Off 1st Lt

PO Off Capt

Asst PO Off 1st Lt

Sig Off Admin Order Of  
Capt 1st Lt

Sgt

Sgt

SGM E9

Intel Sgt E8

Ops Sgt E8

Sup Sgt E8

Asst Sup Sgt E8

Const Foreman E7

Asst Opn Asst Sup Admin  
Sgt E6

Sgt E6

Sup E7

Area Commo Ch E7

Ch Radio Opr E5

Ch Radio Opr E5

Ch Radio Opr E5

Ch Radio Opr E5

Commo Ctr Supv E5

mess Sgt E6

Opn Sgt E5

Intel Analyst E6

Sen Acc Spec E5

Order of Btl Spec E5

of Clerk Typist E4

of Clerk Typist E4

Inclosure 14 to Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965



# "B" Detachment

Lt Col CO  
 Maj XO  
 Capt S1  
 Capt S2  
 Capt S3  
 Capt S4  
 Capt CA/PO  
 Capt RF/PF


SGM E9  
 Intel Sgt E8  
 Intel Analyst E7  
 Ops Sgt E8  
 Sup Sgt E7  
 Admin Supv E6  
 Lt Wpns Ldr E7  
 Cbt Engr E7  
 Med Spec E7

Area Commo Ch E7  
 Ch Radio Opr E5  
 Ch Radio Opr E5  
 Ch Radio Opr E5  
 Radio Opr E5  
 Ch RPT Opr E4  
 RPT Opr E4  
 RPT Opr E4




# The three "A" detachments


CLEARING  
(2/10)



SECURING  
(3/9-12)



DEVELOPING  
(2/6-7)





SUBJECT: Australians at Tra Bong

Approximately three years ago there had been a Special Forces camp at Tra Bong. For reasons unknown it was closed. During the ensuing years the District Headquarters was attacked numerous times and the surrounding villages and hamlets were constantly terrorized. In order to bring the government and stability back to the people it was decided to re-open the camp.

On 28 August 1965, Camp Tra Bong was re-opened with an advisory team consisting of Australians and Americans. This organization had come about through the expressed desires of the AATTV members and the realization by the US advisors that in-country knowledge gained in counter-insurgency would be invaluable for any and all nations. Coordination was accomplished at appropriate staff levels; the composite team was formed and assigned its mission.

The team met with almost instant success. The rapport which had been established by the previous team was easily re-kindled. As in all international organizations the oil which lubes the cogs of machinery is rapport. The Australians at Tra Bong have certainly provided a shining example of this elusive emulsion by first building cooperation and understanding with their American counterparts. The team divided by nationalities displayed a united front to their Vietnamese counterparts. Observing this union of nations both the LLDB and the local government officials tried to emulate the cooperation displayed by the team. The smallest of efforts yielded monumental dividends. Obstacles fell and projects were quickly accomplished. The morale of the team and the local government officials soared. The people seeing their government in effective action rallied to the government's cause. A good example of this was the re-establishment of the intelligence net which had been dormant for three years. In a short while it was fully operational due to the people, who were and are the key to success.

The camp was opened with 3 CIDG companies and 1 Nung Company. During the first month, while the camp was being constructed, the Nung company maintained constant aggressive patrolling enabling the CIDG to concentrate their efforts on building the camp. After the initial phases of construction, the CIDG took over the patrol mission and because of persistent LLDB and counterpart leadership maintained an aggressive patrol program. The camp conducted 52 company and platoon sized operations resulting in 12 contacts, in which there were: 16 VC KIA, 18 VC WIA, 45 weapons and a 1000 kilos of rice captured. A further 23 VCC and 42 VC suspects were turned over to the District Chief.

Inclosure 15 (Australians at Tra Bong), To Quarterly Command Report for Period Ending 31 Dec 65, HQ, 5th SFG (Abn), 15 Jan 66.



SUBJECT: Australians at Tra Bong

The camp has also placed emphasis on Civic Action, conducting at least one medical patrol per month. These patrols have resulted in the treatment of 1415 patients. Four hundred and eight refugees from other areas have been brought in or came in of their own free will and were resettled in New Life Hamlets under government control. The Eastern section of the Tra Bong Complex was 80% demolished by mortar attacks and air strikes before the camp was established. The majority of the refugees in the area have moved into these ruins, repaired them with permanent type materials (logs, mud, thatch, etc.) and have made these houses their homes. At this time approximately 50 new homes have been constructed.

In summary it can be said that this camp truly encompasses all phases of counter-insurgency from military action to population and resources control and due to this it is extremely successful.

Incl 15 (over)



Inclosure 16 (CIDG in Area Pacification) To Quarterly Command Report for period ending 31 December 1965, HQ, 5th SFG(Abn), 15 Jan 66.

## SUCCESS STORY

### CIDG IN AREA PACIFICATION

#### 1. General:

Buon Ea Yang is a USASF advised CIDG Camp located in the north western part of Phuoc An district, Darlac Province. The camp was established on 28 April 1965. The USASF Detachment at this camp has a dual role of advisor to both the district chief and LLDB (VN Special Forces) detachment. Prior to the establishment of the camp the Viet Cong were well established throughout the area. The district headquarters was reestablished in a small village adjacent to the camp for protection.

#### 2. Camp Construction:

Upon arrival at the new camp site the construction of defensive positions was the primary concern. The camp was built on a small hill which dominates the valley and the village adjacent to it. During the construction particular attention was given to bunkers and entrenchments which would allow the camp to be defended by a minimum of troops. Although the majority of the construction was completed the first two months, improvements have been continuous. At the present time this camp is considered to be one of the most defensible CIDG camps in VN.

#### 3. Combat Operations:

The Strike force made contact five times during the movement to the new camp site, resulting in 32 Viet Cong killed. With this type of greeting the USASF advisors and their LLDB counterparts realized that extensive clearing operations must be conducted as soon as possible. For the first month at the new site operations were limited to local security patrols and small ambushes while camp defenses were being prepared. Beginning the first of June, company and larger size clearing operations were employed. These operations have proven very successful and resulted in the establishment of firm government control over 400 sq. kilometers. The camp has been given an additional 400 sq. kilometers operational area to clear. The CIDG from this camp conducted a total of 73 operations of company and larger size since the camp was established 8 months ago. Many of these operations were heliborne and the strike force has become very proficient on this type mission.

The results achieved by this camp are considered outstanding. They have killed 322 Viet Cong, averaging 27 VC for each CIDG killed. Several thousand people have been returned to government control and large quantities of weapons, equipment and food have been captured. They have gained the confidence of the population and have an extremely effective intelligence net which provides timely information on Viet Cong activities.



Inclosure 16 (CIDG in Area Pacification) Continued

4. Civic Action and Psychological Operations:

In conjunction with camp construction a dependent village was built. The buildings were constructed from local materials employing the selfhelp program. A three building school has been completed at the village and three teachers are available to conduct classes. A school building is being constructed in the district headquarters village which will be complete in Jan 1966. Several thousand refugees have been resettled in the surrounding villages. National highway 21 has been opened and secured by the CIDG, which has increased the economy of the local area. A ten bed Aid Station was constructed in the camp and sick call for the strike force and local civilians is conducted daily. A village health worker training program to train nurses from the local villages is in progress. Medical patrols from the camp to the outlying villages are conducted frequently.

5. Summary:

In the eight months after moving into their new operational area, Camp Buon Ea Yang has pacified a major part of what was once a completely Viet Cong dominated area. After completing the construction of one of the strongest camps in the II CTZ, CIDG forces from the camp conducted numerous combat operations which resulted in over three hundred and twenty of the enemy slain, establishing a present kill ratio of 27 to one. The degree of security offered by the camp is such that several thousand refugees have come into the area for permanent settlement. Due to its rapid success in pacifying its original operational area, an additional 400 sq km of VC dominated terrain has been assigned to Camp Buon Ea Yang to liberate. Vigorous and positive CA/Psyops programs initiated by the camp has done much to influence the people to support the government of Viet Nam. This loyalty of the residents of the area has made possible the expansion of an excellent intelligence net. As the range of combat operations of the CIDG forces increase, larger areas come under government control, bringing peace to a populace and fertile district of Darlac Province.



DETACHMENT C-3  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces, 96243

AVSF

4 January 1966

SUBJECT: B-52 Post Strike Assessment Operation "Thrust"

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th Special Forces Gp (Abn)  
1st Special Forces  
APO US Forces, 96240

1. On 5 and 6 December 1965, Detachment C-3 5th Special Forces Group (Abn), 1st Special Forces conducted a post strike assessment and analysis of two (2) target areas located in War Zone C.

2. The ground force was organized with a blocking force to cut Viet Cong escape routes from the target areas; An assessment force consisting of two companies reinforced with two reconnaissance platoons from the Multi-Purpose reaction force; A reaction force of two (2) CIDG Companies located at the forward operational base of Soui Da; and a Corps reserve consisting of one (1) ARVN Infantry Battalion located at Tay Ninh, Republic of Vietnam. Supporting forces consisted of: The 2nd Air Division providing the tactical air support; and Detachment B-32 providing the blocking and reaction forces.

3. The target areas were hit with B-52 air strikes on two successive days. Immediately following the air strikes on the morning of 5 December, the 2nd Air Division conducted pre-assault strikes, and landing zone preparation for the initial entry of the ground force in the area of interest. Meanwhile, the blocking force was in position with a series of reconnaissance and security positions extending Northeast and Southwest of the target areas. This force was moved to the blocking position prior to first light on the morning of 5 December.

4. At 051006 December one (1) "MIKE" Force company landed by helicopter on landing zone Green, followed by a second company at 051035 hours. Both landings were unopposed and without incident. However, due to lack of suitable landing zones throughout the entire area, initial entry was made, not by choice, in an area to the south of a stream with an approximate depth of 3-5 meters. The ground force experienced considerable difficulty in traversing the stream which proved to be a more than significant obstacle, costing the maneuver force precious time. After crossing the stream, the ground force moved into the first objective area FT-6. Several hours were spent in a sweep of this area, however, nothing significant was found to substantiate Viet Cong presence or activity in the area.

Inclosure 17 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



SUBJECT: B-52 Post Strike Assessment Operation "Thrust"

5. The "MIKE" Force remained overnight to the North of the first objective area and began movement at first light on the morning of 6 December to the second objective area FT-7.

6. The terrain in both target areas was generally flat and covered with thick deciduous vegetation making movement and navigation extremely difficult. The effects of the bombs in the areas after air strikes on two successive days resulted in tree blow-down averaging 50-100 meters in diameter.

7. In the second target area there were small food caches of approximately 100 kilos of rice located at XT 441631, XT 445632 and XT 420631. A Viet Cong company sized perimeter of individual foxholes and gun emplacements were discovered at XT 442625. Moreover, thirty to thirty-five log-covered foxholes, probably utilized as bomb shelters, were found at XT 442625. A probable ammunition storage area was located at XT 448685. The storage area was destroyed by pre-strike tactical air. Evidence of a secondary explosion substantiated this fact.

8. The effectiveness of the air strikes on VC/PAVN Forces in the immediate target area is unknown. There was no body count. Casualties resulting from the strike had probably been buried or evacuated from the strike area.

9. The evasive or protective techniques employed by the Viet Cong during the strike is unknown. However, the log-covered foxholes mentioned previously indicated that the enemy did take some measure of post strike protective action. Most foxholes appeared to have been occupied prior to our entry into the second objective area. However, no VC/PAVN or civilians were observed rallying as a result of the strikes, and relatively few Viet Cong Forces were observed in the surrounding area.

10. The ground force made light contact with the enemy on three occasions during the assessment. The enemy elected to avoid decisive engagement on each occasion and was never observed in groups larger than squad sized units. Upon contact, the enemy withdrew in a North, Northwest direction. An aerial observer detected three (3) probable Viet Cong KIA. No body count confirmed this fact.

11. With the exception of one CIDG member of the blocking force, who drowned while crossing a stream, no other friendly losses were sustained during the course of the operation.

12. Friendly forces captured enemy mail and several documents of Intelligence value in objective area FT-7. This material was processed through Intelligence channels. In addition, the ground force destroyed a bridge by demolitions located at XT 443628 and a Viet Cong mess hall and cooking area located at XT 440622.

Incl 17 Cont'd



AVSF

4 January 1966

SUBJECT: B-52 Post Strike Assessment Operation "Thrust"

13. Upon completing the assessment of both areas, the "MIKE" Force moved West to link up with the Blocking Force. This maneuver necessitated another river crossing operation as the Viet Cong had destroyed all bridges over the stream in the immediate area. At 061440 the "MIKE" Force linked up with the blocking force and retired from the area to the forward operational base located at Suoi Da.

14. In summary, the mission of the ground force during this operation was to conduct an area assessment of the target areas to determine the effectiveness of the strikes and the validity of the intelligence data which instigated the strikes within the two target areas. This mission was accomplished expediently and effectively considering the limited time for planning, and the nature of the terrain. That Viet Cong contact was light and no body count was made to confirm Viet Cong casualties in the target areas, does not mitigate the fact that valuable Intelligence information and experience was gained from this successful operation.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - SFOB
- 1 - TOC (SGN)
- 1 - S-3

/s/ John S. Warren  
JOHN S. WARREN  
Lt Col., Infantry  
Commanding .

Incl 17 Cont'd



SUBJECT: Tien Phouc Camp Opening

Camp Tien Phouc located in Quang Tin Province was opened on 28 November 1965 with the initial force of one USASF Team, one LLDB Team, two CIDG companies and a Nung company.

During the initial planning phase which was started in July 1965 the following problems were considered and appropriate action taken after coordination with Quang Tin Sector and 2nd ARVN Division Advisors.

a. Area assessment of the Tien Phouc area to include the reaction of the local population to a CIDG camp in their area.

b. The size of the force necessary during the construction phase to provide security for the camp. This was later determined to be one Nung company, two CIDG companies with their accompanying USASF and LLDB teams.

c. The priority for the movement of supplies was established to be ammunition, food and general supplies. These priorities were naturally preceded by personnel requirements.

d. Peculiar problems existing in the Tien Phouc area were determined to be: lack of an airfield in the near vicinity, lack of trafficable roads leading to the camp and weather; as the monsoon rains would dominate the weather pattern during the initial stages of camp construction.

Planning continued until the 20th of November. On this date the USASF team arrived and was married up with its Vietnamese counterpart. Both teams were then briefed by the C detachment and its counterpart on the tasks ahead.

D-day was 28 November. Since that day the following actions have taken place at Tien Phouc.

<u>DAY</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>TACTICAL OPERATIONS</u>
D day	110 Nungs 10 USASF 10 LLDB	8,000 lbs	7 ea H-34	Local Security
D+2	Sock rations Gen. Supplies Food CIDG pax 273	3,960 lbs 4,000 lbs 7,000 lbs	2 ea CV-2 40 ea H-34	" "
D+3	Ammo	8,300 lbs	8 ea H-34	" "
D+4	Ammo	20,000 lbs	1 ea C-130	" "
D+5	Food	4,00 lbs	1 ea CV-2	Plt. and Co size operations were initiated

Inclosure 19 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



<u>DAY</u>	<u>CARGO</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>	<u>AIRCRAFT</u>	<u>TACTICAL OPERATIONS</u>
D+8	Food	5,00 lbs	1 ea CV-2	Plt. and Co size operations were initiated
D+9	Food	5,400 lbs	6 ea H-34	"
D+11	Food	3,400 lbs	1 ea CV-2	"
D+17	Food & Supplies	30,825 lbs	6 ea CV-2	"
D+18	Food & Supplies	22,800 lbs	4 ea CV-2 3 ea H-34	"
D+19	Gen. Supplies	4,500 lbs	1 ea CV-2	"
D+23	Wire & Stakes	6,000 lbs	2 ea CV-2	"
D+24	Food & Wire	12,700 lbs	3 ea CV-2	"
D+25	Ammo	12,000 lbs	8 ea H-34	"
D+28	Food & Gen. Supplies	5,200 lbs	4 ea H-34	"
D+29	Food & Ammo Gen. Supplies	14,400 lbs	1 ea CV-2 2 ea H-34	

Since the opening of the camp a total of 177,485 lbs of supplies have been delivered to the camp.

Presently the construction of the camp is 10% complete. Heavy rains have hindered both the delivery of supplies and work on the ground. Construction will accelerate in the near future as the rainy season is coming to an end.

In spite of the arduous tasks of camp construction the forces at Tien Phouc have conducted one company sized and eleven platoon sized operations which have resulted in three VC KIA, two VC WIA, three VC and one weapon captured. Keeping Civic Action ever in mind the camp has distributed 1500 kilos of captured rice to the villagers and resettled 10 refugees.

The establishment of the CIDG camp at Tien Phouc has brought stability and the RVN government to a valley of 42,000 people.

Incl 18 Cont'd



DETACHMENT C-3  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces, 96243

AVSF

4 January 1966

SUBJECT: Xom Cat Assessment

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th Special Forces Group (Abn),  
1st Special Forces  
APO US Forces 96240

1. On 5 November 1965, Detachment C-3 with attached and supporting units, conducted a joint heliborne combat assault with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and the Australian Royal Rifles to seize objectives, and to conduct search and sweep operations in War Zone D, near the junction of the Song Be and Dong Nai Rivers.

2. The mission of the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the Australians was to find, fix, and destroy Viet Cong Forces previously reported in the vicinity of the junction of the Song Be and Dong Nai Rivers, near the village of Xom Cat (YT153244).

3. USSF missions as a part of the Joint Force consisted of the employment of the multi-purpose reaction (MIKE) force to secure the Xom Cat complex; the entry of an assessment team to conduct an area assessment of Xom Cat for the construction of a Special Forces CIDG camp and medium aircraft landing field; and the establishment of an operational base in an area previously controlled by the Viet Cong.

4. The future missions of the CIDG Forces to be located at Xom Cat will be threefold. First, to conduct combat operations in War Zone D. Second, to extend the influence of area security forces northeast of Bien Hoa Airbase. And last, to provide security for the local population who are believed to be of the Catholic and Buddhist faith, many of whom came originally from North Vietnam as refugees.

5. Prior to the assault of 5 November, the village of Xom Cat was destroyed by tactical air strikes in conjunction with an area defoliation mission. Reconnaissance flights over the area after the air-strikes revealed that with the exception of a few huts, all buildings, including the Catholic Church and Buddhist Temple were destroyed. Moreover, village crops, including banana and other fruit trees were destroyed and the village appeared to be deserted.

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Inclosure 19 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



SUBJECT: Xom Cat Assessment.

6. Based on an analysis of available intelligence information prior to the assault, it was confirmed that the Xom Cat area is a major Viet Cong route of infiltration from War Zone D to Phuoc Tuy Province. Major concentrations of Viet Cong had consistently operated to the Northeast of Xom Cat in the interior of War Zone D. Although only small units were operational in the immediate area of the Song Be and Dong Nai Rivers, larger units were known to be operating to the Northeast and West. The reaction capability of the Viet Cong for the area of interest, during the period of combat operations, was estimated to be up to two regiments in two days.

7. On D-Day 5 November, the "MIKE" Force with a total strength of 560 troops was airlifted to a pre-selected landing zone on the east bank of the Song Be River. Initial entry into the area was unopposed. Two companies secured the landing zone and screened a portion of the airhead line, while the third company conducted a sweep and search operation to the south through the village of Xom Cat to seize the final objective near the junction of the Song Be and Dong Nai Rivers. During the search of the village, one Viet Cong was captured while hiding in a cave on the bank of the river.

8. As darkness approached on the first night, the "MIKE" Force established a tenable defensive position in a tight perimeter with ambush positions as outer security. Barrier materials were air-dropped to reinforce the positions. By evening a patrol plan was developed using a saturation concept out to a distance of 5-7 kilometers. Pre-planned harassing and interdiction fires were used extensively throughout the hours of darkness.

9. At first light, reconnaissance patrols were dispatched forward of our positions, seeking contact with the Viet Cong. Routine patrols of this type destroyed an estimated 350 kilos of rice; captured Viet Cong medical supplies; one briefcase of Viet Cong documents; six male Viet Cong suspects; destroyed several sampans and evacuated a total of thirteen refugees from the area of interest. However, the "MIKE" Force made no significant contacts with organized Viet Cong Forces.

10. Friendly casualties for the "MIKE" Force during the operation were negative, however, the 173rd Airborne Brigade and the Australians suffered light to moderate losses, while the Viet Cong suffered heavy losses, especially in the tactical area of responsibility of the 173rd Airborne Brigade.

Incl 19 Cont'd



AVSF

4 January 1966

SUBJECT: Xom Cat Assessment.

11. ~~The assessment team was organized with the following members:~~  
Commanding Officer, detachment A-312, Engineer Liaison Officer, Soil specialist, Naval Liaison Officer, and ~~CA/PSYOPS Officer~~. The assessment team completed the area analysis on 7 November. However, the "MIKE" Force remained at Xom Cat until extraction on 9 November.

12. The Xom Cat assessment was successfully concluded on 17 November, and serves as an example for the opening of Special Forces CIDG camps in the III CTZ in support of the current USSF expansion program.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1- SFOB
- 1- TOC (SGN)
- 1- S-3

/s/ John S. Warren  
JOHN S. WARREN  
Lt Col., Infantry  
Commanding

Incl 19 Cont'd



HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

28 December 1965

SUBJECT: Chau Doc Success Story

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th Special Forces Group (Abn),  
1st Special Forces  
US Forces 96240

Since the assumption of the Sector Advisory role in Chau Doc Province on 1 May 1965, a great amount of effort has been exerted with many outstanding results attained. Among these successes was the establishing of a Sector Operations Intelligence Center (SOIC). Prior to the arrival of the USASF "B" Detachment, the intelligence gathering effort throughout the Province was being conducted with no coordination between the collecting agencies. This resulted in little or no dissemination of the information obtained. Under the recommendations and guidance of the USASF detachment, the SOIC was formed with representation from the Sector S-2, National Police, Military Security Service (MSS), Regional Force, Popular Force, VMSF and USASF Intelligence personnel. The SOIC was later augmented with sub-sector intelligence representatives and an intelligence team from the Chi Lang training center. The major function of the SOIC being the coordination of military operations throughout the province and a combined intelligence gathering effort by all the agencies represented. With the initial groundwork laid, the functions of the SOIC were closely monitored by the USASF detachment with appropriate recommendations being put forth when the need occurred. Problem areas that did arise, were discussed and solved at the daily meetings conducted by the SOIC. As a result of these daily meetings, an extremely efficient and highly accurate intelligence system was developed and employed. A good example of this is shown in an operation that was conducted on 21 November 1965. At 210800 November, information was received indicating that the Viet Cong were to conduct a meeting that evening. A small unit patrol was dispatched to the area and an ambush was established. At 211845 November, the ambush party made contact with an estimated thirty Viet Cong, killing fifteen of the insurgents and capturing nine. As a result of intelligence obtained through the SOIC, airstrikes accounted for seventy-eight Viet Cong killed and eighty-one wounded during the month of November. These two examples represent a minute fraction of the overall success and important role of the SOIC. The high degree of coordination that now exists between the various military units

Inclosure 20 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



28 December 1965

SUBJECT: Chau Doc Success Story

throughout the province was brought about largely through the joint efforts of the US Advisors. Through joint operations planned by the joint TOC, involving ARVN, Regional Force, Popular Force, CIDG, VN River Assault Group boats (RAG) and Vietnamese and US tactical air support, a close working relationship has developed. The outstanding degree of leadership displayed by the Province and District officials and their military leaders has contributed greatly to the overall success in producing these highly efficient fighting forces. Through the coordinated efforts of these military units, the Viet Cong threat in the province has been brought under a reasonable degree of control with the exception of a few isolated areas in the Seven Mountain region. Another facet of these highly trained fighting units, is their capability of conducting effective Civic Affairs and Psychological Warfare operations in conjunction with military operations. A good example of this was operation "Son Ca 15/41" conducted from 26 to 29 November. This particular operation involved two battalions of the 15th Regiment, 9th ARVN Division, Popular Force, Regional Force, USASF and MACV advisors. Although very little Viet Cong resistance was met, the operation was highly successful in the Civic Action and Psy Ops field. The cooperation displayed by the various military units has been exceptionally good. This can be exemplified by a relief operation conducted on 29 November in the neighboring province of Kien Phong.

At 290830 November, a CIDG FOB of Camp An Long in Hong Ngu District, Kien Phong Province, was attacked by an estimated two companies of Viet Cong. Since Camp An Long was located too far away to provide immediate help, relief was sought from units closer to the besieged FOB. Immediate response came from Chau Doc Province in the form of artillery support, ground forces and naval support. Air support was also provided from the "C" detachment in Can Tho. ARVN artillery located in An Phu placed supporting fire in the area of the FOB, while a relief force of CIDG troops from Tan Chau were being transported to the area by the Vietnamese Navy 26th River Assault Group (RAG). This combined support was further augmented by US tactical air. This is a good example of the close harmony that has been developed between the military forces through the efforts of the Province Chief, his province, district and military leaders, and their US advisors.

Another outstanding achievement of mention, is that of the introduction of Khmer Kumpuchea Krom (KKK) into the CIDG and Regional Force programs. For many years, this pro-Sihanouk Cambodian group has roamed the Seven Mountain area fighting both Viet Cong and GVN troops in their attempt to reclaim portions of the Delta region for the Cambodian people. The initial defection of the KKK to the Government of Vietnam in June of this year can be attributed to the outstanding psychological warfare employed by several District Chiefs in Chau Doc Province. Since their defection, the KKK have been utilized to a maximum in a psychological warfare program

Incl 20 Cont'd



AVSF-C

28 December 1965

SUBJECT: Chau Doc Success Story

directed at the KKK party. This effort has realized a return of over 750 KKK personnel to the Government of Vietnam. In November this year, 300 of these people were introduced into the CIDG program at Camp Tinh Bien. This program should prove to be a great asset to the Government of Vietnam in influencing other members of the KKK party, who are presently on the borderline, to return to GVN. These are but just a few of the successes accomplished throughout Chau Doc Province during the fourth quarter of 1965, yet they convey the flexibility and earnest concern that the government officials in the province are demonstrating. This high degree of success was directly attributed to the efforts and superior leadership of Major John O. Arnn, the B team commander, who was killed on 26 December 1965 by a VC land mine.

*Arthur A. Remling*

ARTHUR A. REMLING  
Captain, Infantry  
ASO IV CTZ

Incl 00 Cont'd



DETACH E T C-3  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces, 96243

AVSF

4 January 1966

SUBJECT: Relief Operations.

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th Special Forces Gp (Abn)  
1st Special Forces  
APO US Forces 96240

1. On 22 November, the "MIKE" Force conducted a reinforcing operation at Nui Ba Den. The mission was to reinforce the camp defenses and conduct aggressive, short range patrols.

2. The unit, composed of 68 CIDG, 3 USSF, and 1 interpreter, arrived at Nui Ba Den at 1600 hours 22 November. They were given a general situation briefing by MSGT Smith and the remainder of the day was spent preparing for the next days operations.

3. At 0600 hours, 23 November, one platoon of CIDG, accompanied by two USSF, departed for the upper pagoda, XT 285580, with the mission of reconnoitering the area. This patrol made contact four times with an estimated squad of Viet Cong, but lost contact when the Viet Cong withdrew to the west. The results of this contact was two CIDG wounded and unknown enemy casualties. The original mission was aborted and two squads returned to camp with the wounded. The other squads remained in the vicinity of the Pagoda XT 285580, and set up daylight ambushes. They made no further contact and returned to base camp at 0600 hours on 24 November.

4. At 1300 hours on 24 November, a recon platoon departed for the vicinity XT 284585. A water point and cave entrance were found but both were deserted. Ambushes were set for the night but no contact was made. Prior to leaving this area, the cave and water point were destroyed by demolitions. The patrol returned to camp at 0700 hours on 25 November.

5. On 25 November, a combat patrol consisting of 3 CIDG squads departed for XT 278597. Enroute, two enemy contacts were made with an estimated Viet Cong squad. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown. The patrol returned at 1500 hours.

Enclosure 21 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



AVSF

4 January 1966

SUBJECT: Relief Operations.

6. At 1445 hours 25 November, a platoon size combat patrol departed for XT 279585. This patrol received small arms fire and detonated a mine at XT 284581. This encounter resulted in one CIDG KIA, 3 CIDG WIA, and one U.S. WIA. The mission was aborted and the patrol closed into camp at 1600 hours.

7. Information from this operation confirmed that one squad of Viet Cong had been operating continuously from XT 280580 to XT 286583 and that an estimated company sized rest area is located at Pui Cau, XT 265607.

8. On 2 December, the "LIKE" Force moved to Suoi Da, Airstrip for movement back to Bien Hoa. Extraction of the force was completed on 3 December.

DISTRIBUTION:

1 - SFOB  
1 - TOC (SGF)  
1 - S-3

/s/ John S. Warren  
JOHN S. WARREN  
Lt Col., Infantry  
Commanding

Incl 21 Cont'd



HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO U S Forces, 96240

AVSFF

7 January 1966

SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report, Project Delta (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)  
1st Special Forces  
APO U S Forces 96240

1. (C) Significant Unit Activities:

a. General.

(1) During the reporting period Project Delta worked as follows:

- (a) Operational days - 34
- (b) Training days - 28
- (c) Troop movement days - 15

b. Personnel.

(1) Following an operation in the area west of Plei Me and Pleiku, 11 of 13 Americans and 6 Nungs who had participated came down with malaria.

(2) By direction of CO, 5th Special Forces Group, a new proposed TUCR is being prepared to meet the expanding requirements of Delta's mission.

(3) Two USAF Forward Air Controllers have become a part of Project Delta. They will provide quicker and more productive air strikes to committed Delta Teams.

(4) The 145th Airlift Platoon (10 HULB's, 3 of them with guns) are now under operational command of Project Delta. This unit can provide a limited lift and support capability for Delta Teams.

Inclosure 22 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report, Project Delta (U)

c. Training - The following programs were conducted:

(1) Refresher training for Vietnamese Recon Teams and the four Airborne Ranger Companies organic to the Project. This training ended with local operations around the Nha Trang area.

(2) Newly assigned American personnel are now put through a course designed to identify and eliminate those who do not have the mental or physical stamina needed to perform the mission.

(3) Training for Nungs selected to operate as recon team members. Subjects stressed were combat movement, reaction firing and fieldcraft.

(4) Training for the newly assigned 145th Airlift Platoon. Subjects stressed were landing zone selection, infiltration and exfiltration techniques, tactics and night navigation by reference points and terrain features.

(5) Training for the US Recon Teams and USAF Forward Air Controllers to familiarize each group with the other's capabilities and limitations. Various target marking techniques were tested as well as procedures for directing air strikes.

(6) In response to a request made by the Commanding General, 1st US Inf Division, Project Delta undertook the training of 4 Officers and 8 Enlisted Men of the Division in "Delta" reconnaissance techniques. (Incl 1, Program of Instruction for 1st Inf Div). At the completion of their scheduled training the trainees will participate with the Project on actual combat operations for a period of two weeks. They will then return to their respective brigades to organize long range reconnaissance units of their own.

d. Movements - All movements during the reporting period were conducted by tactical aircraft. No problems were encountered.

e. Combat Operations.

(1) During the reporting period, Project Delta was involved in seven combat operations. Most significant of the seven was the Plei Me Operation, 21-28 Oct 65. In this operation a task force of two Airborne Ranger Companies, advised by sixteen USSF personnel from Project Delta, successfully reinforced the besieged Special Forces Camp at Plei Me. (Incl 2, Sequence of Events for Plei Me)

Incl 22 Cont'd



7 January 1966

(2) Six reconnaissance operations were conducted. Recon teams were committed to find targets, verify intelligence and conduct air strikes on, or guide reaction forces to, targets discovered. Recon operations were:

OPERATION	DATES	CORPS AREA	TEAM CONTROL
19-65	13-19 Oct	II	VN Teams
20-65*	1-4 Nov	II	US Teams
21-65	14-18 Nov	III	VN Teams
22-65	25-28 Nov	III	VN Teams
23-65**	2-6 Dec	III	US Teams
24-65**	16-18 Dec	III	US Teams

\* In support of 1st Air Cav Division

\*\* In support of 1st US Inf Division

(3) With the increase of US combat forces in Vietnam, Project Delta has received numerous requests to support US units with recon teams. Because Vietnamese led recon teams have experienced difficulty working with US units, Project Delta has formed four US teams. These teams are composed of 3 or 4 Americans and 2 Nungs, the exact composition being tailored to support the particular mission. US teams were used to support the 1st Air Cav Division and the 1st US Inf Division with a great deal of success.

(4) In the past, Delta Recon Teams have used Vietnamese H-34 helicopters for infiltration and exfiltration of operational areas. However, during the past 3 months numerous administrative and mechanical problems have developed with these aircraft and their pilots. While working with the 1st US Air Cav Division, US helicopters and pilots were used for the first time to infiltrate and exfiltrate recon teams. Many lessons were learned: US pilots are weak in night navigation by terrain features; they have difficulty locating LZs at night which they have selected and reconnoitered by day; they are weak in making landings on one-ship LZs at night without lights and pre-landing fire support. After using HU1 series helicopters on three operations it was felt that if one helicopter unit were to train with and support the Project all of the time, techniques could be developed to the point where the US helicopters could replace those of the Vietnamese. With the addition of the 145th Airlift Platoon to Project Delta it is expected that this goal will be reached.

Incl 22 Cont'd



AVSSF

7 January 1966

SUBJECT: Quarterly Command Report, Project Delta (U)

(5) Research and Development. There is a definite need for the development of the following items:

(a) Beacon. An electronic system to mark a target or a team's location. Compact, weight less than 2 pounds, range greater than 5 kilometers, to give a location accurate to 25 meters. The beacon system should not require special aircraft or highly qualified technicians to operate it. The USAF Red Chief Beacon System tested in Vietnam in the summer of 1965 is a good reliable system but requires special aircraft and especially well trained personnel to operate it.

(b) Uniform. A light weight, camouflage pattern uniform for use in southeast Asia. Uniform material should be porous, allowing body heat to escape and air to circulate.

2. (C) Commander's Recommendations.

a. Two problems in communications are presently giving this Project a great deal of trouble:

(1) Only 5 crystals have been issued for use with the AN/PRC-64 radio. Only one of these 5 crystals will communicate reliably. This unit needs as a minimum 15 reliable crystals/frequencies set aside for its sole use. Recommend the necessary crystals be issued this detachment.

(2) Only 4 operational AN/PRC-74 radios are on hand at this unit. This highly efficient radio can be man-packed by recon teams into enemy areas. It's long range voice capability is needed to give the project commander a direct link with his committed teams. Recommend that no less than 20 additional AN/PRC-74 radios be issued this project as soon as possible.

b. All US Infantry units committed to Vietnam during the past year have arrived in country without any organic long range reconnaissance capability. However, to be most effective in this war, infantry units must have this capability. Small groups of men, working on the ground, off the trails, can locate Viet Cong and PAVN soldiers when and where other intelligence agencies cannot. Recommend that US Infantry units programmed for deployment to Vietnam be directed to organize and train personnel for long range reconnaissance prior to their commitment into the combat zone.

2 Incls

- 1 - POI 1st Inf Div
- 2 - Sequence of Events for Plei Me Operation

s/Charlie A Beckwith  
t/CHARLIE A BECHWITH  
Major Infantry  
Commanding

Incl 22 Cont'd



## PROJECT DELTA

## PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION

Twelve day schedule for Recon Personnel from 1st US Infantry Division

<u>Subject</u>	<u>Hours</u>
Orientation	2
Use of Special Equipment	1
Capabilities of UH-1B and UH-1D	1
Loading and Unloading Techniques	2
Directing Aircraft for pickup	1
Landing Zone Selection	1
Infiltration and Exfiltration (PA)	3
Use of Rope Ladder	2
Communications Training	4
Air Relay Techniques	2
Use of Sling Ladder	3
Forward Air Control Techniques	1
Grid System	1
FO Procedures	1
Medical Training	2
Area Study	1
Preparation for Patrol	1
Concept of Operation	2
Map Study and Overlays	1
Patrol Techniques (PA)	4
Range Firing and Jungle Lane	5
Reporting of Information	1
Link-Up Procedures	1
Care and Cleaning	2
FTX, Debriefing and Critique	167
Total Hours	212



**PROJECT DELTA  
TRAINING SCHEDULE  
TWELVE DAY PROGRAM**

TIME		SUBJECT		LOCATION		INSTRUCTOR	
DAY AND DATE	FROM	TO					
1st Day	0800	1000	Orientation	Camp Delta	Maj Beckwith		
	1000	1150	Use of Special Equipment	Camp Delta	SSG Zan		
	1300	1350	Capabilities of HU-1B and UH-1D Helicopter	145 Avn Pad	SFC Untalan		
	1400	1550	Loading and Unloading	145 Avn Pad	SFC Untalan		
	1600	1650	Directing Aircraft for Pick-Up	Delta Tng Area	SFC Untalan		
2nd Day	1700	1750	IZ Selection	Delta Tng Area	SFC Untalan		
	0700	0950	Infiltration and Exfiltration (PA)	Delta Tng Area	SFC Untalan		
	1000	1150	Use of Rope Ladder	Delta Tng Area	SFC Untalan		
	1300	1700	Communications	Camp Delta	SFC Odorizzi		
	0700	0850	Air Recon	Delta Tng Area	SFC Untalan		
3rd Day	0900	1150	Use of Sling Rope	Delta Tng Area	SFC Untalan		
	1300	1350	Forward Air Control	Camp Delta	Capt Kerr		
	1400	1450	Grid System	Camp Delta	MSG Fisher		

Incl 22 Cont'd



# Twelve Day Program (Cont'd)

DAY AND DATE		FROM	TO	SUBJECT	LOCATION	INSTRUCTOR
4th Day		1500	1550	FO Procedure	Camp Delta	MSG Fisher
		1600	1800	Medical Tng	Camp Delta	SGT Pangvitti
		0700	0750	Area Study	Camp Delta	SFC Keating
		0800	0850	Preparation for Patrol	Camp Delta	SFC Keating
		0900	1050	Concept of Operation	Camp Delta	SFC Keating
5th Day		1100	1130	Debriefing	Camp Delta	SFC Keating
		1300	1350	Map Study and Overlays	Camp Delta	SFC Keating
		1400	1800	Practical Work on Patrol Techniques	Delta Tng Area	MSG Grisham
		0700	1200	Range Firing and Jungle Lane	Delta Island	SFC Weber
		1300	1350	Reporting of Information	Camp Delta	MSG Grisham
6th Day		1400	1450	Link-Up Procedures	Camp Delta	SSG Gray
		1500	1700	Care and Cleaning	Camp Delta	MSG Grisham
		0700		Two Day FTX	Delta Tng Area	S-3
7th Day				Exfiltration	Delta Tng Area	S-3

Incl 22 Continued



Twelve Day Program (Cont'd)

DAY AND DATE	FROM	TO	SUBJECT	LOCATION	INSTRUCTION
8th Day	0730	0830	Debriefing	Camp Delta	Delta Team Advisors
	0900		Begin Four to Five Day PTX	TBA	S-3
9th, 10th, 11th Day			PTX	TBA	S-3
12th Day			Exfiltration, Debriefing and Critique	TBA	Delta Team Advisors S-3 and Maj Beckwith

DATE

28 December 1965

for  
CHARLIE A BECKWITH, Major, Infantry s/ A. J. Baker, Capt, Inf



DETACHMENT B-52  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO U S Forces, 96240

AVSFF

15 November 1965

SUBJECT: Sequence of Events for Plei Me Operation for Period  
20-28 October 1965 (U)

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)  
1st Special Forces  
APO U S Forces 96240

1. (C) General

20 October 1965

1330 - Order received to move Delta assets to Pleiku for two day operation. Delta CO, XO and Opn Officer were in Qui Nhon at time of receipt of order. Aircraft was laid on "emergency" basis to move two Airborne Ranger Companies to Qui Nhon.

1530 - Delta closed Qui Nhon with two Abn Ranger Companies.

1630 - An armored Task Force departed Pleiku with the plan of a bivouac approximately twenty kilometers from Plei Me.

1700 - Delta closed new Pleiku Airfield. Received warning order and was briefed by XO, Det C-2 on situation at Plei Me. There were no helicopters available to transport assault units to operational area.

1730 - Due to critical situation at Plei Me, Delta Commander asked for volunteers to go by evacuation helicopters. Ten personnel were selected; however, this was aborted due to darkness.

1800 - 2000 A plan was devised to make a helicopter assault 7 kilometers north of Plei Me, infiltrate through the jungle and reinforce Plei Me.

Inclosure 2

Inclosure 22 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



SUBJECT: Sequence of Events for Plei Me Operation for period  
20-28 October 1965

21 October 1965

- 0630 - CO, 5th SFG and CO, B-52 made aerial recon to select LZ.
- 0730 - LZ was pre-struck by USAF. It was determined that there would be a need for three lifts from the available helicopters with a minimum turn around.
- 0805 - First lift departed Pleiku.
- 1030 - Third lift closed LZ.
- 1100 - Assault force departed LZ and moved into the jungle for infiltration into Plei Me. Movement was very slow through the jungle due to the dense growth. It was necessary to cut 80% of the trail.
- 1300 - Evacuated Vietnamese with broken arm.
- 1500 - Task force encountered three Viet Cong. Two men were armed, the remaining VC was killed carrying 57mm recoilless r. fl. ammo. It was determined that they had been separated and were attempting to move northwest from Plei Me.  
After this encounter Delta CO changed route to go deeper into the jungle.
- 1700 - According to message received from CO, Plei Me, the task force was only 35 minutes from camp. Task force held up due to indecision on part of Abn Ranger unit.
- 1720 - Evacuated possible heat case (VN).  
Task force moved extremely slow. Delta CO assumed point and personally cut trail.
- 2030 - Delta CO had requested a patrol from Plei Me to act as guides into camp. This plan aborted due to darkness and the lack of a good linkup plan.
- 2100 - Task force formed a perimeter approximately 1,000 meters north of Plei Me, with a plan of going into the camp at first light.



15 November 1965

SUBJECT: Sequence of Events for Plei Me Operation for period  
20-28 October 1965

22 October 1965

- 0600 - Task force traveled east approximately 400 meters to a road. To expedite movement into the camp the road was utilized the remainder of the way.
- 0900 - Task force was detected approximately 400 meters from the camp. One VN Lt KIA, two American advisors WIA, one American Photographer WIA.
- 0930 - Task force closed Camp Plei Me. Delta CO assumed command of Camp Plei Me. Delta CO and counterpart determined that the area immediately surrounding the camp must be cleared.
- 1300 - A three company force departed Plei Me with the mission of clearing a hill approximately 400 meters north of camp. Clearing operation was being conducted with skirmish line of two companies abreast. Southern flank was approximately 100 meters from the wire. Viet Cong machine gun was detected and an attempt was made to capture this weapon and crew. VN troops were disorganized to a certain degree since this position in essence had been passed since it was extremely close to the wire. An attempt was made to assault the bunker in the direction of the camp. Friendly troops did not lay down a base of fire, and maneuver. As a result the machine gun maintained its rate of fire and the force withdrew. During this period a resupply of water and ammo was received without incident.

23 October 1965

- 0900 - A platoon of CIDG and one platoon of Airborne Rangers made an attempt to knockout two known machine gun positions. This attack was supported by mortar and

Incl 22 Cont'd



SUBJECT: Sequence of Events for Plei Me Operation for Period  
20-28 October 1965

machine gun fire from the camp. This force moved into position, laid down a base of fire and the maneuver element moved forward to assault the position. At this time one VC came out of his hole and ran the CIDG - Abn Ranger force out of the area. This VC was killed by supporting fires from within the camp. The force withdrew.

1400 - 1800 Ammo resupply without incident. A water party was dispatched to a point approximately 500 yards east from the camp. Water was secured without incident. Requested flame throwers to attack bunkers.

24 October 1965

A recovery party was dispatched to recover bodies that had been left in the vicinity of the two machine guns. Operation was conducted by CO, 1st Co in a very professional manner. Involved coordination of supporting fires, recon party, and carrying party. All bodies were recovered. Resupply of ammo received without incident. Flame throwers received.

25 October 1965

AM Plan was conceived to attack machine gun bunkers with one commando type squad and two Americans with flame throwers. Fires were coordinated with the camp; however, flame throwers malfunctioned and it was necessary to attempt an exchange of equipment. These weapons had been test fired prior to the attack. The commando squad successfully knocked out one light machine gun bunker.

1800 - Armored task force received fuel resupply at west side of camp. Drop from 1,000 feet, CV2 using G1A cargo parachute.

1845 - Armored task force closed on northeast outpost and



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15 November 1965

SUBJECT: Sequence of Events for Plei Me Operation for Period  
20-28 October 1965

established liaison with Delta CO. This force consisted of one Tank Company, M41, one APC carrier Co, M113, and two Ranger Battalions. The mission of this task force was to screen and secure the area outside Plei Me and not to reinforce the overly populated camp. Lengthy discussion between Delta CO and Task Force Commander.

26 October 1965

0900 - Brigade Commander, 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry visited.

0930 - Armored Task Force cleared area north of camp.

1400 - Clearing force came around west end of camp to continue mission of clearing to the South. Task force encountered well dug in unit on south side of airstrip, where they received many casualties and were pushed back to the wire.

27 October 1965

0800 - Two Abn Ranger Companies given the mission of again clearing the hill north of Plei Me, delayed due to 1st Cavalry helicopter operation. 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry conducted helicopter assault, LZ vicinity Plei Me to reinforce Armored Task Force. 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry assumed responsibility for area surrounding Plei Me.

1300 - Clearing operation commenced utilizing Abn Ranger Companies.

28 October 1965

Delta assets withdrawn from Plei Me.

2. (C) Conclusions:

a. That the Special Forces "A" detachment at Plei Me failed to patrol the close in area around their camp.

b. That a reaction force is required at the Corps level, and under control of the "C" detachment commander in order to reinforce camps under seige by the Viet Cong.

Incl 22 Cont'd



AVSFF

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SUBJECT: Sequence of Events for Plei Me Operation for Period  
20-28 October 1965

c. That resupply inside of a camp during the hours of darkness is least desirable since it is dangerous to life in the camp and delivery is less accurate.

d. That Project Delta does have the capability to conduct heliborne operations, move cross-country and reinforce a camp under attack by the Viet Cong.

e. That there was a lack of intelligence on Viet Cong forces outside the camp.

f. That the span of control at Plei Me was most difficult since the senior Vietnamese and US advisor were required to closely coordinate the actions of CIDG forces, various ARVN units, US advisors, and US Forces. This coordination was not as good as it should have been, however, the mission assigned each separate unit was accomplished.

g. That there is a current requirement to retrain the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, Project Delta, in straight-forward offensive tactics.

h. That the Delta H-34 pilots proved they are highly skilled and prepared to accept a great deal of risk.

i. That without American leadership, coordination, and forceful actions on the part of US Advisors within the camp complex, the Plei Me Camp would have been under Viet Cong control.

j. That the USAF did an outstanding job in support of the Plei Me camp.

k. That the Viet Cong units around the Plei Me camp were regular, hard core Viet Cong and were well led troops.

l. That Detachment C-2 and ISC, 5th SFG completely supported the operation at Plei Me.

m. That the planning and decision making process used by CO, 5th SFG (Abn), in order to execute this operation, proved to be quite sound.

Incl 22 Cont'd



AVSFF

15 November 1965

SUBJECT: Sequence of Events for Plei Me Operation for Period  
20-28 October 1965

3. (C) Recommendations:

a. That a reinforcement capability of no less than three companies be maintained at each "C" detachment in order to support Special Forces Camps under seige by Viet Cong.

b. That each "A" detachment commander understands that estimate of the situation and report timely and accurate information.

c. That Project Delta be used, when required, to reinforce any Special Forces camp under seige by Viet Cong.

d. That basic concepts of defense be impressed in the minds of all "A", "B" and "C" Detachments serving Vietnam.

s/Charlie A Beckwith

t/CHARLIE A BECKWITH

Major Inf  
Commanding

Incl 22 Cont'd



Inclosure 23 (Quarterly Statistical Summary) To Quarterly Command Report  
for Period ending 31 Dec 1965, HQ, 5th SFG(Abn), 15 Jan 66.

DETACHMENT B-51  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces, 96240

AVSFE

30 December 1965

SUBJECT: Quarterly Statistical Summary

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF  
ATTN: AVSF-C  
APO US Forces, 96240

In compliance with your letter "QUARTERLY COMMAND REPORT" dated  
15 December 1965, the following information is submitted as inclosures.

6 Appendicies

1. Progress of Dong Ba Thin Training Center period 1 January  
thru 31 December 1965
2. POI for LLDB Officer Course
3. POI for LLDB NCO & EM Course
4. POI for CIDG Leaders Course
5. POI for Combat Reconnaissance Platoon Course
6. Commanders Summary

s/Ernest K. Gruene Jr  
t/ERNEST K. GRUENE JR.  
Major, Infantry  
Commanding



# STUDENT ATTENDANCE AND GRADUATION DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1965

COURSE	1-3 Quarter Incl		4th Quarter		Total	
	ATTENDED	GRADUATED	ATTENDED	GRADUATED	ATTENDED	GRADUATED
IMDB Officer Course	95	77	20	15	115	92
IMDB NCO & TM Course	507	447	112	92	619	539
CIDG Leaders Course	1051	555	424	218	1,475	773
Combat Recon Plat.	324	280	136	112	460	401
Sub Total	1977	1369	892	437	2,869	1,905

REMARKS: Reference CIDG Leaders and Combat Recon, those passing Exams Graduated.  
Those who failed received a certificate of attendance.

Appendix 1 to Inclosure 23 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



SPECIAL FORCES  
OFFICERS TRAINING PROGRAM

PART I	HOURS
1. Special Forces	40
2. Air and Amphibious Operations	31
3. Guerrilla Tactics	114
4. Hand to Hand Combat	32
5. Communications	56
6. Intelligence	32
7. Map Reading	16
8. Weapons	36
9. Demolitions	43
10. Psychological Warfare	08
11. Medical	08
12. Staff	18
13. Training Management	14
14. Leadership Training	16
Total:	<u>464</u>

PART II	
1. Examination	12
2. Commanders Time	08
Total:	<u>20</u>

TOTAL TRAINING HOURS 484

CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret	00
Secret	125
Confidential	210
Restricted Distribution	00
Unclassified	149
Total:	<u>484</u>

TYPE OF TRAINING

Theory	214
Demonstration & Practice	250
Examination	12
Miscellaneous	08
Total:	<u>484</u>

Appendix 2 To Inclosure 23



PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION  
SPECIAL FORCES BASIC OFFICERS COURSE

PERIOD      10 Weeks    484 HOURS

PART I	SUBJECT	Day	Night	Total	Remarks
1.	SPECIAL FORCES (40 hours)				
	Principles of Unconventional Warfare and Guerrilla Warfare	02	hrs		
	Special Forces Duties, Capabilities and Limitations	01	hrs		
	Joint Operations Unconventional Warfare	01	hrs		
	Special Forces Group Organization	02	hrs		
	Special Forces Operational Base	03	hrs		
	Special Forces Support and Logistical System	02	hrs		
	Area Study and Assessment	14	hrs		
	Periods of Guerrilla Development	02	hrs		
	Initial Contact	02	hrs		
	Infiltration Phase	02	hrs		
	Organization Phase	02	hrs		
	Training Buildup Phase	02	hrs		
	Operation guiding period	02	hrs		
	Survival	03	hrs		
	Total:	40	hrs		
2.	AIR AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION (28 hours)				
	Principles of Air-Amphibious	02	hrs		

App 2 to Incl 23 Cont'd



Selection and reporting drop and landing zones	04 hrs	
Marking drop and landing zones	02 hrs	
Reception Committee	02 hrs	02 hrs
Day and night resupply exercise	04 hrs	04 hrs
Jumpmaster duties	02 hrs	
Marshalling area Officers duties	02 hrs	
Drop Zone Officers duties	02 hrs	
Total:	20 hrs	08 hrs

3. GUERRILLA TACTICS (114 hours)

Principles of Guerrilla operations	04 hrs	
Advantages and Disadvantages of Guerrilla operations	01 hrs	
Scouting and patrolling	02 hrs	
Immediate action drill	04 hrs	
Day and night patrol	04 hrs	04 hrs
Area patrols (Day and Night)	04 hrs	04 hrs
Combat patrol	04 hrs	
Guerrilla base organization	01 hrs	
Day ambush	07 hrs	
Night ambush	02 hrs	
Patrol bases	03 hrs	06 hrs
Day raids	04 hrs	
Night raids	02 hrs	04 hrs
Guerrilla offensive operations	02 hrs	

App 2 to Incl 23 Cont'd



Sniping tactics	02 hrs	
Assassination techniques and Counter Measures	01 hrs	
Mobile warfare	02 hrs	
Planning mopping up operations	02 hrs	
Defense (day and night)	02 hrs	
River crossing expedients	04 hrs	
River crossing operations	04 hrs	
Principal of Viet-Cong Guer- rilla warfare	02 hrs	
Viet-Cong Guerrilla organi- zation	02 hrs	
Viet-Cong Guerrilla tactics		
Viet-Cong camp raid tactics	03 hrs	
Viet-Cong raid tactics		
Counter-Guerrilla warfare	02 hrs	
Counter ambush (dismounted) day and night	04 hrs	04 hrs
Counter ambush (Convoy)	04 hrs	
Attack and employment of reserve	02 hrs	
Infiltration and counter- infiltration	02 hrs	
Scouting techniques	02 hrs	
Viet-Cong defense tactics	02 hrs	
Rear area security	01 hrs	
Psychological preparation for Guerrilla warfare	02 hrs	



Total: 88 hrs 26 hrs 114 hrs

4. HAND TO HAND COMBAT (32 hours)

Introduction and fall positions	02 hrs
Judo movements	08 hrs
Hand to hand combat (unarmed)	04 hrs
Hand to hand combat (armed)	04 hrs
Hand to hand combat (knife)	04 hrs
P.O.W. search procedures	01 hrs
P.O.W. processing	01 hrs
Obstacle course	<u>08 hrs</u>
Total:	<u>32 hrs</u>

5. COMMUNICATION (56 hours)

Introduction to Special Forces Communications	02 hrs
Communication security	02 hrs
Introduction to Special Forces Commo equipment	02 hrs
Morse code	40 hrs
Sending CW	<u>10 hrs</u>
Total:	<u>56 hrs</u>

6. INTELLIGENCE (32 hours)

Information collection	02 hrs
Information sources	02 hrs
Intelligence collection planning	02 hrs
Daily, periodic, reports	02 hrs
Intelligence reporting	01 hrs

App 2 to Incl 23 Cont'd



S-2, daily notes	01 hrs	
Escape and evasion	02 hrs	
Handling of P.O.W's.	02 hrs	
Interrogation of P.O.W's.	02 hrs	
OPN orders	02 hrs	
Terrain studies	01 hrs	
Establishment of population intelligence net	02 hrs	
Organization of Intelligence net	04 hrs	02 hrs
Counter-intelligence	01 hrs	
Viet-Cong doctrine	<u>02 hrs</u>	
Total:	28 hrs	04 hrs 32 hrs

7. MAP READING (16 hours)

Introduction to basic map reading	02 hrs	
Use of maps	02 hrs	
Reading coordinates	04 hrs	
Lensatic compass	<u>04 hrs</u>	
Total:	12 hrs	04 hrs 16 hrs

8. WEAPONS (36 hours)

M1 rifle	06 hrs
45 pistol	02 hrs
Thompson SMG	02 hrs
M.3A.1 Sub-machine Gun	02 hrs
Carbine	02 hrs
AR 15	04 hrs

App 2 to Incl 23 Cont'd



BAR cal 30	03 hrs
30 Cal Machine Gun	05 hrs
Grenade launcher M.79	02 hrs
Communist weapons	<u>08 hrs</u>
Total:	36 hrs

9. DEMOLITIONS (43 hours)  
EXPLOSIVES & CHARGES

Introduction	01 hrs
Military explosives	06 hrs
Safety procedures	02 hrs
Electric and non-electric blasting caps	02 hrs
Use of charges and explosives	07 hrs
Demolition formulas	02 hrs
Demolition plans	02 hrs
Reconnaissance report form	01 hrs
Reconnaissance practice	04 hrs
Principles of Landmine warfare	02 hrs
Types of mines	04 hrs
Claymore mines	03 hrs
Use of claymore mines in ambushes	04 hrs
Viet-Cong mines and booby traps	<u>03 hrs</u>
Total:	43 hrs

10: PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (08 hours)

Principles of Psychological warfare	01 hrs
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App 2 to Incl 23 Cont'd



Civil Affairs 02 hrs

Importance of Psychological Warfare activities for Special Forces 02 hrs

Propaganda with the people 01 hrs

Propaganda with the enemy 01 hrs

Propaganda with the troops 01 hrs

Total: 08 hrs

11. MEDICAL CORPS (08 hours)

First Aid, Stop the bleeding, Preventive medicine, Superficial and major wounds, Fractures, Artificial respiration and other wounds 04 hrs

Medical planning for operations  
Fragments, Luxation, Sprain, and Burns 02 hrs

Venereal disease and prevention of Syphilis, Gonorrhea, Chancre, and Venereal disease, the 4th stage 02 hrs  
Total: 08 hrs

12. COMMAND AND STAFF (18 hours)

Introduction 02 hrs

Organization and General principles 02 hrs

Staff organization 04 hrs

Military writing 04 hrs

Practice 06 hrs

Total: 18 hrs

13. TRAINING MANAGEMENT (14 hours)

The instructor-student relationship 02 hrs



Training estimate	01 hrs
Stages of Instruction	01 hrs
Parts of a lesson plan	01 hrs
Presentation method	02 hrs
Use of training aids	02 hrs
Demonstration methods	02 hrs
Practice	02 hrs
Examination writing	<u>01 hrs</u>
Total:	14 hrs
14. LEADERSHIP (16 hours)	
Introduction to leadership	02 hrs
Conduct of leadership	02 hrs
Techniques of commanders	04 hrs
Psychologies of leadership	02 hrs
How to use men	02 hrs
Special leadership in training phase	02 hrs
Special leadership in combat phase	<u>02 hrs</u>
Total:	16 hrs
PART II MISCELLANEOUS	Total (464 hours)
Examination:	
Weekly	09 hrs
Final	03 hrs
Commanders time	<u>08 hrs</u>
Total:	20 hrs
Total hours (484 hours)	



PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION  
NCO AND SOLDIERS SPECIAL FORCES BRANCH TRAINING COURSE  
PERIOD 1: 4 WEEKS: 244 HOURS

PART I. TRAINING SUBJECT	HOURS
Special Forces	28
Air & Amphibious Operations	20
Tactics	60
Hand to Hand Combat	02
Intelligence	20
Map Reading	22
Weapons	26
Demolitions	16
Communications	12
Psychological Warfare	06
Medical	04
Training Management	<u>17</u>
Total:	233

PART II MISCELLANEOUS	HOURS
Examination	05
Transit Period	02
Commanders Time	<u>04</u>
Total:	11

TOTAL TRAINING HOURS 244

CLASSIFICATION	HOURS
Secret	40
Confidential	60
Unclassified	<u>144</u>
Total:	244

TYPE OF TRAINING	HOURS
Theory	95
Demonstration/Practice	142
Examination	<u>07</u>
Total:	244

Appendix 3 to Inclosure 23 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



PERIOD I MCC AND SOLDIERS SPECIAL FORCES BRANCH TRAINING COURSE

1. SPECIAL FORCES	HOURS		
	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
Principles of Unconventional Warfare	2		2
Mission, Capabilities and Limitations of Special Forces	1		1
Special Forces Joint Operations	1		1
Special Forces Group Organization	2		2
Special Forces Operational Base	3		3
Area Study and Assessment	4		4
Periods of Guerrilla Warfare Development		2	2
Initial Contact Period		2	2
Infiltration		2	2
Organization Period		2	2
Training Period		2	2
Operations Period	2		2
Survival	<u>3</u>		<u>3</u>
Total:	18	10	28
2. AIR AND AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS			
Introduction to Air and Amphibious Operations			2
Selection and Reporting of Drop Zones	4		4
Marking Drop Zones	4		4
Reception Committee	2		2
Practical Exercise	<u>4</u>		<u>8</u>
Total:	16	4	20
3. TACTICS			
Principles of Guerrilla Tactics	2		2
Advantages and Disadvantages of Guerrilla Operations	1		1
Viet Cong Doctrine	2		2

App 3 to Incl 23 Cont'd



Sniping Tactics	2		2
Long Range Operations	2		2
Planning Hopping Up Operations	2		2
Principles of Counter Guerrilla Warfare	2		2
Viet Cong Camp Attack and Ambush of Relief Column	2		2
River Crossing Operations and Expedients	6		6
Occupation of Patrol Bases	1		1
Day and Night Patrols	4	4	8
Day and Night Ambushes	6	4	10
Day and Night Raids	6	4	10
Immediate Action Drills	<u>4</u>		<u>4</u>
Total:	48	12	60
4. HAND TO HAND COMBAT			
Obstacle Course	<u>2</u>		<u>2</u>
Total:	2		2
5. INTELLIGENCE			
Principles of Intelligence	2		2
Intelligence Cycle	2		2
Intelligence Nets and Informers	2		2
Live and Dead Letter Drops		1	1
Guerrilla Intelligence	2		2
Counterintelligence	2		2
Evasion and Escape	2	4	6
Interrogation of P.O.W's		1	1
Viet Cong Intelligence Organization In South V.N.	<u>2</u>		<u>2</u>
Total:	14	6	20

App 3 to Incl 23 Cont'd



## 6. MAP READING

Introduction to Map Reading	2		2
Map Orientation Land Navigation	2		2
Use of Maps	2		2
Lensatic Compass	4		4
Compass Movement, Night and Day	4	4	8
Finding Coordinates	<u>4</u>		<u>4</u>
Total:	18	<u>4</u>	22

## 7. WEAPONS

M1 Rifle	2		2
Carbine	4		4
Thompson and Machine Gun, M3 and M3A1	4		4
BAR	4		4
Firing BAR	4		4
Familiarization Firing All Weapons	<u>8</u>		<u>8</u>
Total:	26		26

## 8. DEMOLITION

	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
Introduction to Demolitions	1		1
Use of Charges and Explosives	8		8
Demolition Formulas	4		4
Principles of Mines and Traps	2		2
Demolition Expedients	<u>1</u>		<u>1</u>
Total:	16		16

## 9. COMMUNICATIONS

Introduction to Special Forces Communications	2	2
Communication Security	2	2

App 3 to Incl 23 Cont'd



AN/PRC-10 Radio	2	2
Content of a Message, Official Letter Writing Practice	2	2
Message Sending	2	2
Establishing Radio Contact and Receiving Messages	$\frac{2}{12}$	$\frac{2}{12}$
Total	$\frac{2}{12}$	$\frac{2}{12}$

#### 10. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Principles of Psychological Warfare	1	1
Importance of Psychological Warfare with Special Forces	2	2
Propaganda With the People	1	1
Propaganda with the Troops	1	1
Propaganda with the Enemy	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{6}$
Total:	$\frac{1}{3}$	$\frac{1}{6}$

#### 11. MEDICAL CORPS

	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
First Aid	2		2
Stop the Bleeding			
Shock Prevention			
Superficial and Major Wounds			
Fractures			
Respiration			
Other Wounds			
PREVENTIVE CARE DURING COMBAT	1		1
Swelling			
Luxation			
Sprain			
Blisters			
VENEREAL DISEASE	1		1
Syphilis			
Venereal Disease			
Chancre			
Fourth Stage of Syphilis			
Total:	$\frac{1}{4}$		$\frac{1}{4}$

App 3 to Incl 23 Cont'd



12. METHOD OF INSTRUCTION

The Instructor Student Relationship	2	2
The Training Estimate	1	1
Preparation of Lesson Plans	1	1
Presentation Method	2	2
Training Aids	2	2
Demonstration Method	2	2
Practice Method	2	2
Stages of Instruction	1	1
Examination Organization and Practice		
Teaching	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
Total:	17	17

PART II. MISCELLANEOUS

Examination

Weekly	3 hours
Semi-Final	2 hours
Final	2 hours
Commander's Time	<u>4</u>
Total:	11

TOTAL TRAINING HOURS: 244



# SPECIAL FORCES OPERATION AND INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST COURSE

## PART I. TRAINING SUBJECTS

	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
Military Intelligence	24	2	26
Interrogation of Prisoners of War	11		11
Operation Orders	4		4
Terrain Studies	7	2	9
Population Intelligence	15	2	17
Counterintelligence	6		6
Viet Cong Tactics	11		11
Guerrilla Warfare	61	12	73
Counter Guerrilla Warfare	24		24
Organizations, Functions	26		26
Map Reading	27	4	31
Psychological Warfare	18		18
Hand to Hand Combat	30		30
Total:	264	22	286

## PART II. MISCELLANEOUS

Examination	8
CLASSIFICATION	294
Confidential	84
Unclassified	210
Total:	294

## TYPES OF TRAINING

Theory	107
Demonstration	80
Practice	95
Examination	8
Miscellaneous	4
Total:	294

App 3 to Incl 23 Cont'd



SPECIAL FORCES WEAPON SPECIALISTS COURSE  
STAGE II WEAPON SPECIALISTS  
PERIOD 6 WEEKS 289 HOURS

PART I. TRAINING SUBJECT	DAY	NIGHT	TOTAL
M1 Rifle	14	2	16
Pistol Cal 45	8	1	9
Thompson Sub Machine Gun	10	1	11
Sub Machine Gun M3A1	7	1	8
Carbine	11	2	13
AR 15	11		11
Browning Automatic Rifle	17	2	19
Light Machine Gun Cal 30	16	2	18
Mortar 60 MM	23	2	25
Mortar 81 MM	25	2	27
Recoilless Rifle 57 MM	23		23
Rocket Launcher 3.5	19		19
Grenade Launcher M79	11		11
Grenades	6	2	8
Grenade Launcher	10		10
Shot Gun	5		5
Communist Weapons	18		18
Hand to Hand Combat	30		30
Total:	264	17	281
PART II. MISCELLANEOUS			
Examinations	8		8
Total:			289
CLASSIFICATION			
Secret	89		
Confidential	120		
Unclassified	80		
Total:	289		
TRAINING SUBJECT			
Theory	85		
Demonstration	76		
Practice	120		
Examination	8		
Total	289		

App 3 to Incl 23 Cont'd



PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION  
SPECIAL FORCES MEDICAL SPECIALIST COURSE

PERIOD 6 weeks 264 Hours  
STAGE: II Medical Specialists

PART I.	HOURS	REMARK
First Aid	25	
Medical Administration	10	
Diagnosis and Treatment	25	
Anatomy	33	
Pharmacy	24	
Pathology	30	
Hygiene Preventive Medicine	22	
Hand to Hand Combat	<u>30</u>	
Total	199	
PART II. MISCELLANEOUS		
On the Job Training (Dispensary)	48	
Examination	8	
Review	<u>9</u>	
Total	65	
Total	264 Hours	

App 3 to Incl 23 Cont'd



SPECIAL FORCES COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST COURSE

STAGE II: COMMUNICATION SPECIALIST (CERTIFICATE)  
PERIOD 6 WEEKS: 276 Hours

PART I. TRAINING SUBJECTS	HOURS
International Morse Code/Receiving	50
Sending Technique	30
Radio Procedure	25
Voice Procedure	2
Radio Equipment	25
Wire Equipment	10
Antennas	6
Panel Marking Codes	4
Prearranged Message Code	4
Communication Security	3
Communication Introduction	1
Crypto	50
Hand to Hand Combat	<u>30</u>
Total:	260
PART II. MISCELLANEOUS	
Examination	12
Commander's Time	04
Total Training Hours	276

App 3 to Incl 23 Cont'd



SPECIAL FORCES DEMOLITION SPECIALIST COURSE

STAGE II: DEMOLITION SPECIALIST  
PERIOD: 6 WEEKS. 285 Hours

PART I.	HOURS
Charges and Explosives	118
Mines	80
Booby Traps	36
Hand to Hand Combat	<u>30</u>
Total:	264

PART II.	HOURS
Examinations	<u>8</u>
Total:	8

Theory	115
Demonstration	80
Practice	69
Examination	8
Miscellaneous	
Total:	<u>272</u>

App 3 to Incl 23 Cont'd



SUBJECT:

PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION  
STRIKE FORCE S CADRE COURSE  
(PERIOD 4 WEEKS: 258 HOURS)

I. PHYSICAL TRAINING:	DAY	NIGHT	REMARKS
1. Hand to Hand Combat (6 hours)	6		
Total	6		
II. GENERAL TRAINING (58 hours)			
1 Map Reading	18	2	
2 Leadership	8		
3 Communications	8		
4 Medical	3		
5 Intelligence	7		
6 Psychological Warfare	4		
7 Mines and Booby Traps	8		
Total:	56	2	
III. WEAPONS TRAINING (42 hours)			
1 Grenades	2		
2 M1 Rifle	5		
3 Carbine Cal 30	6		
4 M3 and M3A1 Sub Machine Gun	6	3	
5 BAR	3		
6 L.M.G. Cal 30	6		
7 Mortar 60 mm	6	3	
Total:	36	6	
IV. TACTICAL TRAINING (146 hours)			
1 Individual			
Cover and Concealment	3	2	
Hand and Arm Signals	1		
Moving, Observing, Reporting	3	2	
Guides and Liaison Agents	3	2	
Guard Duty	2	2	
2 Squad			
Squad Organization and Equipment	1		
Squad Formations	2		

App 4 to Incl 23 Cont'd



Squad Patrols	4	3
Squad Ambush	4	3
Squad Raid	4	3
3. Platoon		
Platoon Organization and Equipment	1	
Platoon Formation	2	
Platoon Patrolling	4	3
Platoon in Defense	4	3
Platoon in Attack	4	3
Platoon Ambush	4	3
Platoon Raid	4	3
River Crossings	4	
4. Immediate Action Drills	3	
5. Guerrilla Warfare	6	3
6. F.T.X. Platoon Operation with Platoon as Part of a Company	24	24
Total:	87	59
V MISCELLANEOUS (8 hours)		
1 Examination (Tactics)	4	
2 Weapons and Equipment Examination	4	
Total:	8	0
TOTAL HOURS	193	67
	260 hrs	

REMARKS:

- a. The above training hours do not include 30 minutes for Physical Training Per Day.
- b. The Training Schedule is prepared by the VFST Training Center, Dong Ba Thin

App 4 to Incl 23 Cont'd



# 4 Week PIO (Advanced Training) for Combat Recon Teams

## SCOPE OF TRAINING

1. Map and Compass	20 hours
2. LZ & DZ	8
3. Survival	4
4. Patrolling and Operations Orders	17
5. River crossing, poncho raft tng	8
6. Artillery adjustment	20
7. FAC	4
8. E & E	4
9. Civil Affairs & Psy Opns Intelligence	12
10. Commo	11
11. Medical	8
12. FTX & PE	100
13. Briefing & Debriefing	2
14. CO's Time	4
15. Graduation	2
	<hr/> 224 Hours

44 hours per week

4 Weeks

176 hours

48 hours night training

224 total hours

App 5 to Incl 23 Cont'd



## SUMMARY AND COMMENTS

1. One LLDB class graduated during the fourth quarter of 1965. Twenty LLDB Officers attended and fifteen graduated. During the first three quarters seventy four attended and sixty two graduated. During the fourth quarter one hundred and twelve NCO's and E4 attended and ninety two graduated. During the first three quarters three hundred fiftyfive graduated. The LLDB training conducted during the fourth quarter was satisfactory and the two week FTX was well planned and executed.
2. Three CIDG Leaders classes graduated during the last quarter. Four hundred twenty four attended and two hundred and eighteen graduated. During the first three quarters one thousand fifty one attended and six hundred and nineteen graduated. Three major weaknesses existed: the first was poor scheduling, the second was poorly planned practical exercises in tactics training, and the third was poorly planned and conducted range firing. USSF monitors made on the spot corrections and will place more emphasis in these areas in the future.
3. One Combat Recon Platoon class graduated during the fourth quarter. One hundred thirty six attended and one hundred and twenty graduated. During the first three quarters three hundred forty-nine graduated. One class began 14 December 1965 and will graduate 10 January 1966. This class is being monitored by Det B-51, which took over this responsibility on 14 December 1965 from an "A" team from Det B-52. All combat recon platoons were trained by the LLDB Det B-13. The training center assumed the responsibility of training Combat Recon Platoons on 14 December 1965. Because of the short notification from LLDB High Command, the LLDB from Det B-13 are giving the instruction to the class which began 14 December 1965. In the future all Combat Recon Platoons will be trained by the various training center committees which instruct the LLDB and CIDG Leaders Courses. The training conducted by the LLDB Det B-13 is considered unsatisfactory, however this problem will be eliminated when the training center committees take over the instruction. The letter of instruction on the Combat Recon Platoon (Reference Subject Letter Combat Reconnaissance Platoon Hq 5th SFG dated 19 January 1965) is being revised for the group commanders signature and will be submitted to 5th SFG by 15 January 1966.
4. At the present time USSF and LLDB are reviewing and making recommended changes on all POI's. A joint conference will be conducted from 11-15 January 1966 on this subject with representatives of LLDB high command attending.



DETACHMENT C-2  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO U.S. Forces 96295

AVSFB-CO

23 December 1965

SUBJECT: Initial After Action Report (FULRO Incidents 17-21 Dec 65)

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th Special Forces Group (Abn),  
1st Special Forces  
APO US Forces 96240

1. The following report and recommendations have been compiled as a result of recent FULRO activities. Three CIDG camps were involved; Lac Thien, Plei Djereng, and Mai Linh. Also implicated but not involved was the Rhade Security Company at Holloway Army Airfield. Each incident will be presented separately.

2. Holloway Army Airfield Security Company (HAAF, Pleiku, Vietnam, Eagle Flight, SSG James Hayes USSF Advisor).

a. At approximately 171200 December Col Patch and the Staff at C-2 were notified by the II CTZ Advisory Staff that they had received indications of impending difficulties resulting from the FULRO movement. By 171630 December orders had been received by C-2, from the G-3 II CTZ, that the Rhade Security Company, stationed at HAAF, were suspects and should be moved immediately. Following necessary conditioning, this company entrucked and departed HAAF at 171830 December. The company's mission was to proceed South on Hwy #14 to the junction of a local road to Camp Plei Do Lim, detruck at this point and establish a perimeter. At approximately 180700 Dec the company was to conduct road clearing to Plei Do Lim and remain at the camp until further orders were received.

b. At 171930 Dec it was learned that approximately one company of the 3rd AC, also departed Pleiku and moved on Highway #14 to the South. This unit halted approximately one kilometer North of the HAAF Co. with the mission of blocking this avenue of approach into the city of Pleiku. C-2 was informed, by a FAC, that the Tank TF Commander was instructed to shoot any personnel attempting to pass his position. At this point ARVN was contacted thru LLDB channels, the II CTZ Advisory Staff was contacted by Col Patch and CIDG or USSF. By 172330 Dec the situation was somewhat less tense, and it was determined that Major George, at 180730, would depart Det C-2 with five USSF to insure that no shooting incident developed. At 180805 contact was made with the Armored TF (which had been reinforced with one RVN Ranger Co) and the CIDG. As a result no difficulty was encountered, as C-2 vehicles had returned to Pleiku and the CIDG departed for Plei Do Lim.

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c. At approximately 181730 Dec the HAAF Company arrived at Plei Do Lim and established positions outside of the camp. From these positions they augmented the camp security thru vigorous patrolling.

d. As of 211200 Dec the HAAF Company remains at Plei Do Lim.

### 3. COMMENTS.

a. Due to the difficulty arising as a result of the positioning of the HAAF Co. and the Armor TF, it would appear that proper coordination was not accomplished prior to Det C-2 being ordered to move the HAAF Co.

b. At no time, during the period 17-21 Dec 1965, did LLDB/USSF/GVN experience any difficulty with the HAAF Company.

### 4. RECOMMENDATIONS.

In view of the fact that the HAAF Co. is Rhade and as such is suspect with respect to the FULRO movement, it is recommended that:

The HAAF Co. be relieved of responsibility for securing the outer perimeter at HAAF, Pleiku, and that they be transferred to a CIDG camp in Pleiku Province, from which location they could be properly employed in a CIDG role.

### 5. LAC THIEN (Det A-236, Capt John McKinney).

a. At 180805 December, Detachment C-2 was notified by Detachment B-23 that an unknown number of FULRO troops had arrived at Camp Lac Thien, that the LLDB had been tied up by approximately 20 strikers, and a FULRO representative was talking with the camp CIDG. By 180845 the troops had broken formation and resumed their normal activities, and all LLDB but 3 had been released.

b. At 180920, three LLDB were taken hostage and removed from the camp to a nearby village. Capt McKinney at this time was in conference with the LLDB and the FULRO leaders, and at 181000 Dec. the three LLDB were returned to camp unharmed. The situation, at this point, remained in doubt as FULRO leaders were attempting to induce the Lac Thien CIDG to march on District Headquarters. This attempt proved abortive.

c. By 181215 Dec. FULRO representatives were completely confused. The Strike Force refused to acknowledge the revolutionary attitude and elected to remain loyal to GVN. The FULRO leader then stated he would withdraw from the camp and departed. With the departure of the FULRO leaders, the camp returned to daily routine activities. From 181230 Dec thru 21 Dec 1965 the situation at Lac Thien has remained quiet and no further difficulties are presently anticipated.

Incl 24 Cont'd



## 6. COMMENTS.

a. FULRO contacts with the CIDG were fermented from the outside and made little, if any, impression on the Montagnard Strike Force.

b. As a result of this contact; however, the LLDB Camp Commander "lost face" and was replaced by Lt Col Phong on 21 Dec 65.

c. Actions of two Strike Force company commanders and the Rhade interpreter were outstanding - Every time the FULRO representative made a statement or accusation, these three individuals refuted his remarks.

d. When identified by the LLDB, the Strikers involved in the incident will be discharged. To date this identification has not been made.

e. Recommendation: On the evening of 21 Dec, Lt Col Patch and Lt Col Phong visited General Mahn, CG 23d Division, and recommended that the camp be permitted to commence normal operations without delay. Gen. Mahn concurred in this recommendation. A heliborne operation is planned for 24 December 1965.

## 8. PLEI DJERENG (A-213, Capt Jackie Schmidt).

a. At 180905 December, Capt Schmidt informed Col Patch that his CIDG were awaiting a contact from FULRO, and that their exact intentions at that time, could not be determined. (As a result of this message a Nung reaction force operation, scheduled for 181400, vic Plei Djereng was held in abeyance). Further discussion with the Strike Force indicated, initially, that two Rhade company commanders, and an interpreter were FULRO representatives, and that they were awaiting instructions from outside the camp. By 181200 Dec. Capt Schmidt had determined that local FULRO would make its move during the night of 18-19 Dec 65, and they would depart the camp with weapons and ammunition.

b. At approximately 181330 Dec. C-2 was informed by Capt Schmidt that since the Strike Force was expecting the Nung Reaction Force, he recommended the 181400 Dec operation, previously delayed, be continued as scheduled. This operation had been planned as a result of reported VC concentrations, and was executed in an attempt to kill VC, and additionally, to reinforce the camp. On Capt Schmidt's recommendation the Nung Reaction Force was moved from its field location, vic Plei Bek, to Plei Djereng. Upon arriving, they prepared positions on defensible high ground, approximately one kilometer Southwest of the camp.

c. By approximately 181400 Dec., Col McKean, CO, 5th SFG, had arrived at C-2. He was briefed by Col Patch on the FULRO situation in CTZ as it effected CIDG camps. As a result of this briefing Col McKean, Lt Col Patch, and Lt Col Phong, CO C-2 LLDB, departed this location for a conference with FULRO leaders at Plei Djereng. The purpose of this conference was to air grievances, present GVN position, and explain that FULRO attempts had been abortive. Upon arriving at Plei Djereng, the camp dissidents stated that they would talk to Col McKean and Lt Col Patch, but not to Lt Col Phong -

Incl 24 Cont'd



Col McKean refused to speak to them unless Lt Col Phong could act as principal speaker - The dissidents then agreed to speak to Lt Col Phong. Col Phong promised them that if they behaved themselves and went back to work, no harm would come to them. Col McKean, Lt Col Patch, and Lt Col Phong departed at 181700 after the dissidents agreed to go back to work.

d. By 181830 Dec. it was apparent that FULRO elements in Plei Djereng had not been dissuaded from their cause. The camp reported that the Strike Force was gathering equipment, food and water. Additionally, they were ordered to carry their weapons at all times and to be prepared to move on order. Capt Schmidt reported that upon issuance of a movement order the LLDB would be exterminated and the Strike Force would march on Pleiku. Concurrent with the receipt of this message, Capt Schmidt indicated that he had informed the FULRO leaders that they would not harm the LLDB. At this time one platoon of the Nung Reaction Force was infiltrated into the camp, their mission was to guard the inner compound and secure the LLDB.

e. By approximately 181900 Dec, Capt Schmidt, thru further discussion with FULRO representatives, had determined that the primary FULRO leader Y BA HAN was issuing final instructions to the Montagnards via radio transmission. The transmission was to be broadcast over a frequency of 4,750 MC, SW, at 190300 Dec. Immediate instructions were passed to Detachments B-22 and B-23 to jam this frequency in conjunction with Detachment C-2. Jamming was to commence at 190230 and continue until 190330. Requests for additional jamming support were also forwarded to II CTZ and FFORCEV. Jamming of radio frequency 4.750 MC was attempted from approximately 190230 hours to 190315 hours. The immediate results of the attempted jamming could not be determined.

f. On 19 Dec. discussions with local Rhade leaders at Plei Djereng indicated that they believed government forces destroyed the FULRO radio antenna and that they had not received the expected 190300 Dec. radio instructions. Capt Schmidt reminded the Montagnards of the futility of their efforts, and further attempted to determine their exact intentions. Throughout the day there appeared to be a slight relaxation of tension at the camp and plans for resuming local security patrolling were completed. At 191800, however, the LLDB at Plei Djereng requested they be withdrawn, a recommendation not concurred in by Capt Schmidt or Lt Col Patch. To ease this situation Col Patch and SMG Ruddy departed 191815 Dec for the camp with the intention of spending the night, this further insured the security of the LLDB and lent additional stability at this time.

g. At 200900 Dec. Col Patch and SMG Ruddy returned to Pleiku. The situation having almost completely resolved itself. The only remaining action to be taken included disposition of the LLDB and a determination of the status of the local FULRO leaders at Plei Djereng. After a joint camp LLDB/USSF/CIDG meeting was adjourned, it was agreed, by all, that the LLDB should remain in the camp, as all differences could be resolved. The camp FULRO leaders were screened, sent to Ban Me Thout, paid, and discharged on 21 Dec 65.

Incl 24 Cont'd



## 9. COMMENTS.

a. During the entire period 180800 Dec. thru 21 Dec 65 all differences at Camp Plei Djereng were settled peaceably.

b. All overtures directed at USSF by FULRO were rejected, FULRO ambitions were discredited and in all cases USSF defended GVN policies and representatives.

c. In this incident, unlike Boun Brieng, LLDB/USSF were able, thru direct coordination with DSA II CTZ, Col Mataxis, to develop a solution completely compatible with GVN policies. This solution in the final analysis has been acceptable to all principals concerned. As a result of this approach it was not necessary to close Camp Plei Djereng.

## 10. RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. That no harsh reprisals be directed at the Montagnard population at Camp Plei Djereng.

b. That a concerted, fruitful, psychological warfare operation be directed at the Montagnard population at Plei Djereng. This operation should include:

(1) Documentation as to the futility of FULRO.

(2) Restatement of GVN positions regarding FULRO.

(3) Amplification of proposed GVN support of the Montagnard population.

(4) Education of the population as to who their government is, i.e., a presentation of personalities from the Premier down to their local Montagnard Affairs Officer.

## 11. MAI LINH (A-112, Capt Charles Gregor).

a. On 181035 Dec. Detachment C-2 received a message from B-22 that during the night of 17-18 Dec. Montagnards killed approximately 30 Vietnamese personnel at Plei Kanong, Phu Thien District. This message further stated that elements of the 3d Bn, 40th Rgt. were dispatched to secure this area for the government, and that Camp Mai Linh was curtailing operational activities until such time as the implications of this attack could be determined.

b. At 181910 Dec, elements of three platoons, alleged to have conducted the attack in Phu Thien arrived at Mai Linh camp and requested that they be granted asylum. These elements were disarmed and held under guard outside the camp. The Phu Bon Province Chief was notified, and instructed the camp to hold all Montagnards, turning themselves in, under confinement. Interrogations, to determine what transpired at Phu Thien, were begun immediately, and revealed that at 180300 Dec. Montagnard troops fired into government billets with small arms and automatic weapons. These troops were determined to be members of the 269th and 503d RF Companies, and .

Incl 24 Cont'd



apparently acting in concert with a FULRO movement attempting an overthrow of the Phu Bon Province government.

c. By 192039 Dec. a total of eighty-two men had surrendered and turned over all weapons to the LLDB/USSF at Mai Linh. They were moved to Phu Bon Province Headquarters pending judicial action by GVN.

## 12. COMMENTS.

a. There is apparently no plausible explanation as to why these troops willingly surrendered to LLDB/USSF. It appears that immediately upon conclusion of the attack on Phu Thien District, these troops departed for Mai Linh.

b. All troops from both RF companies surrendered willingly and appeared quite docile.

c. Both LLDB/USSF acted in concert, thus minimizing difficulties that might otherwise have developed.

## 13. CONCLUSIONS.

The FULRO movement appeared to be wide spread but poorly organized. In addition it lacked communications as well as a common theme - There appeared to be no FULRO leadership with the camp at Lac Thien, only a handful of weak followers. Two Strike Force Company Commanders and two interpreters at Plei Djereng were definitely involved and probably could have caused serious trouble had they received definite orders from FULRO. These men have been discharged.

s/William A. Patch  
t/WILLIAM A. PATCH  
Lt Col, Infantry  
Commanding

Cpy Furn:  
DSA II CTZ  
LNO, 5th SFG, Saigon

Incl 24 Cont'd



DETACHMENT A-215  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96295

AVSF-B

13 December 1965

SUBJECT: Strategic Hamlet - CA/Psy Ops Program at Duc Co

TO: Commanding Officer  
Detachment C-2  
5th SF Gp (A&N), 1st SF  
APO US Forces 96295

1. General. Due to strong VC control of the population near Duc Co, a program was initiated to clear the VC from the area and to provide security for the people. Objectives initially were to (a) enhance camp security, (b) gain and maintain contact with the population, (c) clear local VC away from the camp.

2. Initial Security Operations. Initially a company size unit (100 or more men) was used to attack and seize various village objective areas. Moving under cover of darkness, the assault, support and blocking forces were in position for the attack by daylight. After the village was cleared, security was established in and around the objective. A reserve was normally maintained near the C.P.

3. Intelligence. One LDB or CIDG is designated to handle the intelligence requirements. Advance planning is made, if possible, on details of VC strength, names etc. After the village is secure the intelligence man begins interrogation of captives, Chieu Hoi's, and the village civilians. Initial emphasis is placed on determining VC status, hiding places and or routes of withdrawal. Additional sweeps are organized as necessary. Captives or Chieu Hoi's can often be used as guides. However, care must be taken to prevent being led into a trap.

4. Initial Civic Action. The troops must be well indoctrinated not to loot or steal from the people. Troops are strongly encouraged to pay for goods received such as food. Fair treatment of the people is mandatory. It is important initially to help the people as much as possible to negate VC propaganda against SVN and US soldiers. Holding sick call is an excellent civic action device for the civilians. Treating wounded VC or Chieu Hoi's demonstrates the good faith and intentions of the CIDG.

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13 December 1965

SUBJECT: Strategic Hamlet - CA/Psy Ops Program at Duc Co

5. Initial Psy War. All troops must be oriented to the possibilities of the Chieu Hoi Program. The troops must be alert to receive them and give them fair treatment. Certain troops are designated to carry leaflets for distribution on and near the objective. During the operation to clear and secure the village, a psy war aircraft if available, drops Chieu Hoi leaflets and makes a loudspeaker appeal. After the village is secured the people are assembled and the details of the program explained by the senior LLDB present. If a Chieu Hoi is available he should be present at the formation where the LLDB or CIDG congratulate him and publicly pay for his weapon if he had one and turned it in. Many Chieu Hoi will desire to leave the village with their family. This should be permitted when possible to avoid VC reprisals. Families of VC are contacted individually with regards to this program. Wives or children but not both are sent out to make contact with their VC relatives and encourage them to surrender. An LLDB soldier or CIDG striker should have primary responsibility for this project and not as an additional duty. Close coordination between the intelligence, psy war and civic action program is necessary. Promises made in the leaflet, loudspeaker or person to person appeal must be honored. The CIDG troops, if they exercise a CA/Psy War attitude, can be invaluable in this program.

6. Continuation of CA/Psy Ops.

a. The people are assembled and informed of the role the CIDG will play in their village. The CIDG will provide security and civic action help for the people. The people are also told their responsibilities in the new village life. The CIDG will provide security for the crop harvest and the village area. However, the people must participate in village security, defense, intelligence, civic action and encourage their friends and relatives to participate in the Chieu Hoi Program.

b. Harvesting of crops is organized under CIDG protection. Certain persons are organized to prepare defensive positions and clear fields of fire. Others with CIDG help are designated to make necessary repairs to facilities such as roads, bridges, dispensaries, and school houses. A guerrilla auxiliary platoon (unarmed) of approximately 30-60 men is organized. For reliability these men are normally selected from families in the village under CIDG control. This platoon augments the CIDG in local security, defense, patrols and resupply operations.

c. The senior LLDB or CIDG becomes the village commander. A village chief and necessary assistants are appointed, after close counter-intelligence checks, to help administer the people. A CIDG aidman operates the dispensary and a village nurse is selected and sent to Duc Co for medical training. If no school teachers are available, certain CIDG can teach school on a part time basis until a permanent teacher can be employed. CA/Psy War patrols make periodic visits from the camp.



SUBJECT: Strategic Hamlet - CA/Psy Ops Program at Duc Co

d. One LLDB or CIDG has primary responsibility for intelligence and counterintelligence. Nets are set up as soon as feasible. Counterintelligence is emphasized since the operation is literally surrounded by VC agents and sympathizers. Good faith towards the people will encourage them to identify VC hard core key leaders and guerrillas in the population.

7. Conclusions.

a. The end result is that the village becomes a combination strategic hamlet and a small FOB for the camp. The FOB provides local security, a limited defensive capability with bunkers, wire, flares, and claymores. The hamlet becomes a detriment to the VC effort. With the population secured, the VC lose manpower resources, food supply, and their intelligence is curtailed considerably.

b. One main key to the success of the program is the Striker. He must be Civic Action/Psy War oriented. This is not an easy task, however the details and benefits of the program must be explained to the troops and the leaders must be held accountable for the actions of their men.

c. Duc Co CIDG are equally split between Vietnamese and Jarai. The program has been successful in both types of villages. Currently over 6,000 people in different locations are in this program. The potential for expansion is excellent. Plans are now progressing to incorporate three more villages in this program. In the last 40 days, as a result of this program over 120 Chieu Hoi have surrendered, many with weapons and grenades. Emphasis must be placed on self-help for the people. They must be capable of supporting themselves plus providing augmentation to the CIDG. Active small unit patrolling must be conducted in the area. Guerrilla auxiliaries assist the permanent CIDG force so that only 40-60 CIDG troops are required in the village. Also, civilians and former VC are organized as special informers and are dispatched to VC areas to gain intelligence.

s/Richard B. Johnson  
t/RICHARD B. JOHNSON  
Captain, Infantry  
Commanding



DETACHMENT C-2  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96295

AV3FB-ADJ

9 November 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report, Psychological Operations in Support of  
of Camp Plei Me. 20-29 October 1965.

TO: Senior Advisor  
II Corps  
ATTN: G-5 Advisor  
APO US Forces 96295

1. Reference letter MACTH-IIC-5, 26 Oct 65, subject: Coordinated  
US/ARVN Psywar/CA support planned for Plei Me Operations.
2. Participating agencies and responsibilities:
  - a. II Corps G-5 Advisor - Aircraft coordination, leaflet support.
  - b. II Corps G-5 leaflet support.
  - c. S-5 Det C-2, 5th SFGA-leaflet support, taped messages, mission  
coordination.
  - d. Section S-5 Advisor-Pleiku Province-conduct of U-10 loudspeaker  
missions JUSP/O Representative, Pleiku Province leaflet support.
3. Sequence of Events:
  - a. 19 OCT  
1900 hrs-Initial attack on Camp Plei Me.
  - b. 21 OCT  
1500 hrs-PO aircraft requested by S-5, Det C-2  
2100 hrs-Urgent request for PO support by C.O. Camp Plei Me  
received by Det C-2
  - c. 22 OCT  
(1) Leaflets were requested by S-5, Det C-2, Based on intelligence  
reports from Plei Me stating that there were Chinese Advisors on the battlefield  
and that a dead VC was observed chained to his machine gun.

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(2) Loudspeaker appeal was prepared by S-5, Det C-2 to be used in conjunction with the leaflet: "VIETNAMESE BROTHERS. HUNDREDS OF YOUR COMRADES HAVE DIED IN THE ASSAULT ON CAMP PLEI ME TO GRATIFY YOUR ADVISORS. DO NOT BE CHAINED TO YOUR WEAPONS TO DIE NEEDLES BY ANY LONGER. END THIS USELESS SLAUGHTER. THROW DOWN YOUR WEAPONS AND COME TO THE GOVERNMENT, YOU WILL BE FED, GIVEN MEDICAL TREATMENT AND REST. YOU WILL BE ASSISTED IN STARTING A NEW LIFE".

d. 24 OCT

(1) 1700 hrs-U19 Aircraft from 1st Air Commando Squadron arrived with two pilots.

(2) 1930-2200 hrs-Mission Nr. 1

(a) Leaflet dropped: 70,000, Loudspeaker theme(Above)

(b) Area covered: Plei Khot, Chugo Mountain and North of Camp Plei Me.

e. 25 OCT

(1) 0900-1130-Mission Nr. 2

(a) Loudspeaker theme: Same as mission Nr. 1

(b) Leaflet dropped: 50,000-same as above.

(c) Area covered: Large village North of Plei Me believed to be inhabited by VC.

(2) 1100-1330-S-5, Det C-2, Interrogated a captive from the 32nd Regiment element which conducted ambush North of Plei Me. The following facts were established:

(a) Unit had listened to Radio Hanoi and felt that claims of victory were false

(b) Some personnel in unit would defect if given instructions what to do and if told they would be fed, given medical care and good treatment.

(3) 1500-1730-Mission Nr. 3

(a) Loudspeaker theme: Hardship theme with instructions based upon captive interrogation: "VIETNAMESE BROTHERS: YOU ARE NOW VERY HUNGRY, TIRED, AND SICK, HUNGRY AND YOU WILL HAVE MANY MORE KILLED. IT IS NOT NECESSARY. THE GOVERNMENT WILL WELCOME YOU, BROTHERS, WITH FOOD, MEDICINES AND A PEACEFUL LIFE. LEAVE YOUR UNITS, GO NORTH TO HIGHWAY 19 AND FOLLOW IT TO THE GOVERNMENT POST AT THANH BIE. NOW IS YOUR CHANCE TO LEAVE THIS MISERABLE WAR".

(b) Leaflets dropped: 50,000-Bong Son victory exploitation. (same as above theme)

(c) Purpose: Convince VC of hopelessness of cause and a promise of good treatment for ralliers.

(d) Area covered: Northern infiltration route to include Plei Bu Can, Thang Ban and North of Camp Plei Me.

(4) 1930-2100 Mission Nr. 4

(a) Loudspeaker theme: (Same as Mission #3)

(b) Leaflets dropped: 30,000, Chieu Hoi, appeals showing the hopelessness of VC actions and offering assistance to VC in starting a new life.

(c) Area Covered: Plei Me Camp area and North to Plei Bu Can Thang Ban.

Incl 26 Cont'd



d. 26 OCT

(1) 1245-1515 Mission Nr. 5

(a) Loudspeaker message (same as Mission #4) Leaflets dropped 43,000 Plei Me exploitation leaflets.

(b) Area covered: Northwest of Camp Plei Me to highway 19 and along Northern Infiltration route.

(2) 1845-2130 Mission Nr. 6

(a) loudspeaker message: "VIETNAMESE BROTHERS: YOUR VC LEADERS PROMISED YOU A QUICK VICTORY. WHAT HAVE YOU NOW? YOUR VC LEADERS TOLD YOU THAT THE END OF THE WAR IS NEAR. YOU SEE NOW THAT IT IS NOT, YOUR LEADERS HAVE DECEIVED YOU. RESIST THEM. LAY DOWN YOUR WEAPONS. GO TO HIGHWAY 19 AND FOLLOW IT TO THE NEAREST GOVERNMENT POST. YOU WILL BE WELCOMED, FED AND YOUR WOUNDS WILL BE TREATED". This message is based upon an analysis of reasons for causing the greatest number of ralliers from the North Vietnamese Army and from the prisoner interrogation the previous day. The divisive theme was developed to bring to the surface a latent distrust of VC leadership. Leaflets dropped: None, Area covered: Area immediately surrounding Camp Plei Me and Chu Ho Mountain.

g. 27 OCT

(1) A morning mission was not flown due to an equipment breakdown. The loudspeaker aircraft had to fly to Qui Nhon to get a new set of speaker coils for burned out unit.

(2) A rallier was reported in Camp Plei Me at 2130, 26 Oct with several important items of information:

(a) Loudspeaker message was effective. Notification of good treatment by government forces was principal reason for surrender, and night missions were extremely harassing.

(b) Rallier picked up one leaflet described as Chieu Hoi leaflet believed dropped 25 Oct (1900-2100 hrs).

(c) More people would have rallied if message would have been repeated more times in immediate area.

(3) 1500-1730 Mission Nr. 7

(a) Loudspeaker message: "VIETNAMESE BROTHERS: YOUR VC LEADERS SAID THAT THE REINFORCEMENTS ARE NEAR. YOU SEE THAT THEY ARE NOT. YOUR VC LEADERS PROMISED YOU A QUICK VICTORY. WHAT HAVE YOU NOW? YOUR LEADERS HAVE DECEIVED YOU. LAST NIGHT SEVERAL OF YOUR COMRADES RALLIED TO THE GOVERNMENT TROOPS. YOU WILL BE WELCOMED WITH OPEN ARMS." This message combined with the notification that personnel had defected (bandwagon idea), and the promise of good treatment. Based on rallier's information a new technique was tried by the pilot to improve sound propagation.

(b) Leaflets dropped: None

(c) Area covered: Same as mission Nr. 6.

(4) 1900-2100 hrs Mission Nr. 8

(a) Loudspeaker message: Same as Mission #7

(b) Leaflets dropped: 20,000 Bong Son exploitation leaflets

(Incl 1)

(c) Area covered: A suspected rear area concentration Plei Rede and the area West of Plei Me. Contact was lost with VC elements which are believed to have retired Westward.

Incl 26 Cont'd



d. The U-10 Mission was flown for the Pleiku Province S-5, times are unknown. Loudspeaker themes: Same as Mission #1, Leaflets dropped: None, Area Covered: Unknown.

h. 29 OCT

(1) 0930-1100 and 1245-1400 Mission Nr. 9 and 10

(a) Loudspeaker theme: "ATTENTION VILLAGERS: THE GOVERNMENT WANTS TO LIBERATE ALL VILLAGES FROM VIET CONG CONTROL, WITHOUT HURTING THE VILLAGERS. YOU MUST HELP THE FRIENDLY FORCES BY REPORTING THE VIET CONG HIDING PLACES. ALL VILLAGERS MUST HELP ELIMINATE THE VIET CONG. DO NOT DELAY ANY LONGER. HELP THE GOVERNMENT SAVE YOUR VILLAGE." This follow-up message is written to establish new contact with the villagers and gain intelligence on enemy movements. Message was in D'jari and Vietnamese,

(b) Leaflets dropped: None

(c) Area Covered: All villages in Plei Me area for radius of approximately 15 kilometers.

4. Psychological exploitation of ralliers:

a. The rallier was interrogated between 1400 and 1430 on 27 Oct., by the S-5's of the LLDB and US3F C-Det's. At that time he wrote a letter which will be produced into a leaflet for further use against North Vietnamese units.

b. He agreed to make a tape for use by loudspeaker aircraft which was recorded at 2000 hrs 27 Oct. This tape has been utilized by the 1st Bde, 1st Cav in continued operations West of Plei Me.

5. Coordination:

a. At 1700 hrs 27 Oct a meeting of Civic Action/Psychological Operations personnel was conducted at Det C-2, 5th SFG. The following personnel attended:

Capt Nghi - II Corps G5  
Capt Griffin - II Corps Psy Ops  
Capt Griffin - 2d Psywar Bn Advisor  
Lt Bong - S-5, LLDB Det C-2  
Lt Cadigan - 25th Psy Ops Det  
Capt Willoughby - S-5 US3F det C-2  
Lt Ho - II Corps Civil Affairs  
Capt Poudrier - S-5 Advisor Pleiku Section

b. The following items were covered:

- (1) Psywar efforts to date on Plei Me Operation
- (2) Delegation of responsibility for further operations in Plei Me area provided contact is retained.
- (3) Themes to be used.
- (4) Ground work was laid for coordination provided similar opportunities are presented. Of particular importance is the fact that all Vietnamese and US Psy Ops personnel were drawn into the direct functioning of Psychological Operations. Also each agency became acquainted with the capabilities of the other units with regards to material support, translators and tape producing capabilities.

Incl 26 Cont'd



## 6. Additional Comments:

a. Reception should be checked with a friendly unit before each mission to determine propagation capabilities. This may be done by simply flying over at mission altitude and determining if the message is heard.

b. It appears that less ground can be covered than previously believed. Aircraft should fly in a circular orbit with a longer time on target. This will enable the audience to enable the audience to be able to hear the whole message rather than fragments.

c. Counterparts appeared to be side tracked on their functions such as the equivalent of graves registration or performing other administrative work during Plei Me attack.

d. The operation received a three day late start due to non-availability of aircraft primarily because of maintenance problems.

e. The stock of appropriate leaflets was exhausted after several missions and maximum benefit was denied from the missions.

f. The Air Force U-10 aircraft carries professional Psy Ops tapes which should be copied by using units to use with other aircraft.

## 7. Recommendations:

a. Loudspeaker aircraft should be programmed so that all are not down for maintenance at the same time. Also, loudspeaker aircraft should be available on a stand-by basis in a similar manner that TAC aircraft are maintained.

b. A re-evaluation of loudspeaker techniques should be conducted. The fact that smaller areas are covered than believed should receive widest dissemination.

c. Senior Vietnamese Officers should be appraised of the need for freeing S-5 Officers for Psy Ops activities.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incls

1. VC chained to MG (leaflet)
2. Ltr fr VC to Mother (leaflet)

s/Horace E. Jordan  
t/HORACE E. JORDAN  
Major, Infantry  
Adjutant

Incl 26 Cont'd



- DO WE WANT TO DO THIS?  
 - ARE WE ENFORCED TO KILL OUR FELLOW-  
 CITIZENS? WE SHOULD FREE OURSELVES AND  
 BE UNITED AS BROTHERS TO RESIST AGAINST  
 THE DOMINATION OF THE COMMUNIST.

- CÓ PHẢI CHÚNG TA MUỐN ĐIỀU NÀY KHÔNG?  
 - CHÚNG TA CÓ PHẢI BỊ ÉP BƯỚC GIẾT HẠI ĐỒNG-  
 BẢO TA KHÔNG? CHÚNG TA HẸY TỰ GIẢI THOÁT VÀ  
 ĐOÀN KẾT NHƯ TÌNH ANH EM ĐỂ CHỐNG LẠI  
 MỌI SỰ ĐÀN ÁP CỦA ĐƠN CÔNG-SẢN.



HỎI CÁC ANH EM THÂN MẾN!  
 HÀNG TRĂM CHIẾN HỮU CỦA CÁC BẠN ĐÃ BỊ CHẾT QAN  
 UNG TRONG CUỘC TẤN CÔNG TRẠI PLEI-ME DO NHỮNG  
 CHIẾN SĨ BIẾT-KÍCH-QUÂN TRẦN GIỮ.  
 SỰ HY-SÍNH VÔ NGHĨA LÝ ĐÓ CHỈ? LẮM THỎA MẮN THAM  
 VỌNG XÂM LĂNG CỦA NHỮNG TÊN CỐ VÂN TRUNG-CÔNG HIẾU  
 CHIẾN.

ĐỂ KHÔNG BỊ CỘT CHẶT VÀO VŨ-KHÍ VÀ CHẴNG BAO LÂU  
 SẼ PHẢI CHẾT MỘT CÁCH VÔ-ÍCH, HẸY CHẤM DỨT CẢNH TÀN-  
 SÁT VÔ-UƠNG NÀY.

CÁC BẠN HẸY BUÔNG VŨ KHÍ VÀ TRỞ VỀ VỚI CHÍNH  
 PHỦ VNCH.

CÁC BẠN SẼ ĐƯỢC SỐNG CUỘC ĐỜI THANH-  
 BÌNH HẠNH-PHỤC.

VIETNAMESE BROTHERS!

HUNDREDS OF YOUR COMRADES HAVE DIED IN THE ASSAULT ON CAMP PLEI-ME  
 TO GRATIFY YOUR ADVISORS. DO NOT BE CHAINED TO YOUR WEAPONS TO DIE  
 NEEDLESSLY ANY LONGER. END THIS USELESS SLAUGHTER. THROW DOWN YOUR  
 WEAPONS AND COME TO THE GOVERNMENT. YOU WILL BE FED, GIVEN MEDICAL  
 TREATMENT AND REST. YOU WILL BE ASSISTED IN STARTING A NEW LIFE.







# LEAFLET TRANSLATION

Since the day I left you and went from Laos to Trung-Nhon-Xangh Area which is in the snow covered mountains, the weather has been bad. But in my search for peace I am willing to bear these hardships.

I have lived in this condition for several months.  
My shoes and clothes are ragged.  
I am alone and cold here.  
Dearest Mother, I miss you.  
I miss my family and friends.  
I think of the small butterflies very much.  
Though this is a strang place.  
The South and the North are both Viet-Nam.  
At sundown the water buffalo return to their sheds.

I can see no liberation,  
Nor farms or markets.  
The bell sounds in the pagoda.  
In the classrooms boys and girls are singing.  
The people in this village are very kind to each other.  
But, I do not know why they force me to burn this village.  
To destroy bridges, set mines, or causes people pain.  
I have been shocked many times.  
After setting the mines and seeing blood.  
I ask time and time again...Whose blood is that?  
The answer then comes to me that it is the blood of my relatives.  
At times like this is when I shed my tears thinking of you, Mother.

The above letter is from a young NVA man. It was written to his aged mother, Tran-thi-Phan, who lives in Hai Duong. This young soldier was shot in the battle of Duc Co in August. He is dead now, but has expressed his anger towards the Labor Party who had forced him south to fight. We are sorry for this dead soldier and print this letter so as to you know how he felt.

Translation to Incl # 2



DETACHMENT C-2  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96295

AVSFB-20

29 December 1965

SUBJECT: Psy Ops Support of Operation Runaround I, 29 Nov - 3 Dec 65

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th Special Forces Group (Abn)  
ATTN: Psy Ops Officer  
APO US Forces 96240

1. Concept of operations:

a. On 29 Nov a combined force of CIDG and MIKE Force attached to clear the towns of Le Kim (YA 935390) Sung Le (YA 890375) and Duc Khanh (YA 900350) to implement population and resources control measures, and to move the population closer to the control of the government.

b. Psychological Operations support consisted of a loudspeaker aircraft on 29 Nov a Psy Ops/Medcap team on 30 Nov - 2 Dec, followed by a second team on 4 -7 Dec.

2. Composition of Psy Ops/Medcap team:

a. US Lt, Psy Ops Det, team advisor.

b. Two (2) Psy Ops Nco's, 2d Psy War Bn (VII), Psy operators, equipped with a mobile battery powered loudspeaker, and a transistor radio.

c. One US Medic, 21st Advisory Gp, equipped with MEDCAP Supplies and M-5 Aid Kit.

d. One interpreter, 2d Psy War Bn (VII), to assist in dealing with the Vietnamese civilians.

e. The CA Off, Det C-2, and two counterparts, LLDB Det C-2, assisted in coordination with military forces and the PO team.

3. Execution:

a. 29 Nov: A C-47 conducted a leaflet drop on the target areas immediately after contact was initiated at 0630 there were 60,000 leaflets dropped consisting of a Chieu Hoi message and a promise of good treatment for Viet Cong. Following the leaflet drop, the aircraft returned to Duc Co to await a psychological opportunity. At 0930, it was determined that the VC had fled, leaving their families in the villages. The location of the VC was believed (YA 925360) and a message stating that the families were well cared for and that they would be welcomed back to the GVN was broadcast over the suspected

Incl 27 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



VC hideout. Three Viet Cong brought leaflets to the USMC Force personnel at Duc Khanh on 30 Nov. 65

b. 30 Nov: At 0930 hrs, the Psy Ops/MEDCAP Team was landed in the vicinity of Duc Khanh. The villagers remaining in the village were assembled in the village square area by the USMC Force personnel for security purposes. Approximately 350 people were gathering their possessions and preparing for the move when the team arrived. The US and USMC Force medics began conducting sick call while the Psy Ops personnel and the advisors talked with the Village Chief and the USMC Force leaders in the area to determine the experience of Villagers with the VC, and to insure the appropriateness of the themes previously decided upon. As a result of the initial assessment, the following themes were used: The interest in the welfare of the people on the part of the government (as shown by medical treatment); current government victories (including the immediate operation), the strength and progress of the government in developing the nation; and the inevitability of government victory. The technique used was to talk to the crowd using the loudspeaker for about ten minutes on one of the themes above, and then spend the rest of the hour talking individually or to small groups of people about their problems, about current events, and other things that they found of interest. This enabled the Psy Ops personnel to develop an area assessment from which they were able to further develop the program. The confidence that the government personnel had obtained was indicated by the fact that the people began to point out the known Viet Cong among them. One was identified as the Deputy District Chief for administration, and another as a propaganda principal. The people asked that those men be separated and specially guarded. By 1800 hours the number of people in the square reached 650. At that time movement was stopped, and security was posted to enforce a curfew.

c. 1 Dec: Only minor medical treatment was administered due to a shortage of medical supplies, and face-to face contact continued by the Psy Ops personnel. Preparations were made to move the people in Duc Khanh, and to receive the 400 people from Le Kin, and 1200 people from Song Le, who were expected to arrive between 1200 and 1400 hrs. It had been planned to move all the people to Duc Hung (YA 895305) on this afternoon, but the people were too tired to continue when they arrived at Duc Khanh, so they remained at that location with two companies used as security. The people from Duc Khanh who were preparing to move were asked to go into the jungle and locate families and friends who had fled there to return. Several of them returned with Viet Cong personnel who gave themselves up. The use of immediate families in gaining Chieu Hoi netted over twenty personnel before the operation was completed. Again, a curfew was established to aid in security.

d. 2 Dec: Medical supplies were flown to Duc Hung, and part of the Psy Ops team was displaced to prepare for the arrival of the refugees, now numbering 2300 persons. The people began arriving at about 0900 hours, and closed the new location by 1500 hours. The medical team utilized the marketplace for sick call, and the Psy Ops team assisted the LLDP in controlling and reorganizing the population. During this move and the previous day's move, it is notable that the strike force personnel carried much of the rice and household items out of the villages for the people. It became commonplace to see CIDG carrying their own gear plus children, pigs, or baskets of food. This

Incl 27 Cont'd



AVSFB-PO

20 December 1965

SUBJECT: Psy Ops Support of Operation Runaround I, 29 Nov - 3 Dec 65

atmosphere of helping is largely responsible for the trust that was developed between the people and the government forces.

e. 3-4 Dec: The Security company continued to organize the population in a defensible posture, and security operations were conducted to return the people to their old villages to retrieve their belongings and carry in more rice. When this was completed, the deserted villages were razed, leaving no food or shelter for the remaining Viet Cong in the area. The Duc Hung area now has ample rice to feed its population.

4. On all combat operations the CIDG are carefully instructed not to indiscriminately injure innocent people or destroy their property. Leaflets were dropped and propaganda broadcasts were utilized prior to Operation Runaround which encompassed the towns of Duc Khanh, Sung Le and Le Kim. This resulted in a total of one hundred and thirty nine "Chieu Hoi". This is significant as this is twice the number of the preceding month. They brought with them fifteen weapons of various descriptions, eighty grenades and neutralized an undetermined number of booby traps. Over 400 persons were treated by medical personnel, and the people have been placed in a secure area where they have developed into productive assets for the government. As the refugees return to this location, lectures are prepared and delivered in conjunction with sick calls and other civic action activities. The personal conduct of many CIDG troops is directly responsible for the success of the "Chieu Hoi" program in this area.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

s/Horace E. Jordan  
t/HORACE E. JORDAN  
Major, Infantry  
Adjutant

Incl 27 Cont'd



DETACHMENT B-41  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96215

AVSFD-CA

7 November 1965

SUBJECT: CA/Psy Ops Exploitation of VC Action

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF  
ATTN: CA Officer  
APO US Forces 96240

1. The following report highlights a successful Psychological Operation conducted in the operational area of Moc Hoa on 5 November 1965.

2. On 3 November 1965 a Viet Cong unit of unknown size probed Nhon Hoa Hamlet, which is located 8 kilometers North of Ap Bac. Through the gathering of local intelligence that day the GVN forces were alerted and waiting in defensive positions when the VC lead elements began their attack. After a brief fire fight the Viet Cong withdrew its forces, but not before two civilian houses were destroyed causing injury and death to the local inhabitants.

3. The following day, 4 November 1965, the Province Chief sent a team to Nhon Hoa to make an on the spot investigation. This team was composed of operations and intelligence, psychological warfare, and social welfare personnel. When the team returned late that afternoon with its report, the Province Chief directed that a tactical operation be mounted the next day. The purpose of the operation was solely psychological.

4. The following day, 5 November 1965, a major psychological warfare operation took place under the direction of the Province Chief. Three (3) company sized forces moved into the hamlet area from Ap Bac and occupied blocking positions around the hamlet. While the companies were moving into position, CA/Psy Ops personnel moved into the hamlet to accomplish the following missions:

a. Give medical treatment to the people who had been injured in the probe, and also anyone who was in need of medical treatment.

b. Pay on the spot death gratuities to anyone who had lost one of their loved ones in the foiled attack.

Inclosure 28 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



AV3FD-CA

7 November 1965

SUBJECT: CA/Psy Ops Exploitation of VC Action

c. Repair of homes and property that were damaged during the attack.

d. Explain to the people that GVN was in control and could move freely anywhere they wanted without interference from the Viet Cong. At approximately 1100 hours an anti-VC rally was conducted at the local high school. The rally was conducted by the VI3 representative who had assembled local hamlet leaders as well as the Vietnamese Welfare representative. Speeches were made discrediting the VC and welfare commodities were distributed to the most needy families in the area. The rally was considered a great success.

5. The encouraging aspect of this operation, is that Major Tan, the new Province Chief, realizes the need and importance of psychological operations, and is willing to conduct combat operations to achieve purely psychological results.

s/Howard A. Simister  
t/HOWARD A. SIMISTER  
Captain, Infantry  
CA/Psy Ops Officer

Incl 28 Cont'd



AVSFB-ADJ

1st Ind

SUBJECT: Implementation of the CA/Psy Ops Mission at the "A" Detachment Level

DETACHMENT C-2, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES, APO US Forces 96295, 19 November 1965

TO: Commanding Officer, 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 1st Special Forces, APO US Forces 96240

1. Attached is a letter from Det A-216, 5th SFG(A), dtd 11 Nov 65 subject: Implementation of the CA/Psy Ops Mission at the "A" Detachment Level.
2. The concept of a CIDG unit in each camp with a CA/PO Mission gives the camp commander a skilled unit to conduct a consistent CA/PO program. This unit provides for the ready compliance with MACV Directive 525-3, subject: Minimizing Non-combatant Casualties, as combat operations can be followed up with a tailored unit of this type. A specialized CA/PO unit can be utilized in either Phase II, III, or IV. In Phase II it would be necessary to have a large security force or to use the unit to follow up combat operations in populated areas. In Phase III or Phase IV camps, the unit can conduct missions alone with a minimum of interference.
3. Camp Plei Do Lim has an extremely flexible and effective squad. An increase in intelligence has been noted, but more important this instrument has increased the interplay between the government forces and the people in the camp's operational area.
4. The organization outlined in the letter is applicable to the Plei Do Lim CIDG force and to the operational area. Recognizing the fact that the requirements of each operational area present diverse problems, modifications to the suggested organization will probably be necessary. The principal of assigning qualified personnel to a similar unit in CIDG camps in the II CTZ is being followed as a result of the success this project has realized at Plei Do Lim. I recommend that CA/PO units be organized in all CIDG camps in Vietnam which are dependent upon the population for the success of the CIDG mission.

Copy furnished  
DSA, II CTZ

s/William A. Patch  
t/WILLIAM A. PATCH  
Lt Col, Infantry  
Commanding

Inclosure 29 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



DETACHMENT A-216  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96295

AVSFB-ADJ

11 November 1965

SUBJECT: Implementation of the CA/Psy Ops Mission at the "A" Detachment Level

THRU: Commanding Officer  
Detachment C-2  
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF  
APO US Forces 96295

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF  
APO US Forces 96240

1. General. A close examination of the existing CIDG organization and apparatus available to the "A" Detachment to conduct an effective Civic Action and Psychological Warfare program revealed several substantial inadequacies. To begin with there is no organization provided within the CIDG structure related to the CA mission. This means that there is no systematic or consistent program to provide continuity of effort. Subsequently there is little or no mechanism available to provide feedback which is so vitally important to a successful Psychological Warfare campaign. Another fact worth considering is that the tools normally recommended to the Detachment Commander in this type of work are loud speakers and leaflets, the mass media communicators, which are certainly limited in their effectiveness and flexibility. In order to bridge the gap not covered by the TO&E combat organizations it was felt that it would be worth while to draw up a special organization. An idea was borrowed from the much publicized and highly successful Viet Cong agent-prop squad to create a Civic Action/Psychological Warfare unit specifically designated to work at the grass roots level. This test unit was designated as the Civic Action Squad, CAS.

2. Organization. Personnel to man this new unit were very selectively recruited from within the CIDG ranks. The following minimum criteria was strictly adhered to in this process. Each person had to have a desire to participate in this type of program. He must be indigenous to the operational area. He must be literate, and finally he must have leadership

Incl 29 Cont'd



11 November 1965

SUBJECT: Implementation of the CA/Pay Ops Mission at the "A" Detachment Level

qualities. In addition to this the men were chosen with an eye towards their suitability to fill the following unit organization:

a. One squad leader - controls and coordinates the overall activities of the squad. Must also have persuasive personality and be a good speaker.

b. Two man medical team - to provide much welcomed and greatly needed medical assistance to the villagers. Here is short term, high impact help which readily demonstrates the government's ability and desire to help the people.

c. Two man civic action team - they are principally concerned with distribution of CA items such as soap, salt, toothbrushes and tee-shirts, and help in projects such as sanitation, crop improvement and construction of rice storage houses.

d. Two man propaganda team - they are the communicators of the squad who specialize in political discussion and the alignment of the villagers with the local anti-VC effort in the area. They distribute leaflets and explain them to the villagers.

e. Two man area assessment team - they are assigned the responsibility of finding out and recording as much data as they can on the village and villagers. They make sketches of the village and trails in the area, count the number of villagers, gather biographical data on village chief and other family heads or important people. An area assessment folder is then maintained for every village in this area.

f. Two man intelligence team - they pick up all OB, recent sightings, tactics and future plans of the VC in the area. They are also interested in the spotting, recruiting, training and control of agents and informants. They also establish an early warning net.

3. Training. Once the people were selected for this assignment there was the task of indoctrination and mission orientation that had to be accomplished. They had to learn a new philosophy of war, a war for the willing support of the people. From a very practical point of view the question immediately arose concerning the advisability of moving throughout the operational area with only eleven men. The men were assured that their mission was not suicidal and that their chances for continued success were excellent if they observed the following rules. Complete secrecy as to destination, departure and return times. Never use the same route twice. Maintain one third of the force alert and in ambush while the others rest at night outside of the village. Use the villagers as an early warning system. If they truly succeed in helping the villagers then the villagers will help them.



11 November 1965

SUBJECT: Implementation of the CA/Psy Ops Mission at the "A" Detachment Level

4. Operations. (See Inclosure 1, Civic Action Squad Patrol Report)

5. Conclusions. The Civic Action Squad described in this report has thus far shown that it is a workable unit, readily accepted by the people, but in need of much more experience and training. One example of this would be the squads' inability to expertly handle group discussion aimed at arriving at a preplanned conclusion. This is the type of activity which is usually most productive in winning the minds of the people, but it involves the mastery of a technique which cannot be acquired overnight. In addition to the continuing training conducted at this location, ten selected personnel are attending a ten week Civic Action school at the Montagnard Training Center at Pleiku. Personnel are instructed in life improvement motivation, agriculture, animal husbandry, tailoring, blacksmithing, carpentry and psychological operations. The program outlined here is not presented as the solution of a very complex problem but as a solution which hopefully will work in this particular area. This is a long term project which conceivably will take years to reach full productivity. However, in two months time it has already reached into every village in this area and lets the people know that the government is very interested in them.

1 Incl  
as

s/James L. McCoy  
t/JAMES L. McCOY  
Capt Inf  
Commanding

Incl 29 Cont'd



DETACHMENT A-216  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
AFO US Forces 96295

11 November 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report of CA/Psy Ops Patrol

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TO: Commanding Officer  
Detachment C-2  
5th SF Gp (A5n), 1st SF  
AFO US Forces 96295

This patrol was carried out by a newly formed Special Action squad composed of (11) men who function as five 2-man teams: 2-Medics, 2-CA workers, 2-Psy Ops men, 2-Intelligence gatherers, 2-Intelligence agent recruiters and the Squad Leader. The purpose of this squad is to increase intelligence from, and relations with, the local people by more personal contact and more direct aid. The village visited on this patrol was Plei Breng II (AR826301). The patrol was planned for two days, and was accompanied by SSG E-6 Allickson and SGT E-5 House on this initial mission to advise the squad in their new role.

On 22 September, the patrol left Camp Plei Do Lim at 1300 hrs. With the (11) men Special Action squad were 2 USSE and 1 interpreter. We moved West and circled North as to enter the village at the Southwest side. At 1500 hrs we entered the village and placed (5) men of the squad on security. The squad leader (TEL) then assembled all villagers and gave a general propaganda talk of 1hr 15min duration. Sick Call was begun at the end of TEL's talk. The medical aid was received very enthusiastically by the people and (26) patients were treated (the majority being children with severe colds). A sick call was carried on the squad leader and four of his men, (CA/Psy Ops) personnel, distributed 20 bars of soap, 12 bags of salt and 1 soccer ball. The ball was an immediate success and was played with unceasingly from that time on. The Psy Ops men also spoke on and distributed 200 leaflets depicting the VC stealing food and burning villages. During the same period the intelligence men of the squad were busy making contacts for the more detailed information quest that began the next day. At 1830 hrs we ate evening chow and when finished (1900 hrs) we moved out to set up for the night. We moved South for approximately 400 meters and established an ambush on the trail in vicinity of coordinates AR828298. The ambush was a straight type with a claymore mine on each end and a 3.A.R. position in the center. No contact was made during the night.

Incl 29 Cont'd



11 November 1965

SUBJECT: After Action Report of CA/Psy Ops Patrol

At 0600 hrs, the next morning (23 Sept) we left the ambush site and at 0615 hrs we moved into the village. Seven men entered from the South side while eight men swept the village from the North. The villagers were gathered together after we had eaten and spoke with the chief. The squad leader again spoke to the village and re-affirmed the fact that we were there to help them in any way possible. Again Sick Call was begun at the end of this opening general propaganda speech. Both medics were working, as we had decided only five men were necessary on security. Response to the medical aid was even greater this time, and (41) people received treatment (a large part of which were skin infections that could be cleared up by a steady supply and useage of soap alone). The medics did a fine job and were largely responsible for the enthusiasm and cooperation of the villagers. Meanwhile two men were involved in aiding in the construction of rice houses, a project which lasted until our time of departure. We watched a portion of the work and found the people of the village both amazed and happy over the fact that soldiers were actually helping them perform menial, laborious tasks. The squad leader and one of the CA men now began to police up the village grounds and after a short time many of the villagers were participating. All of the trash was raked together and set aflame and a sump was dug to dispose of the items that wouldn't burn. The appearance of the village was improved 50% and the villagers realized and appreciated that fact. Later I saw many of them placing trash in the sump rather than simply throwing it out the door. The one remaining man not on security was involved in gathering intelligence the complete day. The people told him that there are only (2) VC in the area with weapons (1 with a MAS 36 with 5 rounds, and 1 with a Carbine with 5 magazines). They stated that the last large group of VC were in the village during the time of the big ambush. (I am not sure of which ambush they were speaking about.) The intelligence men took lengthy notes on all information and these are being translated at this time, along with the notes of the other squad members. SSG Allickson rated the information, the 2 VC as F-3. As projects were progressing (approx 1000 hrs), the squad leader and USSF personnel distributed 30 tee-shirts, 20 toothbrushes, 20 tubes of toothpaste, and 20 small South Vietnamese Flags to the children and adolescents. They immediately donned their tee-shirts and the squad leader than gave them a demonstration of the correct useage of the toothbrush. It proved both educational and amusing. Also distributed were 200 leaflets showing government troops killing the VC and thus protecting the local people. The whole day was consumed with the projects already mentioned, interspersed with Psy Ops talks on a small scale and wild soccer games. The gift ball was still being used constantly and was the largest single success of the visit. The chief of the village was sincerely happy with our stay in his area and as a result the USSF personnel were forced to sample all rice wine on hand. A holiday atmosphere was present in the village and I truly believe we made many friends for Camp Plei Do Lim. After the noon meal the squad was instructed to finish the projects by 1500 hrs. They did so and we departed the

Incl 29 Cont'd



SUBJECT: After Action Report of CA/Psy Ops Patrol

11 November 1965

village at 1530 hrs, amidst many voiced wishes that we return soon. We then proceeded back to Camp Plei Do Lim, circling Northward.

In my opinion the newly formed squad did a very good job. The mission was carried out and we were well received. The idea which prompted the enactment of a Special Action squad could, and should, prove very profitable in this area. The villagers are ready for sincere friends and sincere help and this squad will give them both.

s/Floyd L. House  
t/FLOYD L. HOUSE  
SGT (E-5) Medic  
Patrol Advisor

Incl 29 Cont'd



DETACHMENT A-304  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96227

AVSFC-CA

7 November 1965

SUBJECT: Relocation of Refugees, Tanh Linh

TO: Commanding Officer  
5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF  
ATTN: CA Officer  
APO US Forces 96240

1. Detachment A-304, located at Camp Tanh Linh, Binh Tuy Province, III Corps, has a dual mission which consists of sub-sector advisory and CIDG role. During the past three months 2,300 refugees have moved into the detachments operational area. To effectively meet the needs of the refugees this detachment in conjunction with the District Chief developed and implemented a three phase refugee plan.

a. Phase I. The refugees are relocated in a central refugee building and given an orientation on what they can expect in the future.

b. Phase II. Each refugee family is given a plot of land in the village for the purpose of constructing their home and raising their crops. In addition to the plot of land, they are given a portion of undeveloped rice paddy for their use. During the first 30 days they receive 7\$VN per day from province funds to help defer financial difficulties. During this phase they clear their land and begin construction of their homes. The Village Chief organizes and supervises the construction.

c. Phase III. The District Chief furnishes the refugee families with vegetables and live stock. He loans them tools to farm their land and construct their homes. Special Forces and USOM provides needed clothing, blankets, rice, and tools. After a family completes its home it is inspected by the District Chief. If the District Chief considers the home satisfactory, the family is given 3500\$VN. During this phase a program is initiated to help the people improve their agriculture production and living conditions. The following is explained and demonstrated during this program: how to improve rice production, crop diversification, transporting agriculture products to market, and health and sanitation. This completes phase III, however, a continuing program exists whereby refugees receive help as needed.

Inclosure 30 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



AVSFC-CA

7 November 1965

SUBJECT: Relocation of Refugees, Tanh Linh

2. This is a functional and effective program designed to gain the support of the refugees, meet their needs, and assist them to become self-sufficient as soon as possible.

s/Ronald M. Robinson  
t/RONALD M. ROBINSON  
Captain, Infantry  
Commanding

Incl 30 Cont'd



#### MONTHLY TEAM SUMMARY

The US3F Motivation Team has made great progress during this quarter. Operating only in An Phu District, Chau Duc Province, last quarter, it has now expanded its area of operations with teams conducting motivational training in An Phu, Tinh Bien and Tan Chau Districts, Chau Duc Province; and Dien Khauh District in Kienh Hoa Province. The number of civilian cadre has been doubled resulting in a total of forty (40) highly skilled instructors organized in to eight (8) five man teams. The total number of personnel trained has increased from 175 CIDG soldiers last quarter to 961 CIDG soldiers at the end of this quarter; 114 Popular Force soldiers last quarter to 380 Popular Force soldiers at the end of this quarter; and 42 civilian officials last quarter to 133 civilian officials at the end of this quarter. Following is a translated letter from the civilian students in An Phu District who attended SF Motivation Training Course with the CIDG soldiers. They have expressed the following feelings:

#### EXPRESSION OF FEELINGS

As the representative of 14 civilian students, including the Hamlet Police Commissioners and the Hamlet Chiefs in An Phu District attending SF Motivation training Course with the CIDG soldiers, I express the following feelings.

Gentlemen,

We are glad that we were requested to attend this course together with Special Forces Border Surveillance Co. under the direction of US3F instructors.

We see that they instructed us in this course with quite large a program in a very short period, of 12 days, from 13-24 October 1965.

We see that the instructors explained clearly every purpose of the program, and we have gained more from this instruction than from any other course we have attended in the past.

The essential purposes of the Training program are as follows:

1. The fighting history of our people through regimes. Analysis of the revolution against the French 1945-1954.
2. Analysis of the present war against the communists on basic and particular points.
3. Advantages and disadvantages of both sides (ours & enemy's)
4. The role of the people in the present war.

Inclosure 31 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



Motivation Team Summary (Cont)

5. Point out the errors of our cadres and armed forces from the past.
6. Why and how we establish propaganda with the people.
7. The purpose and methods of the Open arms campaign.
8. Concepts of VC guerrilla and antiguerrilla tactics.
9. Conterespionage and secrecy preservation, the cadres' and CIDG's roles and duties in this present phase against the communists.

With above subjects and essential particulars we can remember satisfactorily owing to the instructors' detailed explanations.

We are happy to have more information for our cause against the communists, we promise that we will practise correctly the proposed schedule of the Government which we studied and we will work with and for our people.

We promise to our superiors: after this closing ceremony we will actively serve for the correct purposes that we have studied as good cadre for the people.

Once more, we wish the officers and members of HQ USBF in Saigon, and the District Chief good health.

An Phu 24 November 1965  
Representative of the trainees  
1st Hamlet, Khanh Binh village

s/Nguyen-van-Huynh.  
t/NGUYEN-VAN-HUYEN.

Incl 31 Cont'd



Inclosure (Casualty Figures) To Quarterly Command Report for  
Period ending 31 Dec 65, HQ, 5th SFG (Abn), 15 Jan 66

TOTAL CASUALTY FIGURES FOR CY 1965

	<u>1ST QTR</u>	<u>2D QTR</u>	<u>3D QTR</u>	<u>4TH QTR</u>
KIA	5	13	7	9
WIA	51	65	30	55
MED EVAC TO CONUS	8	13	13	3
MIA	0	0	2	0

US VS CIDG CASUALTIES FOR 1963, 1964, & 1965

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>
KIA	13 : 93	23 : 396	32 : 657

KIA RATIO

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>
VC/US	74 : 1	51 : 1	76 : 1
VC/CIDG	10.3 : 1	2.9 : 1	3.9 : 1

USASF & VC KIA & WIA FOR 1963, 1964, & 1965

	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>
USASF KIA/WIA	13/132	23/132	34/201
VC KIA/WIA	963/316	1153/530	2566/730

Inclosure 32 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



Inclosure 32 (Command Guidance) To Quarterly Command Report for  
Period ending 31 Dec 65, HQ, 5th SFG (Abn), 15 Jan 65

COMMAND GUIDANCE

1. During the conduct of recent combat operations a major deficiency in operational and command techniques which require corrective action through training and command guidance has been observed.

a. USASF personnel are not closely monitoring the command net. This results in delays in reactions and ineffective utilization of combat support facilities.

b. USASF personnel are not familiar with or fail to use proper target marking procedures for air strikes and do not provide the supporting FAC, gun ships or strike aircraft with sufficient information necessary for accurate and timely engagement of VC targets.

2. Recent events have occurred which require clearing up any misunderstandings of subordinate commanders concerning my command responsibilities and as a direct consequence, the absolute necessity for more responsive communications; therefore, I wish to stress the following points:

a. Headquarters, 5th SFG (Abn) is a tactical and operational headquarters in every respect.

b. I exercise command less operational control of all subordinate detachments of the 5th SFG. In addition to the normal administrative and logistical functions associated with "command", I am responsible for certain operational activities pertaining to opening and closing of CIDG camps, ensuring that proper action is taken to relieve, reinforce and resupply camps under attack or threat of attack, and for providing guidance necessary to ensure execution of the missions of the group.

c. As the Special Warfare Staff Officer for COMUSMACV, I am responsible for staffing all actions pertaining to the Special Forces efforts in RVN.

3. Execution of these responsibilities requires that I be kept fully informed of all significant developments, be they administrative, logistic or operational in nature. It is mandatory that all addressees notify this headquarters when any significant action involving a major tactical decision or commitment of Special Forces assets occur. TWX notification will be preceded by a telephone or SSB call giving unclassified spot information on the incoming electrical message. All detachment commanders must ensure that "HOT INFORMATION" is not held up by transmission delays by assigning priorities appropriate to the situation and following through on the message until it is received by the proper person at this headquarters.

Inclosure 33 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



Inclosure (Command Guidance) Continued

4. I desire that your subordinate detachments be appraised of the contents of this message and that command supervision be exercised to insure it is understood at all levels.

WILLIAM A. McKEAN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding

Incl 33 cont'd



HEADQUARTERS  
5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES  
APO US Forces 96240

AVSF-C

6 November 1965

SUBJECT: Troop Unit Change Request

TO: Commanding General  
United States Army, Vietnam  
APO US Forces 96307

1. References:

- a. JCS 252318Z Jun 65.
- b. COMUSMACV 23034.
- c. COMUSMACV 27236.
- d. CINCPAC DTG 072332Z Aug 65.
- e. COMUSMACV 28614.
- f. MACSOG 9709-65.
- g. TOE 31-107E Special Forces Company
- h. TOE 31-247E Signal Company, Special Forces Group
- i. TUCR HQS, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, dtd 24 Aug 65.

2. In accordance with paragraph 1b and c reference c, paragraph 2 reference d, and paragraph 6 reference f, personnel requirements are attached as inclosure 7a, 7b, 9b, 11, 12, change 1 to inclosure 13, 16 and 17. Request TUCR, this headquarters dated 24 August 1965 be amended to reflect changes included herein.

3. Change TUCR, this headquarters dated 24 August 1965 as follows:

- a. Delete: Inclosure 7
- Add: Inclosure 7a (attached)
- Add: Inclosure 7b (attached)

Inclosure 34 To Quarterly Command Report 31 December 1965.



6 November 1965

## SUBJECT: Troop Unit Change Request

- b. Add: Inclosure 9b (attached) Change inclosure 9 TUCR, dtd 24 Aug 65 to inclosure 9a.
  - c. Delete: Reorganization chart and paragraph 1s to Justification, inclosure 11.  
  
Add: Reorganization chart and paragraph 1e and 1f to Justification, inclosure 11 (attached).
  - d. Delete: Reorganization chart inclosure 12.  
  
Add: Reorganization chart and Justification (1 "C" detachment) to inclosure 12 (attached).
  - e. Make pen and ink changes to inclosure 13: (attached)  
  
Delete Justification 31.  
  
Add New Justification 31 and 31a.
  - f. Delete: Inclosure 16.  
  
Add: Inclosure 16. (attached).
  - g. Delete: Inclosure 17.  
  
Add: Inclosure 17 (attached).
4. Request TUCR implementation as soon as possible.

WILLIAM A McKEAN  
Colonel, Infantry  
Commanding



INCLOSURE 7a (Modified B Detachment provided to another Agency - 6 Officers and 20 Enlisted Men) to letter, Subject: Troop Unit Change Request, Hqs, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, dtd 6 Nov 65. Delete Inclosure 7 to TUCR dtd 24 Aug 65.

ADDITION: B Detachment Modified (Type V)

<u>LINE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>
01	Delete (Note 1a) (Note 3a)		
02	XO	Capt	31542
03	Adj	Capt	32110
04	S-2	Capt	39301
05	S-3	Capt	32162
06	S-4	Capt	34010
ADD	PO Advisor	Lt	39305
07	SGM	E-9	11G5S
08	Intel Sgt	E-8	11F5S
09	Opns Sgt	E-8	11F5S
ADD	Opns Sgt (2)	E-7	11F4S
ADD	Opns Sgt (3) (Note 3b)	E-6	11F4S
10	Combt Engr	E-7	12D4S
11	Hvy Wpns Ldr	E-7	11C4S
12	Lt Wpns Ldr	E-7	11B4S
13	Med Spec	E-7	91B4S
ADD	Med Spec	E-7	91B4S
14	Rad Opr Supv	E-7	91B4S
15	Sup Sgt	E-7	76K4S
16	Admin Supv	E-6	71L4S
17	Asst Sup Sgt	E-6	76K4S

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Incl 34 Cont'd



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INCLOSURE 7a (Modified B Detachment provided to another Agency)  
Continued

<u>LINE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>
18	Pvnt Med NCO	E-6	91S4S
19	Ch Rad Opr	E-6	05B4S
20	Demo Spec	E-5	12B2S

NOTE: Change to basic organization

1. Delete:

a. Det Co, Maj, MOS 31542

2. ADD:

a. PO Advisor, Lt, MOS 39305

b. Opns Sgt (2), E-7, MOS 11F4S

c. Opns Sgt (3), E-6, MOS 11F4S

d. Med Spec, E-7, MOS 91B4S

3. Special Notes:

a. Slot to be filled by other agency

b. Security Bn Advisors

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Incl 34 Cont'd



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INCLOSURE 7b (Modified B Detachment provided to another Agency) - 6 Officers and 30 Enlisted Men) to letter, Subj: Troop Unit Change Request, Hqs, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, dtd 6 Nov 65, Delete Incl 7 to TUCR dtd 24 Aug 65.

ADDITION: B Detachment Modified (Type VI)

<u>LINE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>
01	Det CO	Major	31542
02	Det XO	Capt	31542
03	Adjutant	Capt	32110
04	S-2	Capt	39301
05	S-3	Capt	32162
06	S-4	Capt	34010
07	SGM	E-9	11G5S
08	Intel Sgt	E-8	11F5S
09	Opns Sgt	E-8	11F5S
10	Cmbt Engr	E-7	12D4S
11	Hvy Wpns Ldr	E-7	11C4S
12	Lt Wpns Ldr	E-7	11B4S
13	Med Spec	E-7	91B4S
14	Rad Opr Supv	E-7	05B4S
15	Sup. Sgt	E-7	76K4S
16	Admin Supv	E-6	71L4S
17	Asst Sup Sgt	E-6	76K4S
18	Pvnt Med NCO	E-6	91S4S
19	Ch Rad Opr (4)	E-5	05B4S
20	Demo Spec	E-5	12B2S
ADD	Opns Sgt (Note 3a)	E-7	11F4S
ADD	Opns Sgt (5) (Note 3b)	E-6	11F4S

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Incl 34 Cont'd



INCLOSURE 7b (Modified B Detachment provided to another Agency)  
Continued

<u>LINE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>
ADD	Finance Clk (2)	E-6	71H4S
ADD	Med Spec	E-6	91B4S
ADD	Clk Typists (2)	E-4	71B2P
ADD	Motor Sgt	E-6	63B4S
ADD	Parachute Rigger	E-5	43E3P

NOTE: Change to basic organization

1. DELETE:

None

2. ADD:

a. Opns Sgt	E-7	11F4S
b. Opns Sgt (5)	E-6	11F4S
c. Finance Clk (2)	E-6	71H4S
d. Med Spec	E-6	91B4S
e. Clk Typists (2)	E-4	71B2P
f. Motor Sgt	E-6	63B4S
g. Parachute Rigger	E-5	43E3P

3. NOTES:

- a. Instructor, recon, land navigation and survival.
- b. Advisors for battalion.

Incl 34 Cont'd



INCLOSURE 11 (TUCR for "B" Detachment) to letter, Subject: Troop Unit Change Request, Hqs, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, dtd 6 November 1965.  
Delete Reorganization Chart and paragraph 1e to Justification Inclosure 11 TU dtd 24 Aug 65. Add New Reorganization Chart and paragraph 1e and 1f. to Justification inclosure 11 TUCR dtd 6 Nov 65.

# REORGANIZATION

TPSN	UNIT	TOE	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH		
			OFF	WO	ENL
	12 SF "B" Det	31-107E	OLD 72	0	204
	(Increase 5 B Det)	SRC 31-107E 00	NEW 114	0	282

	<u>BR</u>	<u>MOS CODE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE NO</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
LESS:	IN	31542	Maj	03	01 7	Det CO
	IN	31542	Capt	03	02 10	Det XO
	NC	11C4S	E-7	03	11 9	Hvy Wpns Ldr
	NC	76K4S	E-6	03	17 10	Asst Sup Sgt
	NC	91S4S	E-6	03	18 11	Pvnt Med NCO
	NC	05B4S	E-5	03	19 2	Ch Rad Opr
		12B2S	E-5	03	20 10	Demo Spec
PLUS:	IN	31542	Lt Col	03	10	Det CO
	IN	31542	Maj	03	1	Det CO
	IN	31542	Maj	03	10	Det XO
	IN	31542	Capt	03	1	Det XO
	IN	39301	Capt	03	4	S-2
	IN	32110	Capt	03	1	S-1
	IN	32162	Capt	03	2	S-3
	IN	34010	Capt	03	5	S-4
	IN	39305	Capt	03	13	CA/PO Officer
	IN	31542	Capt	03	10	RF/PF Adv
	IN	32162	Capt	03	1	Asst S-3
	IN	39305	Lt	03	1	PO Advisor

Incl 34 Cont'd



INCLOSURE 11 (TUCR for "B" Detachments) Continued

	<u>BR</u>	<u>MOS CODE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE NO</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
	NC	11G5S	E-9	03	5	SMaj
PLUS:	NC	11F5S	E-8	03	6	Intel Sgt
	NC	11F5S	E-8	03	6	Opns Sgt
	NC	11F5S	E-8	03	1	Recon Tm Sr Adv
	NC	31Z4S	E-7	03	13	Area Comm Ch
	NC	11F4S	E-7	03	16	Recon Tm Adv
	NC	11F4S	E-7	03	4	Asst Opn Sgt
	NC	11F4S	E-6	03	8	Asst Opn Sgt
	NC	12D4S	E-7	03	5	Combat Engr
	NC	91B4S	E-7	03	7	Med Spec
	NC	11C4S	E-7	03	1	Hvy Wpns Ldr
	NC	11B4S	E-7	03	4	Lt Wpns Ldr
	NC	91B4S	E-6	03	1	Med Spec
	NC	76K4S	E-7	03	1	Supply Sgt
	NC	76K4S	E-6	03	5	Supply Sgt
	NC	71L4S	E-6	03	4	Admin Supvr
	NC	05B4S	E-7	03	1	Radio Opr Supvr
	NC	05B4S	E-6	03	6	Radio Opr Supvr
	NC	96B3S	E-6	03	13	Intel Analyst
	NC	11F4S	E-5	03	2	Asst Opn Sgt
		71B2P	E-4	03	2	Clk Typist
	NC	91S4S	E-6	03	1	Pvt Med NCO
	NC	05B4S	E-6	03	4	Chf Radio Opr
	NC	05B4S	E-5	03	4	Chf Radio Opr

Incl 34 Cont'd



INCLOSURE 11 (TUCR for "B" Detachments) Continued

<u>BR</u>	<u>MOS CODE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE NO</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>
NC	71H4S	E-6	03	2	Finance Clk
NC	63B4S	E-6	03	1	Motor Sgt
NC	43E3P	E-5	03	1	Parachute Rigger

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JUSTIFICATION:

e. B Detachment, (Type V): Performs a special classified mission under the supervision of COMUSMACV. The detailed organizational structure of this detachment is outlined in inclosure 7a.

(1) Psychological Operations Lieutenant. MOS 39305: To function as Senior US Advisor to the camp Psychological Operations training committee to include development and continuing modification of Programs of Instruction to suit the instructional mission of the camp. He will also supervise the Vietnamese instructors in the implementation of the resultant POIs. In addition he will provide the advice and methods to the executive officer on motivation of student personnel. Finally he will conduct necessary Psychological operations planning and analysis in support of the camps local Psy Ops program.

(2) Two Operations Sergeants, E-7, MOS 11F4S are required to function as assistant advisors to the camp security battalion under the supervision of the senior advisor, security battalion. They will function as senior advisor to camp Airborne Operations training committee to include development and continuing modification of POI's to suit the training mission of the camp and supervise Vietnamese instructors in implementation of the POI's. They will also supervise the basic airborne course run under camp auspices and be NCOIC's of all airborne operations conducted, to include personnel drops, resupply drops, and all airborne test activities. Finally they will provide advice in the field of airborne operations to staff sections at the next higher headquarters.

(3) Three Operations Sergeants, E-6, MOS 11F4S are required to assist the operations officer, submit training schedules, POI's to Operations Sergeant for finalization, and insure the printing, distribution and implementation of all training schedules and directives. They will function also as the assistant advisor to the camp Airborne Operations Training Committee. Finally they will function as Senior Advisor of the Land Navigation, Map Reading, Survival and River Crossing Training Committee.

(4) Medical Specialist, E-7, MOS 91B4S is required to assist the NCOIC of the camp medical program and specifically responsible for the following areas: The camp dispensary, medical support for the security force and training activities.

f. "B" Detachment - Type VI: This B detachment is functionally organized to provide a forward operations base and conduct advanced training for reconnaissance teams, reaction force, and security force. In addition they will activate an alternate Command and Control Center on order. Detailed organization is outlined in inclosure 7b.

(1) Detachment Commander, Major, MOS 31542: He will command the forward operations base that includes a security force, reaction force and reconnaissance teams. In addition he will supervise the organization, equipping and training of these forces. He also will activate the alternate Command and Control Center on order.

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15 November 1965

SUBJECT: Troop Unit Change Request (U) Justification Continued

(2) Detachment Executive Officer, Captain, MOS 31542: Exercises staff supervision over the 4 staff sections (S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4) each headed by a Captain. His main function is the responsibility of the security of the forward operating base by organizing, equipping and training the security force.

(3) Adjutant, Captain, MOS 32110: Processes incoming and outgoing correspondence and non-operational message traffic. He executes personnel actions for all detachment personnel along with supervising the administration of the forward operations base.

(4) Intelligence Officer, Captain, MOS 39301: Conducts necessary intelligence planning in support of operations to include the defensive plans of the forward operations base. He conducts necessary counter-intelligence activities, maintaining a current situation map, and processes all information received from the reconnaissance teams. In addition he will act as the custodian of all classified documents and material.

(5) Operations Officer, Captain, MOS 32162: Assists the detachment commander in the planning and execution of operations in coordination with the C detachment. He is responsible for installation, maintenance and operation of internal and external communications links. He plans and conducts advanced training and field exercises for the reconnaissance teams, security forces, and reaction force. Finally he is responsible for the coordination of operations with adjacent commanders as required.

(6) Supply Officer, Captain, MOS 34010: Provides logistical support for friendly forces operating from the forward operational base. He is responsible for the logistical planning and operations of counterpart organizations and coordinates all of his operations with the "C" detachment S-4.

(7) Sergeant Major, E-9, MOS 11G5S: Supervises the enlisted personnel of the B detachment and attached reconnaissance teams. He assists the adjutant in administrative and personnel actions and the control of classified documents and material.

(8) Intelligence Sergeants, E-8, MOS 11F5S: Assists the S-2 in carrying out his responsibilities and plans for, conducts, and evaluates advanced intelligence training of reconnaissance teams.

(9) Operations Sergeant, E-8, MOS 11F5S: Assists the S-3 in carrying out those responsibilities in paragraph 5, above.

(10) Combat Engineer, E-7, MOS 12D4S: Plans, conducts, and evaluates basic and advanced demolition and combat training of the reconnaissance teams, reaction force, and security force. Performs other

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CONFIDENTIAL



AVSF-C

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15 November 1965

SUBJECT: Troop Unit Change Request (U) Justification Continued

demolition and combat engineer tasks in support of forward operations base activities.

(11) Heavy Weapons Leader, E-7, MOS 11C4S: Plans, conducts and evaluates basic and advanced individual and team weapons and tactical training of all the detachments forces. Assists the S-3 in the planning and conduct of defensive actions. The weapons leader also advises the local commanders as directed by the detachment commander.

(12) Light Weapons Leader, E-7, MOS 11B4S: Performs same functions as the heavy weapons leader, paragraph 11, above.

(13) Medical Specialist, E-7, MOS 91B4S: Provides medical support for the US and indigenous troop population.

(14) Radio Operator Supervisor, E-7, MOS 05B4S: Installs, maintains and operates necessary communications links in support of the detachment's forces. He also supervises the communications training of these forces. He is responsible for the maintaining of equipment to support an alternate command and control center.

(15) Supply Sergeant, E-7, MOS 76K4S: Assists the S-4 in carrying out those responsibilities listed in paragraph 7 above, in support of the combined US and indigenous population.

(16) Administrative Supervisor, E-6, MOS 71L4S: Assists the Adjutant and Sergeant Major in carrying out the tasks listed in paragraphs 3 and 7 above.

(17) Assistant Supply Sergeant, E-6, MOS 76K4S: Assists the supply sergeant in carrying out his assigned tasks.

(18) Preventive Medicine NCO, E-6, MOS 91S4S: Carries out preventive medicine, veterinary and sanitation activities in support of a semi-permanent encampment.

(19) Chief Radio Operators (4), E-5, MOS 05B4S: Carry out all communication functions as described in paragraph 14, above.

(20) Demolitions Specialist, E-5, MOS 12B2S: Assists the combat engineer in carrying out those tasks listed in paragraph 10, above.

(21) Finance Clerk, E-6, MOS 71H4S: Assists the adjutant in the performance of his duties in the areas of finance to include the advising of the Senior Advisor on the legality of all fund disbursements.

(22) Medical Specialist, E-6, MOS 91B4S: Provides medical support to the US and indigenous troop population.

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AVSF-C

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15 November 1965

SUBJECT: Troop Unit Change Request (U) Justification Continued

(23) Finance Clerk, E-6, MOS 71H4S: Assists the adjutant in the performance of his finance duties.

(24) Clerk Typists (2), E-4, MOS 71B2P: Assist portions of the training section in carrying out administrative functions.

(25) Motor Sergeant, E-6, MOS 63B4S: Assists the S-4 in the performance of his duties to include the maintenance and the repair up to 5th echelon of all vehicles and handling the administrative matters relating to the camp motor pool.

(26) Parachute Rigger, E-5, MOS 43E3P: Assists the Camp Airborne Operations Committee Senior Advisor in the performance of his duties and functions as the technical advisor to the Senior Advisor and higher headquarters in the planning and conduct of airborne operations.

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Incl 34 Cont'd



CONFIDENTIAL

INCLOSURE 9b (Modified C Detachment provided to another Agency - 6 Officers and 39 Enlisted) to letter, Subject: Troop Unit Change Request, Hqs, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, dtd 6 Nov 65.

Para 02: C Detachment Modified

<u>LINE</u>	<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>
01	Det CO	Lt Col	31542
02	Det XO	Major	31542
03	Adjutant	Capt	32110
04	S-2	Capt	39301
05	S-3	Capt	32162
06	S-4	Capt	34010
07	SGM	E-9	11G5S
08	Intel Sgt	E-8	11F5S
09	Opns Sgt	E-8	11F5S
10	Sup Sgt	E-8	76K5S
11	Asst Sup Sgt	E-7	76K4S
12	Rad Opr Supv	E-7	05B4S
13	Admin Supv	E-6	71L4S
14	Ch Rad Opr (4) (Note 1a)	E-6	05B4S
15	Sr Fld Rad Rpmn	E-5	31E2S
ADD	Asst Opns Sgt (20) (Note 2a) (Note 3a)	E-8	11F5S
ADD	Clk Typist (2) (Note 2b)	E-4	71B2P

PARA 14. TOE 11-247E

01	RTT Tm Chf (Note 2c)	E-5	05C4S
02	RTT Oprs (Note 2d)	E-4	05C2P

NOTE: Change to basic organization

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ENCLOSURE 9b (Modified C Detachment provided to another Agency)  
Continued

1. DELETES:

a. Ch Rad Opr (1)	E-5	05B4S
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2. ADD

a. Opns Sgt (20)	E-6	11F5S
------------------	-----	-------

b. Clk Typist (2)	E-4	71B2P
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c. RPT Tm Chf	E-5	05C4S
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d. RPT Opns	E-4	05C2P
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3. NOTES:

a. MOS's 11C and 11B in grades E-6 and E-7 are acceptable substitutes.



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INCLOSURE 12. (TUCN for "C" Detachment) Continued

<u>BR</u>	<u>MOS CODE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE NO</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>
	71B4P	E-4		02 2	Clk Typist
	0504S	E-4		02 1	RTT Tm Chf
	0502P	E-4		02 4	RTT Oprs

<u>TPSN</u>	<u>UNIT</u>	<u>TOE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH</u>		
			<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>
	4 Admin Dets	31-107E	(NEW) 0	0	0
		SRC 31-107E00	(OLD) 4	0	48

JUSTIFICATION:

C Detachment, that performs a special classified mission under the supervision of CO USMACV. The detailed organizational structure of this detachment is outlined in inclosure 9a.

1. Detachment Commander, Lieutenant Colonel, MOS 31542: Commands and supervises the overall operation of the "C" detachment and carries out all missions that are assigned to the forces under his control.

2. Executive Officer, Major, MOS 31542: Supervises the organic "C" detachment staff in fulfilling the responsibilities of the commander.

3. Adjutant, Captain, MOS 32110: Executes personnel actions related to the administration of the "C" detachment and subordinate "B" detachment personnel. In addition he will act as custodian of all classified documents and material.

4. Intelligence Officer, Captain, MOS 39301: Conducts necessary intelligence planning and supervises all intelligence activities of subordinate forces.

5. Operations Officer, Captain, MOS 32162: Assists the detachment commander in the planning of all operations and supervises the staff related actions of the operations section.

6. Supply Officer, Captain, MOS 34010: Provides logistical support to the "C" detachment and supervises logistical support to the subordinate "B" detachments. He also plans the logistical support for all of the operations.

7. Sergeant Major, E-9, MOS 11058: Supervises the enlisted personnel of the "C" detachment and assists the commander and the adjutant in whatever manner he can.



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ENCLOSURE 12 (TWO for "C" Detachment) Continued

BR	LOS CODE	GRADE	LANA	LINE NO	DESIGNATION
NC	71L4S	E-7		02 4	Admin Supvr
NC	05B4S	E-6		02 8	Ch Radio Opr
NC	73D2P	E-5		02 4	Senior Acct Spec
NC	96B3S	E-5		02 4	Order of BTL Spec
	71B4P	E-4		02 9	Clk Typist
	72B4P	E-5		02 4	Comm Gen Supvr
	76K2P	E-4		02 4	Unit Sup Spec
NC	31Z4S	E-7		02 4	Area Comm Ch
IN	31542	Lt Col		02 1	Det CO
IN	31542	Maj		02 1	Det XO
IN	32110	Capt		02 1	S-1 Officer
IN	39301	Capt		02 1	S-2 Officer
IN	32162	Capt		02 1	S-3 Officer
IN	34010	Capt		02 1	S-4 Officer
NC	11G5S	E-9		02 1	SGM
NC	11F5S	E-8		02 1	Intel Sgt
NC	11F5S	E-8		02 1	Opns Sgt
NC	11F5S	E-8		02 20	Asst Opns Sgt
NC	76K5S	E-8		02 1	Sup Sgt
NC	76K4S	E-7		02 1	Asst Sup Sgt
NC	05B4S	E-7		02 1	Radio Opr Supvr
NC	71L4S	E-6		02 1	Admin Supvr
NC	05B4S	E-6		02 1	Ch Radio Opr
	31E2S	E-5		02 1	Sr Fld Rad Rpmn



ENCLOSURE 12 (TOCR for "C" Detachment) to Letter, Subject: Troop Unit Change Request, Hqs, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF, dtd 6 Nov 65, Delete Reorganization Chart to 7 C. dtd 24 Aug 65, Add Reorganization Chart and Justification (1 "C" Detachment) to TOCR dtd 6 Nov 65.

# REORGANIZATION

<u>TPSN</u>		<u>UNIT</u>	<u>FOR</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED STRENGTH</u>			
				<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>TOTL</u>	
		4 C Dets (Increase 1 C Det)	31-107E SEC 31-107E00	OLD NEW	24 60	0 0	72 137
	<u>BR</u>	<u>NOS CODE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>FO</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>
LESS	NC	05B4S	E-7		02	4	Radio Opr Supvr
	NC	71L4S	E-6		02	4	Admin Supvr
		31E2S	E-5		02	4	Sr Fld Rad Rpmn
PLUS	SIG	30310	Capt		02	4	Signal Officer
	IN	32162	Lt		02	1	Asst S-3
	IN	32160	Lt		02	4	Admin Officer
	IN	34010	Lt		02	1	S-4 Officer
	IN	38104	Capt		02	4	CA Officer
	IN	38104	Lt		02	4	Asst CA Officer
	AIS	3118	Lt		02	4	Order of BTL Officer
	IN	39305	Capt		02	4	Psy War Officer
	IN	39305	Lt		02	4	Asst Psy War Off
	NC	11F4S	E-7		02	5	Asst Opn Sgt
	NC	51M4S	E-7		02	4	Const Foreman
	NC	94B4P	E-6		02	4	Mess Sgt
	NC	76K4S	E-6		02	4	Asst Sup Sgt
	NC	11F2S	E-5		02	4	Opns Spec
	NC	96B3S	E-6		02	4	Intel Analyst

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**INCLOSURE 12 (TUOR for "C" Detachment) Justification Continued**

8. Intelligence Sergeant, E-8 MOS 11F4S: Assists the S-2 in carrying out the responsibilities listed in paragraph 4 above.

9. Operations Sergeant, E-8, MOS 11F4S: Assists the S-2 in carrying out those responsibilities listed in paragraph 5 above.

10. Operations Sergeant, (20), E-8 MOS 11F4S: Act as advisor and assistant team leader to the reconnaissance teams.

11. Supply Sergeant, E-8, MOS 76K5S: Assists the S-4 in carrying out those duties listed in paragraph 6 above. In addition he receives, maintains, and issues supplies and equipment to subordinate detachments.

12. Assistant Supply Sergeant, E-7, MOS 76K4S: Assists the Supply Sergeant in carrying out those duties and functions listed in paragraph 11, above.

13. Radio Operator Supervisor, E-7, MOS 05B4S: Installs, maintains, and operates the communications center. He also supervises and insures the operational readiness of communications personnel, and equipment. He also supervises the repair of communication equipment and maintains necessary communications lines with adjacent friendly elements.

14. Administrative supervisor, E-6, MOS 71L4S: Performs personnel administration and other tasks as directed by the adjutant and sergeant major.

15. Chief Radio Operator (4), E-6, MOS 05B4S: Assist the communication chief in carrying out those tasks listed in paragraph 13, above.

16. Senior Field Radio Repairman, E-5, MOS 31E2S; Assists the communications chief in carrying out those tasks listed in paragraph 13, above.

17. Clerk Typist, (2), E-4, MOS 71B2P: Performs the typing workload generated by the detachment commander and his staff in the administration of the detachment and assigned personnel and the planning, conduct and reporting of operations.

18. RTT team chief, E-5, MOS 05C4S: Installs, maintains and operates command and administrative secure teletype link between command elements.

19. RTT Operators (4), E-4, MOS 05C2P: Assist the RTT team chief in carrying out those functions listed in paragraph 18, above.

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INCLOSURE 17 (Recapitulation) to letter Subject: Troop Unit Change Request,  
HQ, 5th SF Gp (Abn), 1st SF, dtd 6 Nov 1965.

1. Operational "A", "B" and "C" Detachments:

a. TO Authorizations:

48 "A" x 12 = 576	48 "A" x 2 = 96
12 "B" x 23 = 276	12 "B" x 6 = 72
4 "C" x 24 = 96	4 "C" x 6 = 24
4 Adm x 7 = 28	4 Adm x 1 = 4

TOTAL (Incl OFF) 976      TOTAL OFFICERS 196

b. Proposed Authorizations:

38 "A" x 12 = 456	38 "A" x 2 = 76
34 "A" x 14 = 476	34 "A" x 3 = 102
10 "B" x 22 = 220	10 "B" x 8 = 80
3 "B" x 18 = 54	3 "B" x 4 = 12
Incl 5 = 39	Incl 5 = 6
Incl 6 = 21	Incl 6 = 4
Incl 7a = 26	Incl 7a = 6
Incl 7b = 36	Incl 7b = 7
3 "C" x 36 = 108	3 "C" x 13 = 39
Incl 9a = 44	Incl 9a = 15
Incl 9b = 45	Incl 9b = 6

TOTAL (Incl OFF) 1525      TOTAL OFFICERS 352

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# INCLOSURE 17 (Recapitulation) Continued

## 2. Headquarters, Signal and Aviation Companies

a. TO AUTHORIZATION :	OFF	WO	ENL
Hq & Hq Company	44	4	171
Signal Company	6	2	175
Aviation Company	22	25	148
b. PROPOSED AUTHORIZATION:	OFF	WO	ENL
Hq & Hq Company	60	4	203
Signal Company	4	3	1 1
Aviation Company	0	0	0

## 3. Total Strength Recapitulations:

	TOE	TUCR 24 AUG 65	AUGMENTED TUCR 6 Nov 65
Total Operational "A", "B" & "C" DETS:	976	1438	1525
Total Headquarters Company	219	266	267
Total Signal Company	183	198	198
Total Aviation Company	195	0	0
Total Strength 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF	1573	1902	1990

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Enclosure 16 (Encapsulation of Grade 2 & 3 strength) to be test, 3000 psi  
 Concrete Request, 20, 5th St Sp (Ave), 1st St, 4th St, 5th St.

GRADE		TIE		24 APR 65		24 APR 65		24 APR 65		24 APR 65	
TIE		TIE		TIE		TIE		TIE		TIE	
1	6	1	17	1	3	1	10	1	10	1	10
14	27	32	32	11	11	21	21	21	21	21	21
167	167	205	205	1	1	146	146	146	146	146	146
67	67	145	145								
268	268	400	400	16	16	416	416	416	416	416	416
31	31	7	7			7	7	7	7	7	7
17	17	24	24	2	2	25	25	25	25	25	25
31	31	129	129	25	25	154	154	154	154	154	154
349	349	517	517	7	7	524	524	524	524	524	524
181	181	264	264	24	24	203	203	203	203	203	203
307	307	355	355	7	7	342	342	342	342	342	342
256	256	218	218	7	7	225	225	225	225	225	225
70	70	8	8			8	8	8	8	8	8
1	1	0	0			0	0	0	0	0	0
1274	1274	1495	1495	72	72	1567	1567	1567	1567	1567	1567
1573	1573	1:02	1:02	86	86	1590	1590	1590	1590	1590	1590



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CHANGE01 TO INCLOSURE 13 (TUCR for Hq and Hq Co) to letter, Subject:  
Troop Unit Change Request, Hqs, 5th SFG (Abn) 1st SF, dtd 6 Nov 65

REORGANIZATION

TPSN	UNIT	TO&E	AUTHORIZED STRENGTH		
			OFF	WO	ENL
	Hq & Hq Co	31-106E, 63 (NEW) SRC 31-106E 3001(ODD)	60	4	203

<u>BR</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>CODE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>PARA</u>	<u>LINE</u>	<u>NO</u>	<u>DESIGNATION</u>
CHANGE:	IN	2518	MAJOR	05		1	Gp Avn Off
ADD:	IN	2518	CAPT	05		1	Asst Gp Avn Off

DELETE: Paragraph 31 Justification

ADD: Paragraph 31 And 31a

31. Group Aviation Officer, Major, MOS 2518: Plans and coordinates the employment of all aircraft in support of the Group and advises the commander and staff on all matters pertaining to Army Aviation and supporting Air Force aircraft.

31a. Assistant Group Aviation Officer, Captain, MOS 2518: Assists the Group Aviation Officer in the employment of all aircraft in support of the Group and advises the commander and staff on all matters pertaining to Army aviation and supporting Air Force Aircraft.

Incl 34 Cont'd

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